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 “I have a deep and abiding admiration for the legal profession 
and the tremendous role it has played in the service of the cause with 
which I have been identified. The road to freedom is now a highway 
because lawyers throughout the land, yesterday and today, have 
helped clear the obstructions, have helped eliminate roadblocks, by 
their selfless, courageous espousal of difficult and unpopular 
causes.”—Martin Luther King, Jr.1 
INTRODUCTION 
When Martin Luther King, Jr. started college, he considered becoming a 
lawyer.2 When he abandoned that idea in favor of the ministry, he could not have 
imagined the central role that lawyers would play in his life. 
A decade into his career, Dr. King observed: “It is common knowledge that I 
have had a little something to do with lawyers since the 1955 Montgomery bus 
boycott.”3 He then described himself as a “notorious litigant” and a “frequenter of 
jails.”4 Notwithstanding his core philosophical, moral, and strategic commitment 
to nonviolent direct action, Dr. King had an extraordinary amount of interaction 
with lawyers and with the legal system, though often not by choice. 
Dr. King’s activism began and ended with lawyers and the courts. From the 
1955 arrest and prosecution of Rosa Parks in Montgomery that jump-started his 
career,5 to the 1968 court victory in the Memphis Sanitation Workers Strike on the 
day of his death,6 lawyers served as a nearly constant companion—a fact of his 
activist life. The lawyers’ roles depended on the activists’ and their opponents’ 
strategies and tactics, as well as on the lawyers’ own creativity and innovation. 
                                                
1 Martin Luther King, Jr., Foreword to WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER, DEEP IN MY HEART, at xxi (1966). 
2 DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN 
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 37 (1st Perennial Classics ed. 2004). The intellectual challenge, 
the chance to serve, and the opportunity to get out from under his father’s large shadow drew Dr. King 
to the law. See id. When asked what he would have done if he had not entered the ministry, Dr. King 
said, “I started out as a pre-law student. I was interested in going into law . . . . At one time I thought 
about medicine . . . but then after entering college I felt that I wanted to go into law.” Interview by 
Eleanor Fischer with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in Atlanta, Ga. (Nov. 22, 1961), http://www.wnyc.org
/story/261384-previously-unreleased-interviews-reverend-dr-martin-luther-king-jr/.  
3 King, supra note 1, at xxi. 
4 See id. 
5 See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i. 
6 See discussion infra Section III.B.3.v. 
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The lawyers remained largely behind the scenes. Nonetheless, they were 
almost always present and contributed in many important ways. Here, in this 
Article, the lawyers take center stage. This Article examines Dr. King’s and his 
colleagues’ processes, criteria, and decisions in enlisting and deploying lawyers 
during the Civil Rights Movement.7  
The literature by and about Dr. King pays little attention to legal proceedings. 
In light of the gap between the literature and Dr. King’s recognition of lawyers’ 
importance to the Civil Rights Movement, 8  the lawyers warrant an in-depth 
examination.  
More than seventy lawyers, and several legal organizations, represented Dr. 
King, his colleagues, and the thousands of protesters involved in the movements 
with which he was associated.9  
The lawyers’ roles fell into two broad categories. First, they provided support 
to enable the civil rights activists to carry out their core strategy of nonviolent direct 
action—referred to within the Article as the “support” role. Dr. King’s nonviolent 
direct action encompassed both direct action, such as boycotts, marches, and 
demonstrations, and a philosophy of nonviolence, a “willingness to accept suffering 
without retaliation, to accept blows from the opponent without striking back.”10 
Since public officials often used the law and the courts to prevent protest activities 
and resist change, much of the lawyers’ support work was reactive. It included 
                                                
7 For ease of expression, this Article will refer to Dr. King’s choices even when others were involved 
in the decision-making process. The Article will also try to clarify whether it was “he” or “they,” when 
relevant. This approach stems from Dr. King’s caveat in Stride Toward Freedom, his book about the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott, where he writes that he sometimes means “we” when he says “I.” MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY, at ix (1st Perennial Library 
ed. 1964). Others involved include those within his organizations—the Montgomery Improvement 
Association (MIA) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)—and activists with 
whom they worked. At the same time, Dr. King had the final say much of the time, even when his 
colleagues or lawyers disagreed with him. See, e.g., LERONE BENNETT, JR., WHAT MANNER OF MAN: A 
BIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 186 (8th rev. ed. 1992) (“Although King’s decision-making 
methods have proved apt to his purposes, they have not contributed to the peace of mind of associates 
who live in a somewhat more distant relation to divinity.”); FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE 65 
(rev. ed. 2013) (“There were times when Dr. King said, ‘Fred, I understand what you say the law is, but 
our conscience says that the law is unjust and we cannot obey it. However, there is a higher law. So, if 
we are arrested we will be calling on you to defend us.’ ”). 
8 John Lewis, fellow civil rights activist and later long-term congressman from Atlanta, held a 
similar view about the importance of lawyers to the Civil Rights Movement. See, e.g., JOHN LEWIS 
WITH MICHAEL D'ORSO, WALKING WITH THE WIND: A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT 256 (Harcourt Brace 
& Co. 1999) (1998) (“[W]e knew we would have many arrests and trials ahead of us, and we would 
need all the legal representation we could get.”); id. at 494–95 (“Without the years of struggle of the 
civil rights movement, without people like Dr. King, without the unsung heroes of the movement, 
without the people who came before them and the people who came after, we would not be where we 
are today.”). 
9 This figure is not limited to the lawyers who literally represented Dr. King. Rather, it encompasses 
those who worked on matters related to movements, events, and litigation in which Dr. King, his 
colleagues, or fellow protesters were involved. Thus, it is a quite inclusive definition of the relevant 
lawyers. For a complete list of the lawyers, including their characteristics, affiliations, and participation, 
see infra Appendix. 
At the same time, more than seventy is likely a conservative estimate. It comes from accounts and 
court documents. Other lawyers volunteered for less visible roles, such as defending the thousands of 
protesters arrested in the various campaigns, which makes identifying them difficult. 
10 KING, supra note 7, at 85. 
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defending against criminal prosecutions and civil suits, and challenging injunctions 
designed to prevent marches and demonstrations.11 But some support work was 
proactive, such as seeking permissions or injunctions that would allow planned 
direct action to proceed legally.12 
The second major role of the lawyers was to rely on the strategy of 
constitutional challenges to segregation laws and policies. That strategy was not 
new. For example, in the first half of the twentieth century, a small cadre of lawyers, 
led by Charles Houston and his protégé Thurgood Marshall, used the courts to 
attack segregation laws.13 They proceeded independently of any broader social 
movement. 14  The paradigm example is the school desegregation litigation 
campaign that culminated in 1954 with Brown v. Board of Education.15  
Starting with the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the lawyers played both roles.16 
Movement leaders turned to litigation—referred to here as “complementary 
desegregation litigation”—in conjunction with direct action, seeking synergy 
between the two strategies.17 In these movements, however, the choice of whether 
to pursue desegregation through the courts rested with Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
other protest leaders, rather than with the lawyers.18 
Timing is also important in this analysis. In the early years, from 1955 to 1962, 
Dr. King’s overall strategy included both nonviolent direct action and 
complementary desegregation litigation.19 It was partly a period of “persuasive 
nonviolence,” based on the assumption that protests could enlighten and change 
minds and policies and practices.20  
The 1963 Birmingham Movement marked a strategic turning point. Starting 
with that movement, Dr. King and his organization, the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC),21 turned to more aggressive forms of nonviolent 
direct action—moving entirely from persuasion to coercion.22 In his “Letter from a 
Birmingham Jail,” Dr. King wrote that the goal was “to create such a crisis and 
                                                
11 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
12 See discussion infra Section II.A.2.i. 
13 See CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 62–68, 148 
(1998); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME 
COURT, 1936–61, at 6, 10–12, 70–72 (1996). See generally MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 162–67, 239–42 (2004) 
(discussing litigation strategy); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 185–98 (1st Vintage Books ed. 
2004) (discussing Marshall’s early work with NAACP’s legal efforts).  
14 See sources cited supra note 13.  
15 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
16 See discussion infra Sections II.A.1.i.a, II.A.2.i, II.B.1. 
17 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
18 See infra notes 574–578, 616 and accompanying text.  
19 See discussion infra Section II.B.  
20 See generally KING, supra note 7, at 83–88 (discussing nonviolence philosophy). 
21 SCLC was a faith-based organization formed by a group of southern Black ministers and other 
supporters to challenge segregation and racial discrimination throughout the South. See ADAM 
FAIRCLOUGH, TO REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 
AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 13 (1987). 
22 See DAVID J. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1965, at 221 (1978); MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 156–57. SCLC leaders gave the Birmingham 
movement the name “Project C,” for “confrontation,” to symbolize the new level of aggressiveness. See 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 47 (1964). 
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foster such a tension that a community which has consistently refused to negotiate 
is forced to confront the issue.”23 “Nonviolent direct action,” Dr. King explained, 
“seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored.”24  
This shift meant an increase in the number, size, and length of marches and 
demonstrations. On one occasion, it even meant violating a federal court’s 
injunction.25 Every movement and event from 1963 to 1968 reflected some aspect 
of the escalation. Ratcheting up the level of direct action elicited mass arrests, as 
well as violence by local police (Birmingham), state troopers (Selma), and private 
citizens (Chicago).26  
A second major strategic change also marked the later years. Activists 
eliminated complementary desegregation litigation from their arsenal.27 With the 
evolution of the movement’s strategies, the lawyers’ responsibilities and challenges 
similarly changed.28 While some tasks continued throughout Dr. King’s career, 
new ones also emerged, and others disappeared. Just as the activists had no 
instruction manual to follow, the lawyers had to adjust and come up with creative 
approaches to support the activists in carrying out their continually evolving direct 
action tactics.29 
Noting the changing roles of lawyers in the Civil Rights Movement generally, 
activist lawyer Arthur Kinoy captured the shift from the early years to the later 
years of Dr. King’s career: 
In a fundamental way, the traditional role of the lawyer in the civil 
rights movement was changing in order to meet the new need. It was 
shifting away from the older, relatively independent role of seeking 
to attain the goals of the movement through developing key test 
cases, to a role of a very different character, that of defending the 
ability of the people themselves to attain the goals of their movement 
through their own strength and power.30 
                                                
23 KING, supra note 22, at 81.  
24 Id. See generally infra note 659 (discussing Dr. King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”).  
25 See discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. 
26 See infra Sections III.B.1.i, III.B.3.iii, III.B.3.iv. 
27 See, e.g., J. MILLS THORNTON III, DIVIDING LINES: MUNICIPAL POLITICS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS IN MONTGOMERY, BIRMINGHAM, AND SELMA 282 (2002) (“[Dr. King] was eager to find a 
venue in which he could prove that direct action could produce real results”); id. at 299 (“King found 
himself opposed . . . by black activists previously associated with the NAACP, who emphasized legal 
attacks on segregation’s statutory and constitutional foundations.”). At the same time, the activists 
shifted from using the federal courts proactively to aggressively pursuing federal legislation. See id. at 
371; see also CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S 
91–92 (1981). 
28 See infra Section III.B. 
29 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
30 ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE’S LAWYER 158 (1983). Kinoy 
emphasized that the shift in the movement “would have sweeping implications for the functioning of 
people’s lawyers but which at the time very few of us outside the movement understood.” Id. at 156; 
accord KLARMAN, supra note 13, at 467 (explaining that litigation competed with direct action for 
scarce resources, and that civil rights leaders eventually came to realize its limited capacity for 
producing social change). Professor Klarman observed: 
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MOVEMENT AND EVENT DESCRIPTIONS 
This Article focuses on the movements and events in Dr. King’s career where 
lawyers played a significant role. The following is a brief description of each of 
them to provide context for discussions later in the Article.31 
The Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955)  
When Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a segregated Montgomery, 
Alabama bus on December 1, 1955, it triggered a yearlong boycott of the city’s 
buses by the Black community. 32  Local leaders formed the Montgomery 
Improvement Association (MIA) to coordinate the movement, and they elected 
Martin Luther King, Jr. president.33  Due to a synergy of the bus boycott and 
complementary desegregation litigation by the MIA, Montgomery eventually 
desegregated the bus system.34 When Blacks returned to the buses in December 
1956, the bus company ceased the long-standing enforced segregation and 
humiliating treatment that had brought about the movement.35 
In the aftermath of the bus boycott, the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference was formed to continue fighting segregation in the South. 36  The 
organizers selected Martin Luther King, Jr. as president, an office he occupied until 
his death in 1968.37  
                                                
Though litigation had performed valuable service in mobilizing racial protest and 
securing Court victories, . . . it could not fulfill all of the functions of direct action. Sit-
ins, Freedom Rides, and street demonstrations fostered black agency much better than did 
litigation, which encouraged blacks to place faith in elite black lawyers and white judges 
rather than in themselves. . . . In addition, direct-action protest more reliably created 
conflict and incited opponents’ violence, which ultimately proved critical to transforming 
national opinion on race. 
Id. at 467. 
31 The Article does not purport to cover every campaign or movement in which Dr. King 
participated, but only those where attorneys played an important role. 
32 Useful overviews of the Montgomery Bus Boycott include TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE 
WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63, at 131–207 (1988); DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM: THE 
MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT (Stewart Burns ed., 1997); FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 15–18, 23–35, 
53–54 (1987); GARROW, supra note 2, at 11–32, 57–89; KING, supra note 7; THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 50–99 (Clayborne Carson ed., 1998) [hereinafter MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY]; 
THORNTON, supra note 27, at 20–140. 
“Black” is capitalized wherever it refers to Black people, to indicate that Blacks, or African 
Americans, are a specific cultural group with its own history, traditions, experience, and identity—not 
just people of a particular color. Using the uppercase letter signifies recognition of the culture, as it does 
with Latinos, Asian Americans, or Native Americans. See generally MARTHA BIONDI, TO STAND AND 
FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR NEW YORK CITY (2003); Kimberlé Williams 
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988). 
33 KING, supra note 7, at 41–42; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 16–17. 
34 Christopher Coleman, Laurence D. Nee & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Social Movements and Social-
Change Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 663, 684 (2005). 
35 See KING, supra note 7, at 150–51, 157; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 697–98. 
36 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 12–13, 23, 29.  
37 See id. at 37. 
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Dr. King’s Alabama Perjury Trial (1960) 
In 1960, the State of Alabama tried Dr. King for perjury, alleging that he 
falsified his 1956 and 1958 state income tax returns.38 The prosecutors accused Dr. 
King of under-reporting his income in those years.39 An all-white jury acquitted 
Martin Luther King, Jr. of the charges, enabling him to avoid a potentially lengthy 
prison sentence.40 
Dr. King’s Incarceration in Georgia (1960) 
In early 1960, Dr. King moved back to Atlanta from Montgomery.41 A police 
officer ticketed him for not having obtained a Georgia driver’s license within ninety 
days, as was required of new residents under Georgia law.42 He received a fine and 
a suspended sentence, with a year’s probation. 43  The local judge revoked his 
probation when he was arrested during a demonstration in an Atlanta department 
store.44  He was sent to a maximum-security prison.45  His lawyers secured his 
release and persuaded the appellate court that the original sentence was beyond the 
trial judge’s authority.46 
The Albany (Georgia) Movement (1961–1962) 
In 1961, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and local 
activists initiated the Albany Movement to challenge all forms of segregation and 
discrimination in the city.47 Local leaders invited Dr. King and SCLC to the city to 
help revitalize the stalled movement. 48  The movement failed on many levels, 
providing important lessons for later campaigns.49 
                                                
38 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 276–311; GARROW, supra note 2, at 129–37; Edgar Dyer, A 
“Triumph of Justice” in Alabama: The 1960 Perjury Trial of Martin Luther King, Jr., 88 J. AFR. AM. 
HIST. 245, 248 (2003). 
39 See Dyer, supra note 38, at 254. 
40 See id. at 258.  
41 MAURICE C. DANIELS, SAVING THE SOUL OF GEORGIA: DONALD L. HOLLOWELL AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 114 (2013). 
42 GARROW, supra note 2, at 135–36.  
43 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 114–15; GARROW, supra note 2, at 143.  
44 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 114–15. 
45 Id. at 116. 
46 See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.c. 
47 BRANCH, supra note 32, at 529; CARSON, supra note 27, at 58. See generally BRANCH, supra note 
32, at 529–58, 602–39; GARROW, supra note 2, at 173–230; DAVID L. LEWIS, KING: A BIOGRAPHY 143–
45 (Univ. of Ill. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1970). 
48 GARROW, supra note 2, at 180–81. This was the first of a number of occasions in which local 
leaders requested SCLC’s involvement to bolster a locally initiated movement. See, e.g., KING, supra 
note 22, at 65 (discussing Fred Shuttlesworth’s request for SCLC to “come to Birmingham” to help the 
Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights); see also discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i–ii, 
III.B.2, III.B.3.i–v.  
49 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 217–19, 225–29, 235, 290, 326, 456; KING, supra note 22, at 34–35.  
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The Birmingham Movement (1963)  
In April 1963, SCLC joined a local Birmingham movement in a mass direct 
action campaign largely targeting the local business community.50 Local police 
used fire hoses and police dogs to disrupt the marches, bringing national attention 
to the movement and building momentum for the passage of federal civil rights 
legislation.51 Dr. King violated an injunction, was jailed for contempt, and wrote 
his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.”52  
The March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (1963) 
On August 28, 1963, more than 200,000 people assembled in a mass protest 
at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.53 The purpose of the event was to 
lobby Congress for the passage of civil rights legislation and the creation of jobs 
programs for the unemployed.54 The signature moment was Dr. King’s “I Have a 
Dream” speech.55 
St. Augustine, Florida (1964) 
In May 1964, Dr. King and SCLC joined the St. Augustine movement with 
hopes of ending the city’s segregation and winning support for the stalled Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.56 They engaged in a series of night marches in the town square 
where slaves were once bought and sold.57 The marches were plagued with violence 
from Ku Klux Klan members, and while the police were not the source of the 
violence, they did not provide sufficient protection from the Klansmen.58 
                                                
50 Biographical and scholarly accounts of the Birmingham Movement include THORNTON, supra note 
27, at 141–379; BRANCH, supra note 32, at 688–810; TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN 
THE KING YEARS 1963–65, at 76–89 (1998); GLENN T. ESKEW, BUT FOR BIRMINGHAM: THE LOCAL AND 
NATIONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE (1997); GARROW, supra note 2, at 220–74; 
KING, supra note 22, at 43–57; DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA: THE 
CLIMACTIC BATTLE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS EVOLUTION (1st Touchstone ed. 2002); MLK 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 170–217. 
51 See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL BATTLES OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 360 (Twelve Tables Press, Anniversary ed. 2004) (1994); see also sources cited supra note 
50. 
52 Birmingham Campaign (1963), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu
/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_birmingham_campaign/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2015). 
53 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia
.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_march_on_washington_for_jobs_and_freedom/ (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2015); see also CLARENCE B. JONES & STUART CONNELLY, BEHIND THE DREAM: THE 
MAKING OF THE SPEECH THAT TRANSFORMED A NATION 95–96 (2011). See generally BRANCH, supra 
note 32, at 833–87; GARROW, supra note 2, at 265–88. 
54 See CARSON, supra note 27, at 91–95; GARROW, supra note 2, at 266–67. 
55 See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at xiii-xiv. For an illuminating discussion of events 
surrounding the March on Washington and Dr. King’s “I Have a Dream” speech, see GARY YOUNGE, 
THE SPEECH: THE STORY BEHIND DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.’S DREAM (2013). 
56 See generally FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 180–91; GARROW, supra note 2, at 316–44. 
57 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 182–83; GARROW, supra note 2, at 325–26; St. Augustine 
Movement, KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia
/encyclopedia/enc_st_augustine_movement/index.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
58 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 183–86; see also Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law at 
12–13, Young v. Davis, No. 64-133-Civ-J (M.D. Fla. June 9, 1964) [hereinafter Young Findings & 
Conclusions], http://civilrights.flagler.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16000coll4/id/1174/rec/9. 
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The Selma, Alabama Voting Rights Movement (1965) 
In early 1965, SCLC joined voting rights activists protesting the exclusion of 
Blacks from the electoral process in Alabama and seeking massive registration of 
Black voters.59 State troopers attacked marchers with clubs and tear gas as they left 
Selma on their way to the state capitol in Montgomery, fifty miles away. 60 
Ultimately, a five-day march to Montgomery culminated in a demonstration on the 
steps of the state capitol building.61 
The Chicago Freedom Movement (1965–1966) 
Later in 1965, Martin Luther King, Jr. and SCLC began planning their first 
foray into a northern city, and in January 1966 joined forces with a local coalition 
to form the Chicago Freedom Movement.62 The movement focused primarily on 
housing practices and problems, with two strands: (1) open housing marches 
through all-white neighborhoods to address the city’s extreme segregation; and 
(2) a movement to end the slums by challenging landlords who owned extremely 
substandard housing in low-income Black neighborhoods. 63  The movement 
resulted in a quite general “Summit Agreement” to address housing discrimination 
in the city.64 
The Memphis Sanitation Workers Strike (1968) 
In March 1968, Dr. King accepted an invitation to lead a march in support of 
Memphis’s sanitation workers’ strike for better wages and working conditions.65 
                                                
59 Selma to Montgomery March (1965), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford
.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_selma_to_montgomery_march/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 
2015). See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1965–68, at 
137–85 (2006); GARROW, supra note 22, at 39–48 (1978); THORNTON, supra note 27, at 380–499. 
60 See GARROW, supra note 22, at 73–77, 96; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 488; Selma to 
Montgomery March (1965), supra note 59. 
61 See GARROW, supra note 22, at 115–17; Selma to Montgomery March (1965), supra note 59. 
62 See Chicago Campaign (1966), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu
/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_chicago_campaign/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). See generally ALAN 
B. ANDERSON & GEORGE W. PICKERING, CONFRONTING THE COLOR LINE: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN CHICAGO 153, 160–64, 172–78, 188–94 (1986); BRANCH, supra note 59, at 
501–22; JAMES R. RALPH, JR., NORTHERN PROTEST: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., CHICAGO, AND THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1, 7, 28–91 (1993); David J. Garrow, Preface to CHICAGO 1966: OPEN 
HOUSING MARCHES, SUMMIT NEGOTIATIONS, AND OPERATION BREADBASKET, at ix–x (David J. Garrow 
ed., 1989); Alvin Pitcher, The Chicago Freedom Movement: What Is It? (Nov. 1966), in CHICAGO 
1966, supra, at 155, 155–57; Program of the Chicago Freedom Movement (July 1966), in CHICAGO 
1966, supra, at 97, 100. 
63 See RALPH, supra note 62, at 58–65, 92–130. 
64 See generally THOMAS G. AYERS, SUBCOMM. TO THE CONF. ON FAIR HOUS. CONVENED BY THE CHI. 
CONF. ON RELIGION & RACE, THE ‘SUMMIT AGREEMENT’ (Aug. 26, 1966), reprinted in CHICAGO 1966, 
supra note 62, at 147, 147–54. 
65 See JOAN TURNER BEIFUSS, AT THE RIVER I STAND: MEMPHIS, THE 1968 STRIKE, AND MARTIN 
LUTHER KING 156, 190–91 (Carlson Publ’g 1989) (1985); Memphis Sanitation Workers Strike (1968), 
KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc
_memphis_sanitation_workers_strike_1968/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2015) [hereinafter 
Memphis Strike]. See generally BRANCH, supra note 59, at 683–766; GARROW, supra note 2, at 604–24; 
MICHAEL K. HONEY, GOING DOWN JERICHO ROAD: THE MEMPHIS STRIKE, MARTIN LUTHER KING’S 
LAST CAMPAIGN (2007). 
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An assassin took Dr. King’s life on April 4, 1968, just four days before he was 
planning to lead another march in downtown Memphis.66 
The Poor People’s Campaign for Jobs and Income (1968) 
At the time of Dr. King’s death, he was in the midst of planning a 
demonstration in Washington, D.C. to press Congress to address the problem of 
poverty.67  The campaign involved constructing a tent city on the Washington 
Mall.68 After Dr. King’s death, poor people came from all over the country to set 
up “Resurrection City” and seek legislative relief.69 
 
* * * 
 
This Article highlights how Dr. King and other leaders selected and deployed 
lawyers. It also examines how those lawyers’ roles changed as strategies shifted 
between the early years and the later years. 
Part I, “Choosing the Lawyers,” introduces the many lawyers who represented 
Dr. King, his colleagues, and fellow protesters. Section A examines the processes 
of selecting the lawyers and legal organizations. Dr. King made some of those 
choices himself, while delegating others to decision-makers he trusted.70  Both 
enlisted specific lawyers on a largely ad hoc basis in the early years, but then began 
to rely increasingly on a set group of lawyers by the early 1960s.71  
Section B examines the factors that did and did not seem to matter in enlisting 
individual lawyers and legal organizations. These factors include: (1) location (both 
local and northern lawyers participated in significant numbers); (2) identity factors 
(race, gender, religion, and age); (3) strategic commitments (consistent or not with 
the movements); (4) the types of organizations involved; and (5) the lawyers who 
became members of Dr. King’s inner circle.  
After discussing the lawyers’ selection, the rest of the Article examines their 
roles in the various movements and events. As suggested earlier, both continuity 
and important changes in the lawyers’ tasks occurred during Dr. King’s career.  
In Part II, “Deploying the Lawyers: The Early Years (1955–1962),” Section 
A examines the lawyers’ support efforts, including (1) defense work, both criminal 
and civil; (2) efforts to secure permissions and to challenge injunctions; and 
(3) initiatives to secure funding to facilitate chosen strategies. Section B analyzes 
the use of complementary desegregation litigation. It explains the decisions to 
initiate desegregation litigation designed to complement and supplement the 
                                                
66 See BEIFUSS, supra note 65, at 283–85, 292–93, 299; Memphis Strike, supra note 65. 
67 See Poor People’s Campaign, KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu
/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_poor_peoples_campaign/index.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2015). See 
generally BRANCH, supra note 59, at 670–91, 754–65; GARROW, supra note 2, at 575–624; GERALD D. 
MCKNIGHT, THE LAST CRUSADE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE FBI, AND THE POOR PEOPLE’S 
CAMPAIGN (1998); MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 346–55. 
68 See BEIFUSS, supra note 65, at 15; Poor People’s Campaign, supra note 67. 
69 See John Kelly, Before Occupy D.C., There Was Resurrection City, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2011, at 
C3; Poor People’s Campaign, supra note 67. 
70 See discussion infra Section I.A. 
71 See discussion infra Section I.B.4.i. 
Vol. 10:3]  Leonard S. Rubinowitz 
  505 
nonviolent direct action, and provides context by recounting the history of 
desegregation litigation campaigns and Dr. King’s views about such litigation. The 
Section examines the federal desegregation lawsuits in Montgomery, Alabama and 
Albany, Georgia, including the reasons Dr. King and his colleagues pursued a 
multi-pronged strategy in each instance. 
Part III, “Deploying the Lawyers: The Later Years (1963–1968),” explores 
the changes, as well as the continuity, in the lawyers’ roles as the movements 
escalated their nonviolent direct action and abandoned complementary 
desegregation litigation. Section A examines the abandonment of the use of 
complementary desegregation litigation following the Albany, Georgia campaign 
and why the leaders turned, instead, to more aggressive nonviolent direct action 
strategies and tactics. Section B discusses lawyers’ efforts to support activists who 
were using more coercive and expansive nonviolent direct action strategies. A 
conclusion follows.  
I. CHOOSING THE LAWYERS 
As his self-description suggests, Martin Luther King, Jr. turned to lawyers on 
a regular basis.72 As previously discussed, more than seventy lawyers represented 
Dr. King, his colleagues, his organizations, and the thousands of protesters in the 
campaigns and events in which he was involved.73 They drew from three sources: 
(1) the small number of civil rights lawyers practicing at mid-century; (2) other 
established lawyers who began to take up the civil rights cause; and (3) newcomers 
to the profession who shared the commitment.74 Their numbers grew with the 
emergence of the modern Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s.75  
Martin Luther King, Jr. sometimes selected the lawyers himself, though he 
often delegated that task.76 Some of the lawyers provided representation only once, 
while others played recurring roles.77 Dr. King also developed long-term, close 
professional and personal relationships with several lawyers who became part of 
his inner circle.78  
Dr. King and his organizations relied almost entirely on outside counsel, rather 
than assembling their own legal staff for the many occasions when they needed 
                                                
72 See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
74 See discussion infra Section I.B.2.iv. Constance Baker Motley, a leading civil rights lawyer, 
recalls that no one was talking about civil rights law in the late 1940s, when she was in law school. See 
MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 59. Jack Greenberg, another leading civil rights lawyer, said there were very 
few civil rights lawyers at mid-century. He identified half a dozen organizations, none of which had 
more than three lawyers on staff. Beyond that, there were some individual lawyers who handled civil 
rights cases as part of their private practice. Jewish Lawyers in the Civil Rights Movement, CTR. FOR 
JEWISH HIST. (Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.cjh.org/videoplayer.php?vfile=091907JEWSANDJUSTICE
.flv. 
75 See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 153–55; Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives 
on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 216–17 (1976). 
76 See discussion infra Section I.A. 
77 See, e.g., discussion infra Section II.B (discussing Fred Gray’s extensive involvement in the Civil 
Rights Movement). 
78 They ranged from mentor (Stanley Levison) to “disciple” (Clarence Jones). See discussion infra 
Section I.B.5. 
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representation. 79  With any selection process, the lawyers’ competence and 
commitment to the cause mattered. And in light of the ongoing financial challenges 
Dr. King’s organizations faced, their cost mattered, too. 
A. The Process of Enlisting Lawyers 
Lawyers entered Martin Luther King, Jr.’s orbit in a number of different 
ways.80 When Dr. King enlisted lawyers himself, it was usually a matter of a simple 
request to join the struggle.81 For example, Fred Gray’s representation of Rosa 
Parks led to Dr. King and other leaders tapping him as counsel for the MIA.82 In 
1961, Dr. King issued another invitation when he met William Kunstler.83 Based 
on Kunstler’s reputation as a civil rights lawyer, Dr. King asked him to serve as 
SCLC “special trial counsel,” which meant being available when needed.84 That 
request began a relationship spanning several years and movements.85 
                                                
79 Fred Gray became an exception as MIA’s counsel. See discussion infra Section I.A. 
80 As Dr. King’s reputation grew, many lawyers sought to represent him or his movement. See infra 
note 154 and accompanying text. 
81 See, e.g., Kunstler, William Moses (1919–1995), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http: //
kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_kunstler_william_moses_1919_1995/ 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2015) (explaining how Dr. King met William Kunstler “during the 1961 Freedom 
Rides . . . [and] asked Kunstler to take on several cases throughout the 1960s”). 
82 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 50–54; KING, supra note 7, at 41. See generally supra notes 32–33 and 
accompanying text. The only other Black lawyer in Montgomery at the time, Charles Langford, later 
assisted Gray in working with the MIA. GRAY, supra note 7, at 26, 28. Dr. King emphasized that Gray 
was his choice by referring to him as “my attorney.” See id. at 65. 
83 See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 74–76. 
84 See WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER WITH SHEILA ISENBERG, MY LIFE AS A RADICAL LAWYER 109–12 
(1994); DAVID J. LANGUM, WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER: THE MOST HATED LAWYER IN AMERICA 62–63 
(1999) (conveying Kunstler’s account of meeting Dr. King in late September 1961 and Dr. King asking 
him “to serve as his special counsel on matters unsuited for his regular attorneys” at LDF, and stating 
that Kunstler subsequently “undert[ook] specifically commissioned assignments from the SCLC and 
King, representing specific clients in specific situations”); Kunstler, William Moses (1919–1995), supra 
note 81 (“King asked Kunstler to take on several cases throughout the 1960s and praised him for the 
‘magnificent job’ he had done as a civil rights attorney.”). 
85 See LANGUM, supra note 84, at 65–66 (“Kunstler participated in the campaigns in Albany, Georgia 
(1962–63), Danville, Virginia (1963), Birmingham, Alabama (1963), and St. Augustine, Florida 
(1964).”). Kunstler describes his work in these campaigns in his 1966 memoir Deep in My Heart, 
though the nature and scope of his involvement is a matter of some dispute. Compare, e.g., KUNSTLER, 
supra note 1, at 173–200, 211–32, 271–304 (recounting the work Kunstler did for SCLC in 
Birmingham, Danville, and St. Augustine), and LANGUM, supra note 84, at 65–66 (discussing how Dr. 
King occasionally “called upon Kunstler” as “an outside attorney” to help with his major campaigns 
and pointing out other matters Kunstler worked on “[a]t King’s request”), with MOTLEY, supra note 13, 
at 139–40 (rejecting Kunstler’s assertion that “he was Martin Luther King’s lawyer”). Motley says she 
“never saw Kunstler . . . representing King or anybody else,” and that he simply “flew to whatever spot 
appeared in newspaper headlines.” Id. at 140. 
Over time, Kunstler’s relationship with SCLC suffered, and his role declined, ending by 1964. See 
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 98, 178. There were claims that Kunstler alienated colleagues with his 
“penchant for self-advertisement, [his] manner of exploiting his relationship with King, and [his] habit 
of making commitments in SCLC’s name on his own initiative.” Id. at 178. Also, financial tensions 
arose when the Gandhi Society failed to raise enough money to cover Kunstler’s fees. Id. Though 
Kunstler sometimes claimed that his civil rights work was all pro bono, he often received fees for his 
work. Compare LANGUM, supra note 84, at 67 (quoting from an interview in which Kunstler stated he 
had never taken fees), and KUNSTLER WITH ISENBERG, supra note 84, at 110 (saying he never expected 
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But it was not always so easy to sign up lawyers for the cause. For example, 
Dr. King had to carry out an aggressive recruiting effort to secure Black lawyer 
Clarence Jones’s services for his 1960 perjury trial defense team. At the time, Jones 
was just getting settled into his private practice in Los Angeles.86 He resisted Dr. 
King’s entreaties mightily until the minister shamed him, without naming him, in a 
sermon he attended (at Dr. King’s request) on the obligations of Black professionals 
to serve the Civil Rights Movement.87 After the perjury trial, their relationship 
flourished, and Jones soon became a highly valued member of Dr. King’s inner 
circle.88 
                                                
fees from civil rights cases), with LANGUM, supra note 84, at 67–68 (listing fees Kunstler accepted from 
CORE and SCLC). 
Further, SCLC turned increasingly to the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF) for its 
representation, making continued participation of individual lawyers like Kunstler less important. See 
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 98, 178; see also discussion infra Section I.B.4.i. 
Kunstler also engaged in extensive civil rights representation unrelated to Dr. King or the SCLC, as a 
member of NLG, CORE, and the ACLU. See LANGUM, supra note 84, at 64, 67–68. After working on 
civil rights issues, Kunstler made a career out of representing unpopular clients and causes. See 
generally id. at 77–128. 
86 See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 37; CLARENCE B. JONES & JOEL ENGEL, WHAT WOULD 
MARTIN SAY? 2 (2008). 
87 Dr. King’s efforts to persuade Clarence Jones to join him in the Civil Rights Movement had 
something of the sense of a prophet seeking to enlist a disciple. See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, 
at 37–38. As Jones tells the story, Dr. King first had Hubert Delany, co-lead counsel in the perjury case, 
contact him in Los Angeles to ask him, on Dr. King’s behalf, to join them in Alabama. Id. at 37. Delany 
had been a mentor to the young lawyer while he was in law school. See Clarence B. Jones, First 
Diversity Visiting Professor, Univ. of S.F.; Scholar Writer in Residence, the Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Research & Educ. Inst., Stanford Univ.; Political Advisor, Counsel & Draft Speechwriter for Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Keynote Address at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth 
Annual Symposium: Martin Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on Washington 
to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 688, 691 (2016). Jones had just recently 
graduated from Boston University Law School in 1959, and he was settling into his new career as an 
entertainment lawyer in Los Angeles. See JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 2, 5. He had little sense of 
the importance of the perjury trial and no plans to be a civil rights lawyer. See id. at 3–4, 6. He declined 
Delany’s invitation. Id. at 3. Dr. King then had his secretary arrange a personal meeting at Jones’s home 
in Los Angeles when Dr. King was in town for a speech. Id. at 4. 
That visit led to another polite rejection. Id. at 7. But Dr. King invited Jones to attend his sermon in 
the affluent Black Baldwin Hills section of Los Angeles, and Jones obliged. Id. at 10–11. Dr. King 
spoke in his sermon, as he had done during the visit at Jones’s home, about the need for Black 
professionals to join the Civil Rights Movement, and he then referred to a “highly gifted [unnamed 
Black] attorney” who had resisted his overtures. Id. at 7, 12–13. After a pause, that elicited a “for 
shame” kind of response from the congregation. See id. at 13. 
Dr. King greeted Jones after the service and said, “I hope that you didn’t mind me using you to make 
a point in my sermon. There were a lot of people here in this church I needed to reach today, and I 
always use whatever I think is going to be most effective. No offense, Mr. Jones.” Id. at 16. In 
response, Jones said, “Dr. King, the only thing I need to know is when you and Judge Delaney want me 
to leave [for Alabama].” Id. 
Jones later recalled, “And from that point on, I was a Martin Luther King, Jr. disciple.” JONES & 
CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 44. 
88 See infra Section I.B.5. Colleagues Bayard Rustin and Ella Baker introduced Dr. King to Stanley 
Levison, a lawyer who became one of his closest confidants. See David J. Garrow, The FBI and Martin 
Luther King, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July-Aug. 2002, at 80, 85. Levison in turn encouraged Harry 
Wachtel, a well-connected, tax-savvy New York lawyer, to contribute to SCLC. See FAIRCLOUGH, 
supra note 21, at 97. In early 1963, Clarence Jones introduced Dr. King to Wachtel, who offered to 
assist SCLC in an advisory role and later joined the inner circle as well. See JONES & CONNELLY, supra 
note 53, at 194 n.1. Dr. King’s decision to add Levison and Wachtel to his inner circle was based on his 
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When Dr. King delegated the lawyers’ selection, the lawyers he selected 
sometimes enlisted other lawyers because of a need for additional legal manpower, 
or to join forces with lawyers with greater experience and expertise.89 For example, 
when Fred Gray became the attorney for the MIA, he brought in Charles Langford, 
the only other Black lawyer in Montgomery, to share the workload.90 Gray relied 
on experienced local lawyer Clifford Durr as a mentor, as well.91 He also turned to 
Robert Carter of the NAACP and Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP Legal Defense 
and Education Fund (LDF), the leading civil rights lawyers of the day, for the 
expertise and experience needed to challenge bus segregation in court.92 
Similarly, working with an organization like LDF meant that its head made 
the decisions about assigning staff and volunteer lawyers to particular matters.93 As 
Dr. King turned increasingly to LDF for assistance in the 1960s, Director-Counsel 
Jack Greenberg (Thurgood Marshall’s successor) assigned the lawyers to the tasks 
at hand.94 
Also, a selection committee of Dr. King’s trusted advisors assembled a 
defense team for his Alabama perjury trial.95 A conviction could have resulted in a 
lengthy prison sentence, as well as a devastating impact on his stature and 
                                                
extensive interaction with them. See generally BRANCH, supra note 32, at 225–27, 581–82; 
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 98; Garrow, supra. 
89 Even when he was not directly involved, his priorities and his past experience typically carried the 
day. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 171. See generally Mary Lou Finley, The Open Housing 
Marches: Chicago, Summer ’66, in CHICAGO 1966, supra note 62, at 1, 36–37. 
90 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 26, 28, 72, 88. 
91 Id. at 17, 43–44. 
92 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 158; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 682. LDF was 
more commonly known as the “Inc. Fund.” LANGUM, supra note 84, at 62; see also Gilbert A. 
Cornfield, Cornfield & Feldman, LLP, Remarks at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social 
Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on 
Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 667, 674 (2016) [hereinafter 
Cornfield Remarks]. 
93 See discussion infra Section I.B.4.i. The leaders of some ongoing movements or efforts that were 
floundering called on Martin Luther King to join forces with them. See infra Sections II.A.1.i.d 
(Albany, Georgia), III.B.3.iv–v (Chicago & Memphis). Dr. King sometimes referred to himself as a 
“fireman” in those situations. See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 632. Even when a movement was well 
underway, with its lawyers in place, Dr. King sometimes brought additional lawyers into the fray as the 
movement expanded in scale, scope, or its strategies, once he had allied himself with local activists. 
See, e.g., infra Sections II.A.1.i.d (Constance Baker Motley in Albany, Georgia Movement), III.B.3.iv 
(LDF in Chicago), III.B.3.v (Chauncey Eskridge in Memphis). 
94 See discussion infra Section I.B.4.i; see also, e.g., GARROW, supra note 2, at 386 (“[King] 
instructed [SCLC staff member Andrew] Young to call Jack Greenberg of the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund, which had been coordinating the Selma movement’s courtroom efforts . . . .”); GREENBERG, 
supra note 51, at 465 (stating Greenberg dispatched several LDF staff lawyers to Washington, D.C. to 
meet with the city’s attorneys and lawyers who had offered to help with legal matters in the Poor 
People’s Campaign). See generally MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 152, 154–55 (assessing Greenberg’s 
appointment as Marshall’s successor). That included LDF staff, consultants, and local LDF cooperating 
lawyers in the South. See generally GREENBERG, supra note 51, passim. For more on the development 
of LDF’s “extensive network of cooperating attorneys,” see Rabin, supra note 75, at 216–18. 
95 GRAY, supra note 7, at 148–49; Dyer, supra note 38, at 251. 
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reputation.96 With such high stakes, Dr. King’s advisors went through a systematic 
vetting process to assemble a high-powered defense team.97 
It is understandable that Dr. King left most of the choices of individual 
lawyers to others. He faced extraordinary demands on his time, energy, and 
emotions. Leadership required that Dr. King carry the burden of continually making 
difficult strategic decisions. Dr. King’s legal team was also in a better position to 
evaluate the fit of individual lawyers with the specific needs of the occasion.98 
Whether Dr. King or others made the selection, many similar factors were 
considered in making the decisions. 
B. Selection Factors 
The choice of lawyers and legal organizations was based on a mix of principle, 
pragmatism, and personal considerations. As far as the lawyers’ locations were 
concerned, Dr. King found advantages in having both local and northern lawyers.99 
Identity factors—including race, gender, religion, and age—also played a part in 
Dr. King’s choices.100 He very much wanted to involve Black lawyers.101 But Dr. 
King did not seem focused on including women lawyers.102 While SCLC was faith-
based and Christian, the lawyers’ religion did not seem to matter.103 Age similarly 
did not seem to be part of the selection criteria; a number of very young lawyers 
served the movements alongside older and more experienced ones.104 
In light of his core strategic commitment to nonviolent direct action, Dr. King 
might have insisted that the lawyers share that commitment. And while many of 
them did, some viewed the courts as the primary venue for seeking social change 
and expressed great skepticism about direct action.105 That strategic disconnect did 
not seem to matter to Dr. King. 
In the 1960s, Dr. King also relied heavily on an inner circle of advisors, which 
included several lawyers who served as counselors and confidants.106 
                                                
96 GRAY, supra note 7, at 147–48; Dyer, supra note 38, at 246, 249. 
97 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 149; Dyer, supra note 38, at 251. See also discussion infra Section 
II.A.1.i.b. At the same time, Dr. King played a direct role in enlisting Clarence Jones for the defense 
team, after the committee had assembled the rest of the team. See supra note 87. 
98 For the perjury trial, the needs included criminal defense experience, tax expertise, knowledge of 
Alabama criminal procedure, and an understanding of how Black lawyers could navigate a white-
dominated state judicial system. See Dyer, supra note 38, at 245–61. 
99 See discussion infra Section I.B.1. 
100 The intersectionality of aspects of identity, such as race and gender, complicated those selections. 
See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 
149 (1989). 
101 See JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 12. 
102 See discussion infra Section I.B.2.ii. 
103 See discussion infra Section I.B.2.iii. 
104 See discussion infra Section I.B.2.iv. 
105 See discussion infra Section I.B.3. 
106 See discussion infra Section I.B.5. 
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1. The Lawyers’ Locations: Local and Northern Lawyers 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s legal representation began with local lawyers in 
Montgomery in 1955 and ended with local lawyers in Memphis in 1968. In-
between, he relied on an ever-changing mix of local and northern counsel.107 Those 
lawyers often worked together in teams that drew upon their complementary 
knowledge and experience. 
i. Local Lawyers 
Enlisting local lawyers took advantage of their knowledge of state and local 
law and procedure, as well as the local courts.108 Also, movement leaders often 
knew and trusted them.109 Their continuing presence on-site mattered, especially at 
a time of limited technology and mobility. Using local lawyers also had political 
benefits. For example, it helped to blunt opponents’ claims that the protests were 
the work of “outside agitators,” a potentially powerful rallying cry.110 Moreover, it 
avoided the risk of trial judges excluding or restricting the participation of a lawyer 
because he was not licensed to practice in the state.111 
While the advantages of using local lawyers seemed apparent, the question of 
their availability and willingness to serve remained. Most lawyers in the South were 
white, and most white lawyers were segregationists with little sympathy for civil 
rights.112 Even the few white lawyers who shared the movements’ views were 
rarely willing to risk the severe professional and personal consequences likely to 
                                                
107 See infra Parts II, III. Of course, lawyers in the Chicago Freedom Movement of the mid-1960s 
were both local and northern. See infra Sections III.B.2, III.B.3.iv. 
108 LDF litigated in many states and had long recognized the value of local counsel. See GREENBERG, 
supra note 51, at 375. LDF had assembled a network of local cooperating attorneys, especially in the 
South. See id.; see also discussion infra Section I.B.4.i. 
109 See infra notes 130–132 and accompanying text. 
110 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 67. 
111 See, e.g., KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 216–17 (describing a contempt trial for a demonstrator in 
Danville, Virginia, where Kunstler was not allowed to participate because the judge would not take his 
word that he was an attorney); THORNTON, supra note 27, at 223 (“Federal court rules in Birmingham 
forbade an out-of-town lawyer to file suit unless he associated a local attorney with him.”). Federal 
judges in Mississippi required out-of-state lawyers to appear with local counsel, which required 
cooperation that white Mississippi lawyers would not give. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 375. Out-
of-state lawyers largely relied on the three Black lawyers in the state, to the extent their time permitted. 
Id. 
112 See, e.g., KING, supra note 7, at 92 (calling the white lawyer for the bus company in Montgomery 
“our most stubborn opponent”); KINOY, supra note 30, at 166 (“Only a tiny handful of Black lawyers 
were practicing in the South, because Black people had been almost totally excluded from the 
profession . . . . Therefore, Black people were almost always represented by white lawyers.”); Randall 
Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 
98 YALE L.J. 999, 1009 (1989) (noting that Montgomery, Alabama had 189 white lawyers and judges 
in 1950 but only two Black lawyers, while its population was forty percent Black); J. Mills Thornton 
III, Challenge and Response in the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955–1956, 33 ALA. REV. 163, 226 
(1980) (“[T]he most inflexible of the whites were lawyers.”). 
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result from assisting activists like Dr. King.113 Threats of violence made matters 
even worse.114 
Among the few participating local white lawyers was Clifford Durr, an 
experienced Montgomery attorney from a prominent, upper middle-class Alabama 
family.115 Durr served as a mentor and colleague for the inexperienced Fred Gray 
even before the bus boycott.116 
By the mid-1960s, some white local lawyers outside the Deep South were 
willing to represent Dr. King and his supporters. For example, Gilbert Cornfield 
and Gilbert Feldman, among others, represented activists in the Chicago Freedom 
Movement pro bono.117 
In 1968, several white lawyers in two mainstream Memphis law firms 
provided pro bono representation related to a planned march during the sanitation 
workers’ strike.118 Dr. King persuaded them of the importance of the demonstration 
                                                
113 See, e.g., KINOY, supra note 30, at 165–66 (“No white lawyer could survive in the South who, in 
the defense of a Black client, raised any . . . controversy-laden constitutional questions which went to 
the heart of the legitimacy of a segregated society.”). See generally VIRGINIA FOSTER DURR, OUTSIDE 
THE MAGIC CIRCLE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF VIRGINIA FOSTER DURR 269–70, 276–77, 288 (Hollinger 
F. Barnard ed., 1985). White Mississippi lawyer William Higgs accepted racial cases. See KINOY, supra 
note 30, at 191. As a result, he was falsely accused of sexual misconduct with a minor and run out of 
town. See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 167–69. Higgs was convicted in absentia and disbarred, though it 
was clear that the police and the accuser had created the story. Id. at 168. Edward Lynch, a white 
Tennessee lawyer, similarly lost his practice and was forced to leave town after defending members of 
an interracial group charged with petty crimes. Id. at 242. 
114 Len Rosenthal, a Mississippi attorney associated with the National Lawyers Guild, was evicted 
from his office building and chased with a shotgun by a relative after taking civil rights cases in 1964. 
SARAH HART BROWN, STANDING AGAINST DRAGONS: THREE SOUTHERN LAWYERS IN AN ERA OF FEAR 
232, 236 (1998). Charles Morgan Jr., a white lawyer in Birmingham, was forced to leave Alabama after 
speaking out against the 1963 bombing of a Baptist church that killed four young girls. See KUNSTLER, 
supra note 1, at 242–43. 
115 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 43–44; JOHN A. SALMOND, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER: CLIFFORD 
J. DURR AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES, 1899–1975, at 2 (1990); Clifford Durr, MONTGOMERY BUS 
BOYCOTT, http://www.montgomeryboycott.com/clifford-durr/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). See generally 
THORNTON, supra note 27, at 54–55, 60–61, 71 (discussing Durr’s background and legal work in 
Montgomery). By accepting Gray’s 1955 request to help represent the family of a Black boy against a 
white man who killed their son while driving 100 miles per hour, Durr became alienated from his 
family, friends, and the white community. See SALMOND, supra, at 171. In the same year, Durr and 
Gray represented Black teenager Claudette Colvin for refusing to give up her seat on a bus. Id. at 172. 
Durr assisted Gray in defending her at trial and on appeal. Id. at 173. 
116 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 17, 24; SALMOND, supra note 115, at 171. 
117 See discussion infra Section III.B.2 (discussing Cornfield’s and Feldman’s work in Chicago); see 
also BILL AYERS & BERNARDINE DOHRN, RACE COURSE: AGAINST WHITE SUPREMACY 25 (2009). See 
generally Leonard S. Rubinowitz, The Chicago Freedom Movement and the Federal Fair Housing Act, 
in THE CHICAGO FREEDOM MOVEMENT: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVISM IN THE 
NORTH 115 (Mary Lou Finley et al. eds., 2016). 
In Chicago, some Black lawyers were beholden to Mayor Richard J. Daley and the Democratic 
machine, so they were not in a position to assist the Chicago Freedom Movement. See infra Section 
III.A (discussing the interaction between Dr. King and William Ming, who had been Dr. King’s defense 
counsel in Alabama in 1960 but was aligned with Mayor Daley in Chicago six years later). See 
generally RALPH, supra note 62, at 230–31 (observing decline in “the machine’s stranglehold on 
Chicago’s Negro population”). 
118 See infra Section III.B.3.v (discussing the lifting of the injunction against marching). See 
generally W.J. Michael Cody, King at the Mountain Top: The Representation of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Memphis, April 3–4 1968, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 701 (2011). All but one of the half-dozen 
Memphis lawyers involved from the Burch, Porter & Johnson and Ratner, Sugarmon firms were white. 
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to show that they could have a nonviolent march and that nonviolence remained a 
viable strategy.119 As a result, they joined as counsel even though they were well 
aware that their “representation would not be popular in Memphis and that the firm 
might expect to lose substantial business if the engagement was undertaken.”120 
Most of the participating local lawyers were Black.121 They faced greater risks 
than local white lawyers, especially the risk of becoming victims of physical 
violence.122 They were not exempt from the bombings that so often struck Black 
churches, and ministers’ and other activists’ homes during this period. 123  For 
example, Birmingham lawyer Arthur Shores endured repeated bombings of his 
home during the 1950s and 1960s.124  Racists in North Carolina burned down 
attorney Julius Chambers’ office in 1971 and bombed his home because of his civil 
rights work.125 A county sheriff caned Albany, Georgia civil rights lawyer C.B. 
King in 1962.126 In short, it took great courage for local Black lawyers to join the 
Civil Rights Movement. 
Montgomery’s Fred Gray, Rosa Parks’ lawyer and Dr. King’s first lawyer, 
epitomized this important group. He was intimately acquainted with the city’s Jim 
Crow regime, having ridden the local buses regularly.127 Gray would have attended 
law school in Alabama, but the University of Alabama did not admit Blacks in the 
early 1950s.128 When Gray left to attend law school at Cleveland’s Western Reserve 
                                                
See id. at 701. The firms were quite prominent in the region. See MIRIAM DECOSTA-WILLIS, NOTABLE 
BLACK MEMPHIANS 296 (2008); History, BURCH, PORTER & JOHNSON, PLLC, http://bpjlaw.com/history
.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). The presiding federal district court judge, Bailey Brown, had been a 
partner in the Burch firm before he was elevated to the bench. Cody, supra, at 702. A member of his 
firm described Lucius Burch as “the senior partner in our office and one of the most experienced and 
well-respected trial lawyers in the region and a man of significant stature.” Id. 
119 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 619; Cody, supra note 118, at 703–04. 
120 Cody, supra note 118, at 703. Movement lawyers in Atlanta and New York also asked their 
Memphis colleagues to assist Dr. King. GARROW, supra note 2, at 619. 
121 See infra Appendix. 
122 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 52; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 77. 
123 See, e.g., Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 694–95, 727 n.203. 
124 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 39. 
125 See id.; Tom Foreman Jr., Julius Chambers, Civil Rights Attorney, Dies at 76, WASH. POST (Aug. 
4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/julius-chambers-civil-rights-attorney-dies-at-76
/2013/08/04/fc7b13c4-fc74-11e2-9bde-7ddaa186b751_story.html.  
126 See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 117. The next year someone poured acid on the front seat of his 
car. Id. at 242. 
127 Gray was born and raised in Montgomery and graduated from the historically Black Alabama 
State College located there. GRAY, supra note 7, at 6, 10–12. The college is now named Alabama State 
University. See id. at 10; see also About ASU, ALA. ST. U., http://www.alasu.edu/about-asu/index.aspx 
(last visited Sept. 14, 2015). In his part-time job with the local newspaper while attending Alabama 
State College, Gray made multiple daily bus trips during which he routinely experienced 
discrimination. See GRAY, supra note 7, at 5–6, 11–12. 
128 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 13–15; Jonathan L. Entin, ‘Destroying Everything Segregated I Could 
Find’: Fred Gray and Integration in Alabama, 7 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 252, 253 
(2004); Bill Lubinger, A Legal Legend, THINK MAG. (Fall 2004), http://case.edu/think/fall2014/fred-
gray.html. Even though the U.S. Supreme Court held in 1950 that it was unconstitutional for state law 
schools to exclude applicants because of their race, see Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding 
that the University of Texas Law School’s exclusion of a Black applicant violated the Equal Protection 
Clause because no equivalent law school existed for Blacks), the University of Alabama continued its 
discriminatory policy. See GRAY, supra note 7, at 14–15 (explaining how the university imposed 
strategic financial barriers to entry designed to keep Black students out). 
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University, he had made a secret vow to return to his home state and use his legal 
training to “destroy everything segregated [he] could find.”129 
When Gray opened his law office in Montgomery in 1954, he and Rosa Parks 
became NAACP colleagues and friends.130 It was thus natural that he served as her 
defense counsel after she refused to give up her bus seat.131 That representation led 
to Gray’s involvement in other Alabama movements and events, including Dr. 
King’s 1960 perjury trial and the related New York Times Co. v. Sullivan libel 
litigation, and the Selma movement.132 When Dr. King left Montgomery in 1960 
and moved back to his hometown of Atlanta, he asked Fred Gray to join him there 
as SCLC’s counsel.133 Gray declined, choosing to remain in Alabama and continue 
the civil rights struggle there.134 
Dr. King called on a number of local lawyers over the years, mostly in 
Alabama and Georgia. In Alabama, Birmingham’s Arthur Shores was the “senior 
member” of this group.135 For two decades, Shores had been the only Black lawyer 
in Alabama.136  The others that joined him during the Civil Rights Movement 
                                                
129 GRAY, supra note 7, at 13. The university is now Case Western Reserve University. See History, 
CASE W. RES. U., http://www.case.edu/about/history (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
130 GRAY, supra note 7, at 31. Because of his interest in civil rights, and in order to build a network 
for his practice, Gray became active in the local branch of the NAACP. Id. Rosa Parks was secretary of 
the branch. Id. She and Gray worked together in bringing local youth into the organization. See 
DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 8; GRAY, supra note 7, at 31. They often had lunch together 
at his office, located a block and a half from the department store where Parks worked as a seamstress. 
Id. at 31. 
131 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 50. With the activities leading to the beginning of the bus boycott, 
Gray recognized that his “days of having little to do in [his] fledgling law practice were over.” Id. at 52; 
accord Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1030 n.198 (noting that Gray’s legal career changed dramatically 
after he represented Rosa Parks). 
132 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 61, 149, 156–57, 216; see also discussion infra Sections II.A.1.i.b, 
II.A.1.ii, III.B.3.iii. As Gray recounts, “Mrs. Parks’s arrest . . . launched my legal career.” GRAY, supra 
note 7, at 33. Initially, virtually all of the participants in the boycott were local. See generally 
THORNTON, supra note 27, at 20–140 (discussing the Montgomery movement). 
133 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 145. 
134 Id. When Dr. King left Montgomery and his civil rights activities took him to other states, Gray 
did not accompany him or continue to represent him. See id. at 155. As Gray said, “I feel honored and 
proud that I was Dr. King’s first lawyer in the civil rights movement. . . . Martin was to have many 
other lawyers on other occasions, but I was his first.” Id. Gray’s goal remained to challenge segregation 
in central Alabama, where he went on to have an illustrious career as a civil rights lawyer well into the 
twenty-first century. See id. at 155, 383–86; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1030 n.198. Notably, he 
argued and won Gomillion v. Lightfoot before the Supreme Court. See 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding 
that the Alabama legislature violated the Fifteenth Amendment when it redrew the boundary lines of the 
City of Tuskegee in a way that excluded most Black residents from voting). 
135 Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031 n.198. Fred Gray considered Shores the “dean of African-
American lawyers in Alabama.” GRAY, supra note 7, at 347. Shores “handl[ed] civil rights cases 
[across] Alabama before [Gray even] went to law school.” Id. Gray considered Shores his mentor. Id. 
When Gray became president of the National Bar Association in 1985, he initiated the “NBA Hall of 
Fame” to honor pioneers like Shores. Id. 
136 Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031 n.198. After the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965, Black 
voter registration in Birmingham increased dramatically. ALAN F. WESTIN & BARRY MAHONEY, THE 
TRIAL OF MARTIN LUTHER KING: THE LANDMARK BIRMINGHAM CASE AND ITS MEANING FOR AMERICA 
TODAY 274 (1974). See generally GARROW, supra note 2, at 454 (discussing emphasis on voter 
registration efforts in Birmingham). By the mid-1970s, Arthur Shores was a member of the city council. 
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra, at 274. 
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included Orzell Billingsley Jr.,137 Peter A. Hall,138 Charles D. Langford,139 and 
Solomon S. Seay Jr.140 In Georgia, Donald Hollowell came to be known as “Mr. 
                                                
137 Orzell Billingsley Jr. graduated from Howard University Law School in 1950 and became one of 
the first Black lawyers in Alabama. Bravery and Vision: Black Firsts in Birmingham, BIRMINGHAM 
PUB. LIBR., http://www.bplonline.org/resources/BlackBirmingham.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2015); 
see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 38. Billingsley was involved with Dr. King’s movements early 
on, representing Dr. King in Montgomery when he was indicted for allegedly violating Alabama’s anti-
boycott statute. See id. at 225–26. Billingsley also served as one of the couriers who carried Dr. King’s 
famous “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” out of jail. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 246. See generally 
infra note 659 (discussing Dr. King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”). He was heavily involved in 
voter registration efforts as a legal advisor to the NAACP and worked with Peter Hall to “challenge[] 
the exclusion of African Americans from Alabama’s juries.” 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, 
JR.: BIRTH OF A NEW AGE, DECEMBER 1955–DECEMBER 1956, at 184 n.4 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 
1997); see also, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203–04 (1965) (recognizing that a “State’s 
purposeful and deliberate denial” to Blacks of a chance to serve as jurors because of their race violates 
the Equal Protection Clause). Billingsley was also active in other civil rights cases in Alabama, most 
importantly in the case of Caliph Washington, a Black man convicted of capital murder for an 
accidental death. See Sherrel Wheeler Stewart, Civil Rights Lawyer Orzell Billingsley Dead at 77, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Dec. 19, 2001, at 1C. Billingsley fought the case through various appeals for 
fifteen years, eventually securing an acquittal, as well as successfully challenging the county’s practice 
of excluding Blacks from juries. See id. 
138 Peter Hall earned his law degree in 1946 from DePaul University. 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 184 n.4. He was one of the first Black lawyers in Birmingham, 
where he worked in private practice with Arthur Shores and Orzell Billingsley Jr. MIGNETTE Y. 
PATRICK DORSEY, SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER 53 (2010); Frank Couch, Pete Hall, Son of Peter Hall, Civil 
Rights Attorney and Birmingham’s First Black Judge, AL.COM (Feb. 19, 2013), http://videos.al.com
/birmingham-news/2013/02/pete_hall_son_of_peter_hall_ci.html. He also served as LDF’s local 
counsel in Birmingham. See 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 184. Hall 
was part of the legal team that defended Dr. King in Montgomery for violating Alabama’s anti-boycott 
statute and, along with Billingsley, “repeatedly challenged” the practice of excluding Blacks from juries 
in Alabama. Id. at 184 n.4; see, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. 202. In 1965, Hall joined LDF lawyers in 
Montgomery to secure a federal injunction protecting the Selma-to-Montgomery march for voting 
rights. See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). He was a founding member of the 
Alabama Black Lawyers Association and secured significant victories in several civil rights cases 
before becoming Birmingham’s first Black judge in 1972. History & Mission, ALA. LAW. ASS’N, http://
www.ala-lawyers.org/history-mission/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2015); Jon Solomon, Pete Hall: Son of 
Birmingham’s First Black Judge Gains History Lesson About His Dad, AL.COM (Feb. 21, 2013, 8:00 
AM), http://blog.al.com/spotnews/2013/02/pete_hall_son_of_birminghams_f.html; see Kennedy, supra 
note 112, at 1030 n.198. 
139 Charles Langford received his LL.B degree in 1952 from Catholic University of America and was 
admitted to the Alabama State Bar the following year. 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 
supra note 137, at 70 n.9; Alabama Senator Charles Langford; Rosa Parks’s Lawyer, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 13, 2007, at B7 [hereinafter Charles Langford]. He opened his own law practice in Montgomery 
and was the only Black lawyer in his hometown until Fred Gray returned there after law school. THE 
MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT AND THE WOMEN WHO STARTED IT: THE MEMOIR OF JO ANN GIBSON 
ROBINSON 44 (David J. Garrow ed., 1987) [hereinafter ROBINSON MEMOIR]; see also GRAY, supra note 
7, at 26. Langford represented Rosa Parks after her arrest in 1955 and was active in other “legal battles 
that shaped Alabama,” Charles Langford, supra, including the federal litigation that ended segregation 
on public transportation, GARROW, supra note 2, at 59, and Dr. King’s 1960 perjury trial, id. at 130. He 
represented both the MIA and Dr. King until 1960 and later became law partners with Fred Gray. 3 THE 
PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 70 n.9. 
In addition to his legal contributions to the Civil Rights Movement, Langford had a distinguished 
political career. He was elected to the Alabama legislature in 1978, serving two terms in the Alabama 
House of Representatives and then five terms in the Alabama Senate before retiring in 2002. See 
Charles Langford, supra. Langford died in 2007 at age eighty-four. Id. 
140 After graduating from Howard University School of Law in 1957, Solomon S. Seay Jr. returned 
home to Montgomery to join the civil rights struggle. Selma to Montgomery March Profiles, NAACP 
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Civil Rights.”141 Other important local civil rights lawyers in the state included 
C.B. King of Albany and Horace Ward of Atlanta.142 While all of these lawyers had 
                                                
LDF (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/selma-montgomery-march-profiles-ldf-co-
counsel-charles-stephen-ralston-fred-d-gray-and [hereinafter Selma Profiles]. His return to 
Montgomery made him the third of only three Black lawyers practicing there at the time, with Charles 
Langford and Fred Gray being the other two. Id. Seay frequently joined forces with LDF as local 
counsel and devoted his career to “challenging segregation and discrimination across the State of 
Alabama.” LDF Mourns Passing of Legendary Civil Rights Attorney Solomon Seay Jr., NAACP LDF 
(Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/ldf-mourns-passing-legendary-civil-rights-
attorney-solomon-seay-jr/ [hereinafter LDF Release]. He litigated significant cases in almost every area 
of civil rights, including school desegregation, employment discrimination, police brutality, and voting 
rights. Id.; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 193–94, 202, 204, 216 & n.26, 250. Seay was a member of 
Dr. King’s defense team for the 1960 Alabama perjury trial, and he represented the four Black 
ministers, including his father, who later became the MIA’s third president, in the related New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan libel litigation. Id. at 149, 156–57; Donald T. Ferron, Notes on MIA Executive 
Board Meeting (Jan. 30, 1956), in 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 109, 
111 n.6; see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). He also helped secure the injunction to 
prevent interference with Dr. King’s 1965 voting rights march from Selma to Montgomery. See 
Williams, 240 F. Supp. 100; GRAY, supra note 7, at 216–17, 216 n.26. Seay was active in many other 
civil rights cases throughout Alabama and worked for decades to provide Black students equal 
opportunities in education. LDF Release, supra; see, e.g., Knight v. Alabama, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1273 
(N.D. Ala. 2004); Lee v. Macon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967). Seay died in 
2015 at age eighty-one. Rick Harmon, Civil Rights Attorney Solomon Seay Dies at Age 81, 
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Sept. 11, 2015, 6:30 p.m.), http://www.montgomeryadvertiser.com/story
/news/2015/09/11/civil-rights-attorney-solomon-seay-dies-age/72101862/. 
141 Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Foreword to DANIELS, supra note 41, at ix. People similarly called 
Thurgood Marshall “Mr. Civil Rights” when he began to distinguish himself through his 
accomplishments as a young lawyer with the NAACP. See KLUGER, supra note 13, at 271.  
Donald Hollowell graduated from Chicago’s Loyola University Law School in 1951, then moved to 
Atlanta and set up his own practice. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 29–30; see also Edward A. Hatfield, 
Donald Hollowell (1917–2004), NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Sept. 12, 2007), http://www
.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/donald-hollowell-1917-2004. He quickly became 
well-known across Georgia as an effective advocate for social justice. See MAURICE C. DANIELS, 
HORACE T. WARD: DESEGREGATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA, CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCACY, AND 
JURISPRUDENCE 78 (2001) [hereinafter DANIELS, HORACE WARD]. He is perhaps best known for his 
work on school desegregation cases across Georgia. Hatfield, supra. 
Hollowell represented Dr. King at his hearing and eventually secured his release during his 
imprisonment in a Georgia state prison for violating his probation. DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra, 
166–69; see King v. State, 119 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961); see also DANIELS, supra note 41, at 
115–19; GARROW, supra note 2, at 145, 148; discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.c. He also was one of the 
attorneys who represented the Albany Movement in negotiations with the City of Albany. See DANIELS, 
supra note 41, at 143–44, 146–47, 149–51; GARROW, supra note 2, at 185; discussion infra Section 
II.B.2. He again represented Dr. King in court after mass arrests for another demonstration in Albany. 
See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 152–53; GARROW, supra note 2, at 196; discussion infra Section 
II.A.1.i.d. In 1962, Hollowell and C.B. King acted as local counsel for LDF and assisted in the appeals 
to overturn an injunction against demonstrations in Albany. MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 138–39; see 
also discussion infra Section II.A.2.ii. 
In 1966, President Johnson appointed Hollowell director of the southeastern regional office of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, where he remained for nineteen years, becoming 
chairman of the board in 1971. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 189, 201; Hatfield, supra. Hollowell died at 
the age of 87 in 2004. See id. 
142 See Jordan, supra note 141, at xii-xiii. After graduating from Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law in 1952, Chevene Bowers (C.B.) King returned to his home state of Georgia and became 
the only Black lawyer in the southwestern region of the state. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 132; Mary 
Sterner Lawson, C.B. King (1923–1988), NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Dec. 9, 2003), http://www
.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/c-b-king-1923-1988. During the early years of 
his practice, C.B. King earned a reputation as “the only black lawyer south of Atlanta who would take 
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important roles, the limited number of available local lawyers left some roles 
needing to be filled by lawyers from other regions.  
                                                
on civil and criminal cases,” and later became a prominent figure in defending protesters during the 
Civil Rights Era. Id. 
As “chief counsel” to the Albany Movement, C.B. King represented demonstrators arrested in 
Albany, including Martin Luther King, Jr., Ralph Abernathy, William G. Anderson, and Andrew 
Young. Ellen Lake, C.B. King, HARV. CRIMSON (May 13, 1964), http://www.thecrimson.com/article
/1964/5/13/cb-king-pcb-king-is-a/; see also Lawson, supra; discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.d. He 
participated in negotiations with Albany city officials and helped draft the petition to dissolve the 
federal injunction those officials had secured against the movement. GARROW, supra note 2, at 204, 
207; see also discussion infra Section II.A.2.ii. He also defended Freedom Riders. Lawson, supra. 
C.B. King ran twice for political office in the mid- to late-1960s. Id. Though unsuccessful, he was 
Georgia’s first Black candidate since Reconstruction to run for the U.S. House of Representatives and 
the first Black to run for governor of Georgia. Id. He was influential in the lives of numerous law 
students who worked as interns with his law firm in Albany, many of whom “underwent life-changing 
experiences under his tutelage, and . . . went on to become highly distinguished judges, members of 
Congress, and respected civil and environmental rights advocates.” Id. 
Shortly before C.B. King’s death, Georgia’s governor and state legislature presented him with the 
first “Martin Luther King Jr. Humanitarian Award,” and he was honored posthumously in 2002 as 
namesake of the new federal courthouse constructed in downtown Albany. Id. C.B. King died in 1988 
at age sixty-four. Id. 
Horace Ward graduated from Northwestern University School of Law in 1959, after he was rejected 
by the University of Georgia School of Law—the university’s first Black applicant—and lost his racial 
discrimination suit against the university. See DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 40–42, 95, 
118; Dan Rodriguez, Judge Horace Ward ’59, An Extraordinary Alum, WORD ON STREETERVILLE BLOG 
(Mar. 25, 2014), http://deansblog.law.northwestern.edu/2014/03/25/judge-harold-ward-59-an-
extraordinary-alum/; Stephanie Schupska, Horace Ward to Receive Honorary UGA Degree, UGA 
TODAY (Mar. 20, 2014), http://news.uga.edu/releases/article/horace-ward-to-receive-honorary-uga-
degree/. See generally infra note 390 (discussing Donald Hollowell’s involvement in the lawsuit). After 
Northwestern, Ward returned to his home state of Georgia, where he became partner in Donald 
Hollowell’s law firm and worked on several civil rights cases throughout the state, including Dr. King’s 
defense when he was incarcerated in the Reidsville State Prison. See DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra 
note 141, at 118, 166–69; see also King, 119 S.E.2d 77; Schupska, supra; discussion infra Section 
II.A.1.i.c. 
Ward was elected to the Georgia General Assembly in 1964 and became the second Black elected to 
that office since Reconstruction. Schupska, supra. He left the Hollowell law firm to serve briefly as 
deputy city attorney, and he then opened his own practice. DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 
185. After being re-elected to four terms in the Georgia Senate, he was appointed to the state judiciary 
in 1974 as Georgia’s first Black trial court judge. See id. at 189, 197; Schupska, supra. 
Ward was elevated to the federal bench in 1979 when President Carter appointed him to the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 200–
01; see also Robert A. Pratt, Horace T. Ward (b. 1927), NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA (May 9, 2003), http://
www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/horace-t-ward-b-1927. He was the first 
Black federal judge in Georgia. Lericia Harris, Civil Rights Attorney, Federal Judge Horace Ward 
Dead at 88, CBS ATLANTA (Apr. 26, 2016, 8:40 AM), http://atlanta.cbslocal.com/2016/04/26/civil-
rights-attorney-federal-judge-horace-ward-dead-at-88/; see also DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 
141, at 201. Judge Ward assumed senior status in 1994 and retired from the bench in 2012. Schupska, 
supra. In 2014, he was awarded an honorary law degree from the University of Georgia. Id. 
While from an earlier generation, Austin Thomas (“A.T.”) Walden remained active in civil rights 
work in the 1960s. For biographical information on Walden, see TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO 
DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011), and J. CLAY 
SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844–1944, at 198–99, 482 n.185, 
565 (1993). 
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ii. Northern Lawyers 
Southern civil rights activists’ practice of enlisting northern lawyers dates 
back at least to Plessy v. Ferguson,143 the landmark Supreme Court segregation 
case of the 1890s. In challenging the constitutionality of a Louisiana train 
segregation law, the New Orleans Citizens’ Committee brought in New York 
lawyer Albion Tourgée to lead the litigation effort. 144  As civil rights legal 
organizations formed in the North, their lawyers continued to go south throughout 
the first half of the twentieth century.145  
From the outset, Dr. King and his colleagues followed the tradition of drawing 
on northern lawyers.146 This effort added significantly to the pool of experienced 
and committed civil rights lawyers.147 It also increased the participation of Black 
lawyers, which was particularly important in light of the dearth of Black lawyers—
especially Black civil rights lawyers—in the South.148 
The Montgomery Improvement Association reached out to northern lawyers 
for their assistance in sustaining the bus boycott and adding leverage to it.149 That 
experience established a pattern. Throughout his career, Dr. King relied heavily on 
both individual lawyers and legal organizations from the North.150 For example, 
                                                
143 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
144 See CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 30 (1987). 
The full name of the group that brought suit was the “Citizens’ Committee to Test the Constitutionality 
of the Separate Car Law.” Id. at 29. 
145 See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 13, at 100–04, 113–14, 132–37, 194–96, 222; see also Rabin, supra 
note 75, at 209–18 (discussing the ACLU’s and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund’s early 
efforts to reform the law through litigation). 
146 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 302 (discussing Montgomery’s boycott organizers seeking 
counsel from NAACP lawyers in New York). See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: 
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 265 (1976) (“The refusal of white Southern 
lawyers to defend black clients, combined with the unavailability of black lawyers, prompted another 
invasion of carpetbaggers across the Mason-Dixon line: Northern lawyers committed to the objectives 
of the civil rights movement.”). The lawyers’ experience and expertise included both desegregation 
litigation and support of civil rights activists, such as criminal defense work. See infra note 256. 
147 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 292; see also discussion infra Section I.B.2.iv. 
148 See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 36–38, 271. See generally SMITH, supra note 142, at 63–
65, 199, app. 2 at 623–37. State law schools in the South, with rare exceptions, did not admit Black 
applicants until forced to do so by the courts throughout the 1930s and ‘40s. Edward J. Littlejohn & 
Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Black Enrollment in Law Schools: Forward to the Past?, 12 T. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 415, 429–30 (1987). At the time of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, only a few Black lawyers 
practiced in Alabama. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 225–26 (calling Arthur Shores, Fred Gray, 
and Orzell Billingsley “perhaps half the black bar of Alabama”). 
Black civil rights lawyers comprised an even smaller group. The first edition of Fred Gray’s memoir 
includes a photo from the 1960 meeting of the Southwest Bar Association, the southern affiliate of the 
National Bar Association. See FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE 108 (1st ed. 1995). He identifies 
the group of about fifty Blacks as “the major civil rights lawyers in the South at that time.” Id. 
149 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 225–26. 
150 See King, supra note 1, at xxiii–xxv; Dyer, supra note 38, at 251. As suggested earlier, enlisting 
northern lawyers risked eliciting resentment of “outside agitators” coming South to upset the customs 
and traditions that many white people valued so highly. GARROW, supra note 2, at 67. Whites’ 
resentment seemed to be based on memories of the “carpetbaggers” in the post-Civil War 
Reconstruction regime as well. See generally BRUCE E. BAKER, WHAT RECONSTRUCTION MEANT: 
HISTORICAL MEMORY IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 69 (2007). 
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William Ming, of Chicago, and Hubert Delany, from New York, led Dr. King’s 
legal team in his 1960 Alabama perjury trial.151 
Many other northern lawyers, including numerous LDF staffers and 
consultants, the NAACP’s Robert Carter, and William Kunstler also played 
significant roles in Dr. King’s career.152 These northern lawyers, among others, 
were just one of the identities that filled a specific role for Dr. King. 
                                                
151 William Ming graduated from the University of Chicago Law School in 1933. SMITH, supra note 
142, at 39. Ming was one of the first Black members of a law review and was published in the 
University of Chicago Law Review’s inaugural issue in 1933. See id. at 40. He became a member of the 
faculty there in 1947. Id. at 52. Ming worked on numerous Supreme Court cases throughout his career, 
including Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding state judicial enforcement of racially 
restrictive covenants in deeds unconstitutional), and Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding 
exclusion of an applicant to the University of Texas Law School based on his race unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because separate facility provided for 
Blacks was inferior in several respects). Howard Univ. Sch. of Law, William R. Ming, BROWN@50, 
http://www.brownat50.org/brownbios/BioWmMing.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). Ming also served 
on the legal team for Brown v. Board of Education. Id.; see 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
Hubert Delany graduated from New York University Law School in 1926. George James, Hubert T. 
Delany, 89, Ex-Judge and Civil Rights Advocate, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990, at 24. He served as 
a justice in Domestic Relations Court in New York from 1942 to 1955, after which he worked in 
private practice for many years. Id. He was an early civil rights advocate, serving on the boards of the 
NAACP and LDF. Id. 
Chauncey Eskridge also went south from Chicago to join the legal team for Dr. King’s perjury trial. 
See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.b. He graduated from the John Marshall Law School in 1949. 
Kenan Heise, Chauncey Eskridge, 70, Close Ally of Rev. King, CHI. TRIB., JAN. 19, 1988, at A10. 
Eskridge was a longtime SCLC attorney and advised Dr. King on issues relating to his Chicago and 
Memphis movements. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 585, 622–23; see also discussion infra Section 
III.B.3.v. He also assisted with fundraising strategy. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 462–63. Dr. King 
often stayed at Eskridge’s home while in Chicago. Id. at 465. Eskridge was with Dr. King when he was 
assassinated and represented Dr. King’s estate. Heise, supra. 
Eskridge argued many civil rights cases throughout the 1960s as an attorney for the NAACP’s 
Chicago office. Id. He is perhaps best known for representing Muhammad Ali before the Supreme 
Court in Clay v. United States. See 403 U.S. 698 (1971) (reversing Ali’s conviction for refusing to 
report for the draft). Eskridge was elected circuit judge in 1981 and remained on the bench until 1986, 
when he retired. Heise, supra. He died in 1988 at the age of seventy. Id. 
152 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 59, 206–07, 213; GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 225–26, 323, 360–
64, 374; KING, supra note 7, at 127. Arthur Kinoy, Kunstler’s law partner, was also an active civil 
rights lawyer. See LANGUM, supra note 84, at 66–73; Paul Lewis, Arthur Kinoy is Dead at 82; Lawyer 
for Chicago Seven, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2003, at A11; Rutgers Professor Liberties Advocate, NEWARK 
EVENING NEWS, Aug. 18, 1966, http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/rutgers-professor-
liberties-advocate; see also, e.g., KINOY, supra note 30, at 151–53, 180–208 (discussing Kinoy’s work 
in the Montgomery and Danville movements). Kinoy also served as a legal mentor to Clarence Jones, 
who became a member of Dr. King’s inner circle. JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5–6, 13. Kinoy 
had extensive involvement in civil rights matters unrelated to Dr. King and SCLC. See generally 
KINOY, supra note 30, at 161–80; Lewis, supra. While Kinoy also worked on movements closely tied 
to Dr. King and SCLC, because of his communist past, Dr. King made clear that “Kinoy had no 
[official] affiliation with SCLC.” GARROW, supra note 2, at 308. 
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2. Identity Factors 
i. Race 
Dr. King had a strong preference for Black lawyers, though he enlisted many 
white lawyers as well.153 During his initial attempt to enlist Clarence Jones, Dr. 
King urged: 
The movement is fortunate to have the generous support of many 
northern white liberals, including lawyers. . . . One of my concerns, 
however, is our dire need of committed Negro professionals—
doctors, accountants, insurance agents. Particularly lawyers. The 
movement doesn’t have nearly enough of them—of people like you. 
We’d like to see them get more involved with the movement to help 
our southern brothers and sisters.154 
Judging by the numbers and the reputations of the Black lawyers who joined him, 
Dr. King achieved extraordinary success in this effort. While Black lawyers 
                                                
153 See infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
154 JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 6–7. Recounting similar remarks by Dr. King in a sermon he 
delivered the following weekend at an affluent Black Los Angeles church, Jones said that Dr. King 
“noted the ‘literally hundreds of offers’ from white northern professionals, particularly lawyers.” Id. at 
12. “What a shame it was, [Dr. King] said, that the kindness, generosity, and good will of those whites, 
while dearly appreciated, was not dwarfed by the kindness, generosity, and good will of those Negroes 
most in a position to offer them to their own people.” Id. 
Part of Dr. King’s reason for making that point was to recruit Clarence Jones as part of the defense 
team for his 1960 Alabama perjury trial. Forming an all-Black defense team for such a critical matter 
showed Dr. King’s confidence in those Black lawyers’ ability to operate effectively in an all-white legal 
system. It also underscored his stated racial priority. 
Recruiting Black lawyers seemed to be part of Dr. King’s broader agenda of engaging middle-class 
Black people in the Civil Rights Movement. Starting with the Montgomery Bus Boycott, he sought 
both to build unity within Black communities and to bring to bear the skills and resources of middle-
class and more affluent Blacks. See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 675 & 708 n.53, 
710 n.70. One of the great strengths of the bus protest was the unity that overcame previous factions 
within Montgomery’s Black community, including class divisions. See id. at 675, 689. See generally 
THORNTON, supra note 27, at 29, 31–33 (discussing divisions within the Black community). Middle-
class Blacks actively supported the protest, working in concert with the low-income and working-class 
bus riders who were directly affected by the discriminatory policies and practices. Coleman, Nee & 
Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 708 n.53. For example, some affluent Blacks offered their expensive cars 
and their time as drivers to transport boycotters, as part of the “car pool” system. Id. at 676. The 
strength and power of that unity became one of the lessons from the Montgomery protest. See id. at 
676–77, 689. 
Dr. King later pointed to this unity in reflecting on the MIA’s weekly meetings: 
 The mass meetings . . . cut across class lines. The vast majority present were 
working people; yet there was always an appreciable number of professionals in the 
audience. Physicians, teachers, and lawyers sat or stood beside domestic workers and 
unskilled laborers. The Ph.D's and the no "D's" were bound together in a common 
venture. The so-called "big Negroes" who owned cars and had never ridden the buses 
came to know the maids and the laborers who rode the buses every day. Men and women 
who had been separated from each other by false standards of class were now singing and 
praying together in a common struggle . . . . 
KING, supra note 7, at 68. 
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constituted a tiny fraction of the bar nationally in the 1950s and 1960s,155 they 
comprised nearly half of the more than seventy lawyers involved with Dr. King.156 
Table 1: Black Representation in the Legal Profession, 1950–1970157 
Year Number Percentage 
1950 1,450 .80 
1960 2,180 1.03 
1970 3,728 1.37 
 
In addition to the significant numbers of Black lawyers that Dr. King enlisted 
overall, his preference for Black lawyers became clear in his heavy reliance on them 
at critical times in his career. For example, the defense team in his Alabama perjury 
trial consisted entirely of Black lawyers.158 Using Black lawyers in court provided 
an opportunity to showcase their skills and talents. 159  Black lawyers could 
sometimes best their white counterparts in a direct competition, showing that Black 
lawyers could have success even on white segregationists’ terms.160 
Dr. King shared a paradox with those lawyers. Both Dr. King and his lawyers 
“represented the race” in two very different senses: seeking authenticity within the 
Black community, while at the same time trying to be perceived as worthy 
representatives of Blacks to the white community.161 Martin Luther King, Jr. faced 
that dual challenge of “representing the race” in dealing with white government 
officials, media, supporters, and opponents, while trying to build and retain 
credibility and support in the Black community.162 Black lawyers served as the face 
of the race and sought respect in virtually all-white courts and other public forums, 
while establishing credibility in the Black community.163 
                                                
155 See infra Table 1. 
156 See infra Appendix (identifying lawyers by race). 
157 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION: 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION pt. 1, § 2, at 739 tbl.223 (1973) [hereinafter 1970 CENSUS OF 
POPULATION]; 2 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS OF POPULATION: 
1950, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION pt. 1, ch. C, at 276 tbl.128 (1953) [hereinafter 1950 
CENSUS OF POPULATION]; 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS OF 
POPULATION: 1960, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION pt. 1, ch. D, at 544 tbl.205 (1964) 
[hereinafter 1960 CENSUS OF POPULATION]. 
158 See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.b. Similarly, his defense team in his Georgia incarceration 
was entirely Black until his father added a white lawyer on his own initiative. See DANIELS, supra note 
41, at 116; see also discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.c. 
159 See infra notes 349–350 and accompanying text. 
160 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1047–54 (discussing landmark bus segregation decision in 
Gayle v. Browder and the initial reluctance to file the suit); see also JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 
6–7 (recounting Dr. King as having intimated a “dire need of committed Negro professionals” 
becoming involved with the movement). Black lawyers’ participation represented an additional symbol 
of racial unity across class lines. See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1023–24. 
161 See generally KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
LAWYER (2012). 
162 See generally BRANCH, supra note 32, passim; GARROW, supra note 2, passim. 
163 White police, judges, and juries held all the positions of power. See, e.g., King, supra note 1, at 
xxiii–xxiv (reflecting on the “white Southern power structure”); see also discussion infra Sections 
II.A.1.i.a–d, II.A.2.i–ii, III.B.1.i, III.B.3.i–iii, III.B.3.v. 
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ii. Gender 
While women comprised a larger percentage of the nation’s lawyers than 
Blacks, they too constituted a tiny fraction of the bar nationally in the 1950s and 
1960s.164 
Table 2: Women’s Representation in the Legal Profession, 1950–1970165 
Year Number Percentage 
1950 6,256 3.47 
1960 7,434 3.50 
1970 13,180 4.84 
 
Unlike Dr. King’s efforts to enlist Black lawyers, there is no evidence Dr. 
King expressed a desire to include a significant number of women among the 
counsel. 166  Nor did any of his colleagues or those to whom he delegated the 
selection of lawyers. 167  In contrast to Blacks’ impressive statistical over-
representation, just two women—both of whom were Black—played significant 
roles.168 While Dr. King did not seem to seek out women lawyers, he did sing the 
praises of Constance Baker Motley and Marian Wright Edelman.169 
Constance Baker Motley, a prominent civil rights lawyer, served with LDF 
from 1946 to 1965.170 As LDF staff counsel and later associate counsel, Motley 
                                                
164 See infra Table 2. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s experience illustrates the limited opportunities 
those women had in the profession. She graduated near the top of her class from Stanford Law School 
in 1952. ‘Out of Order’ at the Court: O'Connor on Being the First Female Justice, NPR (Mar. 5, 2013, 
2:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=172982275. She contacted 
forty legal employers, all of whom refused to interview her. Id. Many stated explicitly that they would 
not hire a woman. Id. Justice O’Connor eventually took a job with the District Attorney for San Mateo 
County, California based on her agreement to work for no pay at first and to sit at a desk next to the 
secretary. Id. 
165 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, supra note 157, at 739 tbl.223; 1950 CENSUS OF POPULATION, 
supra note 157, at 278 tbl.128; 1960 CENSUS OF POPULATION, supra note 157, at 546 tbl.205; cf. 
CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 4 tbls.I.1 & I.2 (1983) (listing slightly different figures and 
percentages, while acknowledging discrepancies in government records). Virtually all of the Black civil 
rights lawyers in the South were men. See GRAY, supra note 148, at 108 (displaying a photograph of 
members of the Southwest Bar Association in 1960, showing one woman out of about fifty members). 
Similarly, the cover photo of J. Clay Smith’s book, Emancipation, shows the 1932 moot court class 
of Howard Law School, with twenty-six men and one woman. See SMITH, supra note 142. 
166 The sources consulted do not reveal any internal discussion of the lawyers’ gender having any 
bearing on their selection. 
167 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
168 Several other women played limited, behind-the-scenes roles. See infra Appendix. 
169 See infra notes 175–176, 182 and accompanying text. 
170 MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 59, 155, 206. Constance Baker Motley interned with Thurgood 
Marshall at the fledgling NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF) while attending Columbia 
Law School. Id. at 58–59. She volunteered at LDF between the spring and summer of 1945, and 
worked there as law clerk from October 1945 until she graduated from law school in June 1946. Id. 
After law school, she became the first female staff attorney at LDF. See VRA at 50: Day 17, NAACP 
LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/vra-at-50-day-17 (last visited Apr. 26, 2016). In her time at LDF, she 
argued ten cases before the Supreme Court, winning nine of them. See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 193–
202. Her victories also included helping James Meredith gain admission to the University of 
Mississippi in 1962 as its first Black student. Id. at 162–83; see Meredith v. Fair, 83 S. Ct. 10 (1962). 
Motley had a distinguished career after her time at LDF as well. In 1964, she became the first Black 
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represented Dr. King and other activists.171 LDF directors Thurgood Marshall and 
his successor Jack Greenberg assigned her to provide assistance in various 
places.172 On other occasions, local counsel called on Motley as reinforcement 
when they faced difficult challenges, as in Albany, Georgia.173 They did so out of 
respect for her experience and expertise. 174  In a 1966 statement about the 
“tremendous role” that lawyers played in the Civil Rights Movement, Dr. King 
included Constance Baker Motley as one of a half-dozen of those lawyers he 
mentioned by name.175 He singled her out as “that Portia” among “defenders of 
great renown” in American history.176 
Marian Wright Edelman met Dr. King in 1960 in Atlanta, when she was an 
undergraduate student at Spelman College.177 They developed their relationship 
when she spent several years with LDF’s Mississippi office after law school.178 
Through her work in Mississippi, she also came to know Senator Robert 
Kennedy.179 In a 1967 meeting with Kennedy, she expressed her strong concerns 
about the widespread existence of poverty and the need to educate the public about 
poverty.180 She passed along Kennedy’s suggestion to Dr. King to “bring the poor 
to Washington” to dramatize their plight and to press Congress for legislation to 
address it.181 For bringing that message to him, Dr. King called her “an angel sent 
                                                
woman elected to the New York State Senate. LINN WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE 127 
(1994); MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 206. In 1965, she was the first woman elected to the Manhattan 
(New York) Borough presidency. Douglas Martin, Constance Baker Motley, Civil Rights Trailblazer, 
Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/29/nyregion/29motley.html. 
In 1966, President Johnson appointed her as a federal district court judge. Id. She was the first Black 
female appointed to the federal bench. Id. In 1982, she became the first woman to serve as Chief Judge 
of the Southern District of New York, “the largest federal trial bench” in the United States. Rachel 
Christmas Derrick, A Columbian Ahead of Her Time: Constance Baker Motley, COLUM. MAG., http://
www.columbia.edu/cu/alumni/Magazine/Spring2004/motley.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). In 2001, 
President Bill Clinton awarded her the Presidential Citizens’ Medal, in recognition of her service to the 
nation. Id. She died in 2005 at the age of eighty-four. Martin, supra. 
171 See generally MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 132–55. 
172 See discussion infra Sections II.A.1.i.d, II.A.2.ii, II.B.2, III.B.1.i, III.B.3.i. See generally 
MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 70–73, 113, 142, 145, 162–63, 193 (illustrating instances in which 
Thurgood Marshall assigned Motley to assist with LDF cases); Allan Morrison, Top Woman Civil 
Rights Lawyer: Securing Rights for Millions, Negro Woman Is One of World’s Most Influential 
Lawyers, EBONY, Jan. 1963, at 50, 52, 54 (quoting Jack Greenberg on his view of Motley as LDF’s 
“field general” and on assigning her to the organization’s most challenging cases: “If a case is 
important or tough, one that really requires a major undertaking, then Connie gets it.”). 
173 See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 138–39; see also discussion infra Section II.A.2.ii. 
174 See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 154–55. See generally id. at 79, 88–89; WESTIN & MAHONEY, 
supra note 136, at 105. 
175 King, supra note 1, at xxi, xxiii. 
176 Id. at xxiii. The reference to Shakespeare’s heroine in The Merchant of Venice also suggests that 
she was rare, if not unique, as a woman doing civil rights work. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
THE MERCHANT OF VENICE. She was doing men’s work, since the legal profession was historically a 
male domain. 
177 See MARIAN WRIGHT EDELMAN, LANTERNS: A MEMOIR OF MENTORS 63 (1999). 
178 See id. at 73–75, 102–04. While in Mississippi, she engaged in a protracted struggle to secure 
federal funding for the Child Development Group of Mississippi, a pre-school program for poor 
children. See id. at 102–04. Mississippi’s segregationist senators strongly opposed the program. See id. 
at 103. Dr. King assisted her in advocating on behalf of the program. See id. at 102–04. 
179 See id. at 104–07, 172. 
180 See id. at 104, 106–09. 
181 See id. at 109. 
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by God.”182 The idea evolved into the “Poor People’s Campaign,” which Dr. King 
was planning when he was killed.183 Marian Wright Edelman served as counsel to 
the campaign.184 
It is not entirely clear why Dr. King had so few women lawyers.185 Dr. King’s 
focus was on race, and attracting Black lawyers was a key part of his agenda. There 
would be no reason to expect a similar effort to attract women lawyers unless they 
were Black and added to the level of participation of Black lawyers.186 
Moreover, with the separate spheres ideology still holding sway and the 
women’s movement yet to be born to challenge it, 187  Dr. King headed an 
organization that was male-dominated in its board, leadership, and staff.188 The 
men, including Dr. King, retained many traditional views about gender roles.189 
                                                
182 Id. The admiration and respect were mutual. In Edelman’s memoir about her mentors, she wrote 
at length about Martin Luther King, Jr. Describing a meeting with him when she was in college, she 
said: “He was wonderful. He’s almost Christ-like. Went up afterwards and he greeted me as if I were an 
old and dear friend.” Id. at 63. Later she described him as “our greatest twentieth-century national 
prophet.” Id. at 122. 
183 See infra Section III.B.1.iii. 
184 Marian Wright Edelman, CHILD. DEF. FUND, http://www.childrensdefense.org/about/leadership
/marian-wright-edelman/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015); see also infra notes 746, 754 and accompanying 
text. She went on to become the founder of the Children’s Defense Fund, which she continued to lead 
well into the twenty-first century. See Marian Wright Edelman, supra. 
185 Coretta Scott King’s observation about her husband suggested the complexity and perhaps 
contradictory nature of her husband’s views about women: 
On the one hand, he believed that women are just as intelligent and capable as men and 
that they should hold positions of authority and influence. But when it came to his own 
situation, he thought in terms of his wife being a homemaker and a mother for his 
children. He was very definite that he would expect whoever he married to be home 
waiting for him. 
CLAYBORNE CARSON, MARTIN’S DREAM: MY JOURNEY AND THE LEGACY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 
203 (2013). 
186 See, e.g., Dorothy I. Height, “We Wanted the Voice of a Woman to Be Heard”: Black Women and 
the 1963 March on Washington, in SISTERS IN THE STRUGGLE 83, 86 (Bettye Collier-Thomas & V.P. 
Franklin eds., 2001) (“There was an all-consuming focus on race. We women were expected to put all 
our energies into [the March on Washington]. . . . [T]here was a low tolerance level for . . . questions 
about the women’s participation . . . .”). 
187 The separate spheres philosophy is the idea that men should occupy the public sphere of work and 
public policy, while women should occupy the private sphere of the home and family. The late 
nineteenth-century conception of separate spheres is epitomized in Justice Bradley’s concurrence in 
Bradwell v. Illinois, which upheld the State’s exclusion of women from the practice of law based solely 
on their gender. See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). It expresses both the positive and normative view 
that men are biologically and genetically equipped for work and the public sphere while women are 
suited for the domestic and family realm. See id. at 141–42 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
Separate spheres ideology remained a common view of women’s nature, capacity, and appropriate 
role in society well beyond the middle of the twentieth century. Law schools, the legal profession, and 
the Civil Rights Movement itself reflected that constrained conception of women’s place. See generally 
Cary Franklin, Separate Spheres, 123 YALE L.J. 2878 (2014). 
188 See ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES 
ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 103 (1984) (detailing how the SCLC’s male leaders’ views on women drove 
them to select John Tilley over Ella Baker as SCLC’s first executive director). 
189 See id. Bernard Lee, one of Dr. King’s personal assistants, once referred to him as a “male 
chauvinist . . . believ[ing] that the wife should stay home and take care of the babies while he’d be out 
there in the streets.” GARROW, supra note 2, at 375–76. See generally Lee, Bernard Scott (1935–1991), 
KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_lee
_bernard_scott_1935_1991/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2015). 
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Furthermore, as SCLC turned increasingly to LDF for legal representation in 
the early 1960s, it relied heavily on that organization’s staff, volunteers, and local 
cooperating attorneys.190 LDF was also a male-dominated organization. A lack of 
women lawyers working at LDF (Constance Baker Motley was the organization’s 
only woman lawyer for much of this period) may also help to explain the relatively 
small number of women lawyers serving the movement.191 A number of other 
women lawyers made their mark as civil rights advocates during this period in 
movements unrelated to Dr. King.192 
                                                
When William Ming, Dr. King’s co-lead counsel in his 1960 perjury trial, was teaching at Howard 
Law School, he wondered aloud why women were in law school at all. See MACK, supra note 161, at 
229. 
In his co-authored book Behind the Dream, Clarence Jones, who helped write the “I Have a Dream” 
speech, noted with regret that virtually all the speakers at the March on Washington were men. JONES & 
CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 100–01. This was the case even though there were prominent activists like 
Rosa Parks on the podium who the crowd would have wanted to hear. See id. 
Lawyer and civil rights activist Pauli Murray expressed strong feelings about the exclusion of 
women: 
It was bitterly humiliating for Negro women on August 28 to see themselves accorded 
little more than token recognition in the historic March on Washington. Not a single 
woman was invited to make one of the major speeches or to be part of the delegation of 
leaders who went to the White House. This omission was deliberate. Representations for 
recognition of women were made to the policy-making body sufficiently in advance of 
the August 28 arrangements to have permitted the necessary adjustments of the program. 
Pauli Murray, The Negro Woman in the Quest for Equality, ACORN, June 1964, reprinted in REBELS IN 
LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS 172, 175 (J. Clay Smith Jr. ed., 1998). 
Coretta Scott King also expressed concerns about the treatment of women at the March on 
Washington. She had hoped to march at her husband’s side: “I felt that the involvement in the 
Movement of some of the wives had been so extensive that they should have been granted the privilege 
of marching with their husbands and of completely sharing this experience together, as they had shared 
the dangers and the hardships.” CARSON, supra note 185, at 210. 
190 See infra Section I.B.4.i. Pauli Murray, one of the most prominent Black women lawyers of the 
era, sought employment with LDF after law school but Thurgood Marshall rejected her application. See 
PAULI MURRAY, PAULI MURRAY: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A BLACK ACTIVIST, FEMINIST, LAWYER, 
PRIEST, AND POET 263 (1987). Murray dressed and carried herself in an androgynous style. See MACK, 
supra note 161, at 214. That made Marshall concerned about how she would fare in front of southern 
judges and juries. See id. at 220. 
191 See Constance Baker Motley, My Personal Debt to Thurgood Marshall, 101 YALE L.J. 19, 19 
(1991) (“My tribute acknowledges my personal debt to Thurgood Marshall for aiding my career at a 
time when nobody was hiring women lawyers.”); Dorothy Roberts, Constance Baker Motley, in THE 
YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 393, 394 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009) (“Upon 
graduating in 1946, Motley was hired as the only woman on the LDF legal team . . . .”). See generally 
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 32–36; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 151–55. 
192 In his 1966 civil rights memoir, lawyer William Kunstler listed about 350 lawyers who made 
significant contributions to the civil rights cause. See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at xi–xv. While men 
dominated the list, it included more than thirty women civil rights lawyers. See id. Many of those 
women lived in the North and did their civil rights work in their own communities. However, women 
were represented among the lawyers who joined hundreds of college students in Mississippi in the 
massive voter registration drive in 1964’s “Freedom Summer.” See LEN HOLT, THE SUMMER THAT 
DIDN’T END: THE STORY OF THE MISSISSIPPI CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT OF 1964 app. 3, at 280 (1965). Eight 
of the sixty-nine lawyers who went to Mississippi in support of the activists were women. See id. Most 
of them appeared to have been associated with the National Lawyers Guild. See id. 
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iii. Religion 
An SCLC board member once said, “SCLC is not an organization, it’s a 
church.”193 Black ministers led it, and it was “firmly rooted in the Black church.”194 
Even the name reflected the faith-based core of the organization.195 Dr. King felt it 
was important that “Christian” be included in the name to emphasize that the 
organization’s participants and its potential base came mostly from the church.196 
Ministers dominated the formal structure, including the Board and the high levels 
of the staff.197 Those origins could have led to a search for Christian lawyers who 
shared the organization’s religious beliefs and motivations. Nevertheless, religious 
affiliation did not seem to matter in the selection of lawyers.198 Movement leaders 
seemed indifferent about whether their lawyers shared the same faith and faith-
based commitment to civil rights.199 
In fact, several of Dr. King’s lawyers were Jewish.200 Having Jewish lawyers 
seemed consistent with Dr. King’s sense of kinship with the Jewish people because 
of their shared history of struggle against systematic oppression.201 For example, 
Jack Greenberg, who succeeded Thurgood Marshall in leading LDF, was Jewish.202 
Stanley Levison and Harry Wachtel, two members of Dr. King’s inner circle, were 
also Jewish.203 Levison was one of Dr. King’s most loyal and trusted advisers.204 It 
thus appears Dr. King did not attempt to recruit lawyers exclusively of the Christian 
faith. 
                                                
193 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 1. 
194 Id. 
195 See MORRIS, supra note 188, at 86. 
196 GARROW, supra note 2, at 97. Bayard Rustin tried to dissuade Dr. King, for fear that the name 
might put off non-religious civil rights supporters, but Dr. King was unmoved. Id.  
197 See id. at 104–05; MORRIS, supra note 188, at 103.  
198 While Fred Gray is a minister as well as a lawyer, that seemed irrelevant to his selection to 
represent the Montgomery Improvement Association. See GRAY, supra note 7, at 13, 52–54. 
199 The sources do not reveal any internal discussion of the lawyers’ religion having any bearing on 
their selection. 
200 In a 2007 panel discussion on Jewish lawyers in the Civil Rights Movement, former LDF head 
Jack Greenberg recalled: “[O]f the 17 [lawyers who signed the Brown v. Board of Education brief], 
four were white. And of the four, three were Jewish. And the fourth was Charles Black, who . . . was 
married to Barbara Black, who was Jewish . . . . Jewish involvement in LDF was substantial . . . among 
the whites, in the early days at least, I would say ninety percent of them were Jewish. As time went on, 
more and more non-Jews became involved.” Jewish Lawyers in the Civil Rights Movement, supra note 
74. The involvement of Jewish lawyers in Dr. King’s campaigns may have reflected the more general 
connection between Blacks and Jews in the Civil Rights Movement, especially in the 1950s and early 
1960s. See generally JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 125–41. 
201 See JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 126–27. Jones quotes Dr. King as having said: “There isn’t 
anyone in this country more likely to understand our struggle than Jews. Whatever progress we’ve 
made so far as a people, their support has been essential.” Id. at 129. 
202 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 48. 
203 BRANCH, supra note 32, at 582. 
204 See discussion infra Section I.B.5. 
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iv. Age 
Dr. King’s lawyers included the country’s most experienced and celebrated 
civil rights lawyers. 205  At the same time, Dr. King also welcomed—even 
embraced—relatively inexperienced young lawyers.206 That inclusiveness is not 
surprising in light of the fact that Dr. King was only twenty-six years old and a year 
into his first ministry when he assumed the mantle of leadership of the MIA.207 
Moreover, there were few established civil rights lawyers available to serve the 
burgeoning Civil Rights Movement. 208  Young, idealistic lawyers provided an 
important source of supply to meet a growing demand. 
Once again, Fred Gray epitomized the significant role that young lawyers 
played.209 In 1955, at age twenty-four, and only a year and a half out of law school, 
Gray defended Rosa Parks and then served as the MIA’s lawyer.210 While Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s first lawyer may have been his youngest, least experienced one, 
he was not the only one whose youth stood out. In his account of Dr. King recruiting 
him for the perjury defense team, Clarence Jones says that Dr. King repeatedly 
described him as a “young man” or young lawyer.211 It was as if his youth helped 
to qualify him for the assignment as a legal researcher, while at the same time 
                                                
205 See discussion infra Section I.B.4.i. See generally WILLIAM T. COLEMAN JR. WITH DONALD T. 
BLISS, COUNSEL FOR THE SITUATION: SHAPING THE LAW TO REALIZE AMERICA’S PROMISE 199 (2010) 
(“Since the 1930s LDF lawyers have forged much of the transformative legal precedent on civil rights 
through litigation in the federal and state courts and appeals to the Supreme Court. The Inc[.] Fund has 
attracted some of the finest lawyers, regardless of color, who have gone on to extraordinary careers as 
federal judges, law school professors, leading law firm partners, and elected officials.”); MOTLEY, 
supra note 13, at 59 (discussing LDF’s “outstanding lawyers”); WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, 
at 93–94 (discussing extensive credentials of lead-LDF lawyers Jack Greenberg and Constance Baker 
Motley). 
206 See, e.g., JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 2, 4–7 (noting that Clarence Jones was “less than a 
year out of law school” when Dr. King recruited him). Unlike twenty-first century law students, who 
have access to legal clinics, externships, and summer jobs, most of these young lawyers had limited 
practical experience when they joined the Civil Rights Movement. See, e.g., MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 
58–59. 
Moreover, some young lawyers were seeking to represent civil rights activists. See id. at 154–55. 
Their ideological commitment sometimes grew out of their own encounters with racism. For example, 
Fred Gray rode the Montgomery buses extensively and felt the sting of discrimination there. See supra 
note 127 and accompanying text. Horace Ward was rejected from the University of Georgia Law 
School and lost his suit challenging that exclusion. See supra note 142. These young lawyers graduated 
when the modern Civil Rights Movement was getting started, and there were opportunities for idealistic 
young lawyers to become activists for social change. 
Also, it was difficult for Black lawyers to make a living practicing law at that time. For example, 
Fred Gray had a great deal of time on his hands when he started his practice in Montgomery. See GRAY, 
supra note 7, at 31. 
207 GARROW, supra note 2, at 32. 
208 See Jewish Lawyers in the Civil Rights Movement, supra note 74. 
209 When Rosa Parks refused to give up her bus seat, Gray’s life and career took a remarkable turn. 
See GRAY, supra note 7, at 33. 
210 See id. at 6, 22, 50–53, 55–56. 
211 JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 12–13. Jones was twenty-nine years old in 1960, having 
graduated from law school in 1959 after serving in the military. See Jones, Clarence Benjamin (1931– 
), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc
_jones_clarence_benjamin_1931/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). 
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obligating him both to remember where he came from and to serve the civil rights 
cause.212 
In addition to Fred Gray and Clarence Jones, three other young lawyers 
similarly assumed significant roles. The first was Horace Ward, of Atlanta, who 
attended Morehouse College with Martin Luther King, Jr.213 In 1960, the year after 
Ward graduated from law school, he assisted Dr. King’s defense counsel in a 
Georgia criminal matter. 214  The second was Norman Amaker, who was only 
twenty-eight years old when he played a central role in the Birmingham Movement 
of 1963.215 A staffer at the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Amaker 
had been out of law school just four years.216 And the third was Marian Wright 
Edelman, who worked on the Poor People’s Campaign in 1968, and who was just 
twenty-eight years old and less than five years out of law school when she assumed 
that important responsibility.217 
At the same time, Dr. King, his colleagues, and the young lawyers themselves 
relied very heavily on the older, more experienced lawyers who had established the 
field of civil rights law and repeatedly brought their expertise to bear.218 Those 
lawyers included Thurgood Marshall, Robert Carter, Jack Greenberg, and 
Constance Baker Motley.219 
3. Strategic Commitments 
In light of Dr. King’s commitment to nonviolent direct action, it would be 
understandable if he expected the lawyers to share a belief in the principle and its 
efficacy. As Dr. King’s own understanding of, and commitment to, nonviolent 
direct action deepened,220 he might have become insistent that his lawyers were on 
the same strategic page. But Dr. King did not seem concerned about strategic 
conformity. While most of his lawyers supported nonviolent direct action, several 
remained committed to litigation as the essential means to bring about civil rights 
progress. 
                                                
212 See JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 13–14. 
213 DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 26. 
214 See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.c. 
215 See ESKEW, supra note 50, at 249, 252; GARROW, supra note 2, at 243; WESTIN & MAHONEY, 
supra note 136, at 77; Who is Norman Amaker?, LOY. U. CHI. SCH. L., http://www.luc.edu/law/amaker
/who_is_norman_amaker.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2016); see also discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. 
216 See Who is Norman Amaker?, supra note 215. 
217 See EDELMAN, supra note 177, at 67, 73–74, 76, 109–11; Krissah Thompson, Marian Wright 
Edelman Marks 40 Years of Advocacy at Children’s Defense Fund, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2013), http:
//wpo.st/mBsc1; Interview by Henry Hampton with Marian Wright Edelman (Dec. 21, 1988), http://
digital.wustl.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=eop;cc=eop;rgn=main;view=text;idno=ede5427.0676.044. 
Edelman graduated from Yale Law School in 1963. Marian Wright Edelman, BRITANNICA.COM, http://
www.britannica.com/biography/Marian-Wright-Edelman (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). 
218 See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 7, at 72–73; see also sources cited supra note 205. 
219 See discussion supra Section I.A, infra Sections II.A.1.i.a, II.A.1.i.d, II.A.2.ii, II.B.1–2, III.B.1.i, 
III.B.1.iii, III.B.3.i–iii, III.B.3.vi. 
220 See generally KING, supra note 7; MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 67–68, 79, 99, 121–
34. 
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Thurgood Marshall served as the most prominent case in point.221 His training 
and experience led him to view the courts as the central venue for achieving racial 
progress.222 He even expressed disdain for the Montgomery Bus Boycott: “All that 
walking for nothing. They might as well have waited for the Court decision.”223 A 
Marshall biographer suggests that “[i]n his heart, he viewed the bus boycott and 
King’s speeches as street theater that did not come close to equaling the main 
event—the NAACP’s effort to get the courts to end legal segregation.”224 
William Ming, Dr. King’s co-lead counsel in his perjury trial, came from the 
same court-focused tradition as Thurgood Marshall. 225  He had worked with 
Marshall on the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund’s school 
desegregation litigation campaign that included a series of Supreme Court higher 
education decisions and culminated with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.226 
Birmingham lawyer Arthur Shores initially expressed deep skepticism about 
nonviolent direct action.227 He strongly opposed the 1963 direct action campaign 
                                                
221 See Aldon Morris, Leon Forrest Professor of Sociology & African Am. Studies, Nw. Univ., 
Remarks at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin 
Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), 
in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 624, 631 (2016). 
222 See generally KLUGER, supra note 13, at 133–36, 156, 213–15, 222–24, 265–68, 270–73. 
223 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 74 (2000). 
224 JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 247 (Three Rivers Press 
2004) (1998). Williams also suggests that, notwithstanding Marshall’s deep reservations, he did make 
some supportive comments about the bus boycott publicly: “Even as he dismissed King’s protest tactics 
in private, Marshall told the delegates that the NAACP had to evaluate King’s nonviolent technique to 
see ‘to what extent it can be used in addition to our other means of protest.’ ” Id. at 251 (quoting 
Thurgood Marshall, Special Counsel, Keynote Address at the NAACP Annual Convention (June 26, 
1956)). 
While Dr. King may not have been fully aware of Marshall’s attitude toward the boycott and direct 
action generally, Marshall’s core strategic commitment to the courts as the engine for social change was 
a matter of long-standing public record. See, e.g., id. at 247 (describing Marshall’s belief that “people 
[should] obey the laws and the courts, even if they disliked them”). See generally TUSHNET, supra note 
13, at 232–82; Thurgood Marshall, NAACP LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/thurgood-marshall (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2015).  
225 See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 91, 113, 134–35, 137, 198; see also infra notes 683–684 and 
accompanying text (discussing the interaction between Ming and Dr. King during the Chicago Freedom 
Movement). 
226 See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 89–91, 137, 198. The cases included Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 
1 (1948), Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
227 See ESKEW, supra note 50, at 324; Glenn T. Eskew, The Alabama Christian Movement for 
Human Rights and the Birmingham Struggle for Civil Rights, 1956–1963, in BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA, 
1956–1963: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 3, 17 (David J. Garrow ed., 1989). Professor 
Eskew identifies Shores as having been a member of “Birmingham’s black bourgeoisie,” which had 
long “opposed [the] use of direct action confrontation.” Id. at 66–67. 
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in his hometown.228 He preferred to negotiate a compromise and then turn to the 
courts if necessary, rather than engaging in any type of direct action.229 
Notwithstanding these divergent strategic commitments, the lawyers were 
prepared to provide whatever assistance activists needed.230  Consequently, the 
lawyers’ stance on nonviolent direct action seemed largely immaterial to Dr. King. 
4. Civil Rights Legal Organizations  
In addition to individual lawyers, Martin Luther King, Jr. relied heavily on 
civil rights legal organizations. He established an especially close working 
relationship with the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF).231 He also 
secured legal assistance from the similarly named but separate NAACP.232 On 
occasion, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) cooperating attorneys also 
played a role.233  While Dr. King avoided having too many public ties to the 
National Lawyers Guild (NLG), he did enlist individual members from that 
organization.234 
i. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 
In 1940, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF) formed as a 
separate entity from the NAACP to carry out litigation campaigns, and Thurgood 
Marshall served as the organization’s first director-counsel.235 Marshall emerged as 
                                                
228 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 768, 901. Shores and other Black lawyers in Birmingham were 
opposed to a lawsuit to desegregate the city’s parks, viewing it as a bad idea because history showed the 
city would close all the parks if it lost. See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 222–23. They collectively 
agreed that none of them would handle the case unless the Alabama Christian Movement for Human 
Rights hired all of them, which they knew it could not afford to do. See id. at 223–24. 
229 See ESKEW, supra note 50, at 324; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 194; see also, e.g., TUSHNET, 
supra note 13, at 113–14, 119. Professor Thornton describes Shores as “a man always eager to 
accommodate white community leaders” through compromise. THORNTON, supra note 27, at 223. 
230 See supra note 30 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., KINOY, supra note 30, at 192–93 
(“Lawyers were no longer the central agents fighting to achieve the goals of freedom and equality 
through their own special arena, the courts of law. Their role now was vastly different. Their primary 
task was to find ways of helping the Black people themselves resist the efforts of the power structure to 
derail their own forward movement to enforce the constitutional promises of freedom and equality.”); 
ANDREW YOUNG, AN EASY BURDEN: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICA 215–16 (1996) (“[LDF’s] style was such that they never discouraged us from anything. Their 
position was that they could not dictate the strategy of the movement but would be there to manage the 
legal ramifications of our decisions. . . . [Dr. King] determined the political strategy, and the LDF 
crafted a complementary legal strategy to minimize our exposure to legal sanctions.”). See generally 
KINOY, supra note 30, at 168–69, 189. 
231 See infra Section I.B.4.i. 
232 See infra Section I.B.4.ii. 
233 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 375. 
234 See infra Section I.B.4.iv. Jack Greenberg avoided the National Lawyers Guild, presumably 
because of its reputation of having connections to the Communist Party. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra 
note 51, at 376–80. However, Dr. King listed NLG among the legal organizations that had helped 
advance civil rights. King, supra note 1, at xxv. His list also included the ACLU, the Law Students 
Civil Rights Research Council, the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee, the NAACP LDF, and 
the President’s Committee on Civil Rights Under Law. Id. 
235 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 17–18 (discussing LDF’s incorporation in March 1940). 
Because the NAACP’s lobbying and propaganda activities disqualified it from receiving tax-deductible 
contributions, its board created LDF as an independent charitable organization that would carry out the 
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the most prominent civil rights litigator of his era,236 and LDF became the country’s 
preeminent civil rights litigation organization.237 
Fred Gray turned to LDF for assistance early in the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott.238 After that, Dr. King relied increasingly on the organization for legal 
assistance.239 In 1961, as Thurgood Marshall left LDF for a seat on the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals bench, he picked Jack Greenburg as his successor.240 
Greenberg had been with LDF for more than a decade, and he was on the legal team 
that won Brown v. Board of Education.241 The relationship between LDF and Dr. 
                                                
NAACP’s non-lobbying and non-propaganda activities, hoping that its tax-exempt status would attract 
contributions from the Rockefeller family. See id. at 17; see also NAACP v. NAACP Legal Def. & 
Educ. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“Besides serving as a means to ensure on-going 
financing of civil rights litigation, the creation of the LDF provided an important tax advantage.”). LDF 
had its own board of directors, though all of its original directors also served on the NAACP’s board. 
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 18. That influence “assured indirect control” over LDF’s operations. Id. 
236 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 23, 
23 (1991) (“Thurgood Marshall was probably the most important advocate in America, one who used 
his formidable legal skills to end the evils of discrimination. . . . [I]t was his presentations, in case after 
case and in court after court, that helped bring about a society in which ‘equal protection of the laws’ 
could be a reality and not merely a legal phrase.”). 
237 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 551; Rabin, supra note 75, at 216–18. Marshall led the 
organization through its decades-long public education desegregation litigation campaign, culminating 
with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For more on those efforts, see KLUGER, supra 
note 13. 
238 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 70 (stating Gray sought input from Thurgood Marshall shortly after 
the boycott began to guide his discussion with movement leaders about filing a case in federal court). 
239 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 360–64, 374; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135, 159; MLK 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 216–17; King, supra note 1, at xxv. 
240 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 315–17; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 51. As a white 
lawyer, Greenberg’s appointment produced controversy both within and outside of the organization. 
See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 7, 318–19; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 151–54. 
Thurgood Marshall went on to serve as Solicitor General from 1965 to 1967. WILLIAMS, supra note 
224, at 317, 338. In 1967, President Johnson appointed him to the Supreme Court, where he served 
until 1991. Id. at 330–31, 391. 
241 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 25, 175, 551–52; see 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning the 
“separate but equal” doctrine); see also Jack Greenberg, NAACP LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org/jack-
greenberg-biography (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Greenberg LDF Bio]. Jack Greenberg 
graduated from Columbia Law School in 1948, and the following year he joined LDF as an assistant 
counsel under Thurgood Marshall. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at xiii; see also Jack Greenberg, 
COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Jack_Greenberg (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) 
[hereinafter Greenberg Faculty Bio]. During his thirty-five years with LDF, Greenberg argued forty 
cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and hundreds more in the lower courts, in areas such as school 
desegregation, employment discrimination, and the death penalty. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at xiii; 
see, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that, in the three cases before 
the Court, the death penalty violated the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause of the Eighth 
Amendment—applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment—and temporarily ending all 
executions); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (prohibiting reliance on tests with 
discriminatory impact for employment and promotion decisions unless the employer can show that such 
practice is “related to job performance”); Alexander v. Holmes Cty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) 
(holding that segregated school systems must desegregate “at once”). 
Greenberg was an adjunct professor at Columbia Law School from 1970–84, and he left LDF in 
1984 to join the law school’s faculty. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at xiii; Greenberg Faculty Bio, supra. 
He served as Dean of Columbia College from 1989–93, and then returned to teaching full-time as a 
professor at the law school. Id. He has spent numerous semesters as a visiting professor at law schools 
worldwide, and has written several books and other publications reflecting on his battles and victories 
in the Civil Rights Movement. See id; Greenberg LDF Bio, supra. 
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King deepened, since Greenberg was far more sympathetic to Dr. King’s nonviolent 
direct action strategies than Marshall had been.242  By 1963, LDF had become 
SCLC’s primary legal counsel.243 
Dr. King’s relationship with LDF had many benefits for the movement. First, 
it added substantially to the supply of capable, committed lawyers.244 LDF’s level 
of experience and the depth and breadth of expertise dwarfed that of any other 
group. The staff included many of the top civil rights lawyers in the country.245 
Including Greenberg and Motley, LDF had seventeen staff lawyers by the mid-
                                                
In 1996, the American Bar Association recognized Greenberg for his exceptional contributions to 
civil rights by awarding him the Thurgood Marshall Award. Id. In 2001, President Clinton awarded 
Greenberg a Presidential Citizens Medal, noting, “In the courtroom and the classroom, Jack Greenberg 
has been a crusader for freedom and equality for more than half a century.” Id.; see also Jennifer Shotz, 
Law Professor Jack Greenberg Awarded Presidential Citizens Medal, COLUM. NEWS (Jan. 12, 2001), 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/01/01/jackGreenberg.html. 
Greenberg is a founding member of the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and 
continued to serve on LDF’s Board of Directors. Greenberg Faculty Bio, supra. 
242 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463–65. There had also been personal tensions between 
Thurgood Marshall and Dr. King. Marshall resented the fact that Dr. King’s reputation was growing 
and overtaking his own as a leader of the Civil Rights Movement. See WILLIAMS, supra note 224, at 
251–52. 
243 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 374. SCLC never had a full-time in-house legal staff. As its 
primary outside counsel, LDF became the closest thing the organization had to such an arrangement. 
See id.; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 178 (stating LDF took over all SCLC’s important 
litigation in June 1964 when the Gandhi Society expired); Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Robert 
McDougal, Jr. (Dec. 14, 1965), http://thekingcenter.org/archive/document/letter-mlk-robert-mcdougal-
jr# (“[T]he NAACP’s Legal Defense [F]und handles all litigations and judicial proceedings for the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference.”). Michael Meltsner, an LDF staff attorney during this 
period, argued that “[w]hile every lawyer who was ever in the same room with Martin Luther King has 
claimed to have represented him, it was Greenberg—and LDF—that King asked time and time again to 
do his most important legal work.” MICHAEL MELTSNER, THE MAKING OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER 135 
(2006). But some sources suggest that Chauncey Eskridge acted as SCLC “legal counsel” for a period 
of time. See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 2, at 622 (calling Eskridge “[l]ongtime SCLC attorney”); Heise, 
supra note 151 (stating Eskridge was SCLC’s “legal counsel in the late 1960s”). 
244 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 323–26, 374. LDF had a very large and varied docket of its 
own, both substantively and geographically. See id. at 323–26. Even so, LDF provided far more legal 
resources to SCLC than any other organization. See id. at 374, 552. 
245 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 72–73; King, supra note 1, at xxiii; Rabin, supra note 75, at 217 n.38, 
232 n.78. 
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1960s.246 They included James Nabrit III,247 Norman Amaker,248 Leroy Clark,249 
Melvyn Zarr,250 and Steve Ralston,251 among others. LDF’s consultants constituted 
                                                
246 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 323. 
247 After graduating from Yale Law School in 1955, James M. Nabrit III served in the Army and then 
practiced at a Washington, D.C. law firm before joining LDF as a staff attorney in 1959. Matt Schudel, 
Civil Rights Stalwart Argued Key Cases Before High Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2013, at B5. He 
worked on a variety of civil rights cases at LDF, including school desegregation, prison conditions, 
public accommodations, and criminal defense. James M. Nabrit, 1932–2013, NAACP LDF (Mar. 24, 
2013), http://www.naacpldf.org/news/james-m-nabrit-1932-2013 [hereinafter Nabrit]. 
Nabrit co-wrote the Supreme Court brief for the appeal of Dr. King’s 1964 arrest in Birmingham for 
violating an injunction. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 363; see Walker v. City of Birmingham, 
388 U.S. 307 (1967); see also discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. Nabrit also helped write the detailed 
plan for the Selma to Montgomery 1965 voting rights march that the district court approved. Nabrit, 
supra; see discussion infra Section III.B.3.iii. 
Nabrit continued to work for LDF until 1989. Nabrit, supra. He argued twelve cases before the 
Supreme Court, including Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), which found that 
Denver’s segregated schools violated the Equal Protection clause. After his retirement, Nabrit 
continued to advise the organization until his death at the age of 80 in 2013. See Nabrit, supra. 
248 After graduating from Columbia Law School in 1959, Norman Amaker became a staff attorney 
for LDF. Who is Norman Amaker?, supra note 215. Amaker worked on a variety of civil rights cases at 
LDF, including school desegregation, voting rights, employment discrimination, and the death penalty, 
and argued cases before all levels of state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court. Id.; see also 
James Janega, Norman Amaker, 65, Key Civil Rights Figure, CHI. TRIB. (June 11, 2000), http://articles
.chicagotribune.com/2000-06-11/news/0006110048_1_adam-clayton-powell-naacp-legal-defense-fund-
first-year-students. 
Amaker represented demonstrators arrested during Martin Luther King, Jr.’s voter registration drive 
in Selma, Alabama, GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 381, and he briefed Dr. King and other SCLC 
leaders on the likely consequences of violating the injunction against marches in Birmingham. BRANCH, 
supra note 32, at 728; see discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. After Dr. King was arrested for violating 
the injunction, Amaker served as one of the couriers who carried Dr. King’s famous “Letter from a 
Birmingham Jail” out of jail. Who is Norman Amaker?, supra note 215. See generally infra note 659 
(discussing Dr. King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”). 
Amaker left LDF in 1971 to become the Executive Director of Neighborhood Legal Services 
Program, a Washington, D.C. legal aid organization. See Who is Norman Amaker?, supra note 215. He 
became a law professor at Rutgers Law School in 1973, and moved to Loyola University Chicago 
School of Law in 1976. Id. Amaker taught at Loyola until his death in 2000 at the age of sixty-five. See 
id. 
249 After Leroy Clark graduated from Columbia Law School in 1961, he worked briefly at the State 
of New York Attorney General’s office before joining LDF as a staff attorney in 1962. See New 
Member Joins NAACP Defense Fund, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 22, 1962, at 8-D. Clark defended 
Dr. King after his arrest for violating the injunction against demonstrating in Birmingham in 1963. 
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 362; see discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. He also represented 
demonstrators arrested in 1965 for participating in voting rights demonstrations in Selma. GREENBERG, 
supra note 51, at 381. See generally infra Section III.B.3.iii (discussing Selma arrests). After Selma, 
Clark worked with Dr. King on planning for the Poor People’s Campaign and was instrumental in 
bringing the campaign to fruition. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463; see also discussion infra Sections 
III.B.1.iii, III.B.3.vi. 
In 1968, Clark became a professor at NYU Law School, where he worked for eleven years, and then 
served as general counsel for the EEOC from 1979–1981. Leroy D. Clark, CATH. U. AM. COLUMBUS 
SCH. LAW, http://www.law.edu/fac-staff/clark-leroy/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). He went on 
to become a professor at Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law from 1981 until his 
retirement in 2006. Black Law Students Association Honors Professor Emeritus Leroy Clark, CATH. U. 
AM. COLUMBUS SCH. LAW, http://www.law.edu/2013-Winter-Spring/BLSA-Honors-Prof-Emeritus-
Leroy-Clark.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2015). 
250 Melvyn Zarr graduated from Harvard Law School in 1963. Melvyn Zarr, Recollections of My 
Time in the Civil Rights Movement, 61 ME. L. REV. 365, 366 (2009). He started working for LDF as a 
summer position to make money before the bar exam, and ended up accepting a full time position at the 
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a small group of highly committed civil rights advocates, 252  including law 
professors Louis Pollak 253  and Anthony Amsterdam. 254  A network of local 
                                                
end of the summer. Id. at 367–69. Zarr worked on numerous civil rights issues during his time at LDF, 
starting with demonstrator cases. See id. at 368. He spent the summer of 1966 in Grenada, Mississippi, 
giving advice and doing defense work for Dr. King and others involved with a string of SCLC 
demonstrations. See id. at 372. Starting in the mid-60s, Zarr was the Mississippi member of LDF’s 
“Demonstration Team.” Id. at 373. If Dr. King was demonstrating in Mississippi, Zarr traveled there to 
supplement the local lawyers. Id. He also worked with Dr. King to plan the Poor People’s Campaign. 
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463; see discussion infra Section III.B.1.iii. 
Zarr continued doing civil rights work with LDF after Dr. King’s death, including arguing before the 
Supreme Court in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), which held that the exclusionary rule 
applies to fingerprint evidence obtained during an illegal detention. In 1969, he left LDF to become co-
director of a group focusing on poverty law reform. Zarr, supra, at 375. He went on to become a 
professor at University of Maine School of Law in 1973. Id. 
251 Charles Stephen Ralston earned his law degree in 1962 from the University of California at 
Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law. Selma Profiles, supra note 140. After law school, he served in the 
United States Army Reserves and then taught for a year at Columbia Law School before joining LDF in 
1964 as a staff attorney. Id. His caseload at LDF included housing and employment discrimination, 
capital punishment, school desegregation, and voting rights. Id. 
Ralston co-wrote the motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent interference with Dr. 
King’s 1965 voting rights march from Selma to Montgomery. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 383; see 
also discussion infra Section III.B.3.iii. He moved to San Francisco is 1968 to open LDF’s West Coast 
office, but eventually returned to New York and, in 1988, was appointed to lead LDF’s appellate 
litigation practice. Selma Profiles, supra note 140. After serving as senior staff attorney and LDF’s 
employment litigation practice lead from 1993 to 2001, Ralston moved back to San Francisco, where he 
opened his own practice and continued his work with LDF as a cooperating attorney. Id. 
252 See generally GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 171. 
253 Louis Pollak graduated from Yale Law School in 1948. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination 
and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959). After law school, 
he clerked for Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, and then went to work for a New York law firm. 
Dennis Hevesi, Louis H. Pollak, Civil Rights Activist and Federal Judge, Dies at 89, N.Y. TIMES, May 
13, 2012, at A24. While at the firm, he began volunteering at LDF, doing consulting and brief writing 
for school desegregation cases. See id.; see also COLEMAN, supra note 205, at 122, 143, 145, 147, 153; 
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 171. He at one time was vice president of LDF’s Board. Jack Greenberg, 
Louis H. Pollak, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 295, 296 (1978). He went on to work for the State Department and 
in the legal department of a union. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 171. In 1955, Pollak joined the 
faculty at Yale Law School, and in 1965 he became dean. See Hevesi, supra. While at Yale, Pollak 
continued to volunteer with LDF and played an active role in cases during the Freedom Riders 
Movement. Id. He successfully argued Abernathy v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 447 (1965), the Supreme Court 
decision that overturned the convictions of Freedom Riders by citing its holding in Boynton v. Virginia, 
364 U.S. 454 (1960), that racial segregation in public transportation was illegal. Pollak was also part of 
the team that met with Dr. King to plan the Poor People’s Campaign. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 
463; see also discussion infra Section III.B.1.iii. 
Pollak left Yale in 1974 to join the faculty at University of Pennsylvania Law School, and became 
dean of the law school the following year. Hevesi, supra. In 1978, President Carter appointed him 
district judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. Pollak assumed senior status in 1992. Id. He 
died in 2012 at the age of eighty-nine. Id. 
254 Anthony Amsterdam graduated in 1960 from University of Pennsylvania Law School and then 
clerked for Justice Felix Frankfurter. Anthony G. Amsterdam – Biography, NYU SCH. L., http://its.law
.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/profile.cfm?section=bio&personID=19743 (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) 
[hereinafter Amsterdam Profile]. After his clerkship, Amsterdam spent a year as an Assistant United 
States Attorney and then joined the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. See THE 
RULE OF LAW ORAL HISTORY PROJECT: THE REMINISCENCES OF ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM 29–30 
(Columbia Univ. Oral History Research Office ed., 2010) [hereinafter REMINISCENCES]. 
Amsterdam had written a student note for the University of Pennsylvania Law Review on the 
Supreme Court’s application of the vagueness doctrine to address local officials’ use of vague statutes 
such as disorderly conduct and trespassing to discriminate against civil rights demonstrators. Id. at 35–
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cooperating lawyers multiplied the organization’s resources.255 By the mid-1960s, 
about 200 cooperating lawyers served as local counsel in LDF’s litigation.256 
With significant numbers of lawyers at its disposal, LDF gave priority to Dr. 
King and SCLC in assigning its lawyers. With so many crises, Dr. King often 
needed lawyers on very short notice who could commit the time and resources 
required to address Dr. King’s needs.257 Jack Greenberg repeatedly dispatched staff 
lawyers upon request, with little or no delay. 258  He also made himself and 
                                                
36. Based on that research, LDF called on him, starting in 1963, for assistance in defending 
demonstrators, including those involved in SCLC demonstrations. Id. Amsterdam worked with 
cooperating LDF attorneys, primarily writing briefs. Id. at 41; see, e.g., discussion infra Section 
III.B.3.i. 
Amsterdam went on to do a variety of pro bono work throughout his career, including civil rights 
cases with LDF and poverty work with the ACLU. See REMINISCENCES, supra, at 117. His primary 
focus was the death penalty, including arguing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme 
Court decision that ruled existing state death penalty laws unconstitutional. He argued numerous cases 
before the Supreme Court and wrote amicus briefs in many others. See, e.g., Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that North Carolina’s mandatory death sentence for first-degree 
murder violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) 
(reversing a death penalty conviction for a Black Alabama man who had pled guilty to robbery, where 
it was unclear whether the defendant had voluntarily and understandingly entered his guilty plea). 
Amsterdam left Penn Law School for Stanford in 1969 and went on to NYU in 1981. Amsterdam 
Profile, supra. 
255 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 298, 394; Rabin, supra note 75, at 216–18. 
256 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 394. Along with performing substantial work for Dr. King and 
SCLC, LDF performed significant litigation in many areas of civil rights during that time. After its 
victories in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), holding “separate but equal” 
unconstitutional in the area of public education, and Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 
294 (1955), directing localities to move towards compliance with “all deliberate speed,” id. at 301, LDF 
initiated lawsuits all over the South to enforce Brown. History, NAACP LDF, http://www.naacpldf.org
/history (last visited Mar. 3, 2015); see, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (holding that 
a Virginia school board’s adoption of a “freedom-of-choice” plan, in which each student chose which 
public school to attend, did not constitute adequate compliance with Brown when not a single white 
student had chosen to attend a formerly Black school and eighty-five percent of Black students still 
attended the same school that they attended prior to Brown); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) 
(denying an Arkansas school board’s post-Brown request to suspend its judicially-approved school 
integration plan pending the resolution of various legal challenges of state laws aimed at circumventing 
Brown). In 1961, LDF had forty-six school cases, and that number grew to 185 in 1965. GREENBERG, 
supra note 51, at 324. 
Throughout the 1960s, LDF argued approximately forty demonstration cases before the Supreme 
Court, virtually all of which were successful except for Dr. King’s conviction for marching in 
Birmingham when there was a state court injunction prohibiting the march. Id. at 323; see Walker v. 
City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); see also discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. Demonstration 
cases involved fighting for those convicted of crimes like trespass or breach of the peace for 
participating in sit-ins or other demonstrations against segregation. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 
288–92. LDF used various arguments against these types of convictions, largely focusing on how the 
state enforced segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 292–95. 
By the mid-1960s, those types of cases began to decrease as consistent victories led to widespread 
compliance with integration of public accommodations. See id. at 323. Also in the mid-1960s, LDF’s 
legal staff and budget grew substantially, which enabled LDF to increase the variety of cases it 
litigated. See id. LDF attorneys began working on enforcing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with an 
emphasis on the equal employment sections of the Act. Id. at 323–24. They also expanded their 
criminal defense work, fighting against racial discrimination in capital punishment, which eventually 
developed into an attack on the constitutionality of capital punishment. See id. at 326, 394. 
257 See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 364, 374, 381–83, 465; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135, 
159. 
258 See sources cited supra note 94. 
Vol. 10:3]  Leonard S. Rubinowitz 
  535 
Constance Baker Motley available at times and places that Dr. King requested.259 
Moreover, turning to LDF advanced Dr. King’s objective of maximizing 
representation by Black lawyers. Blacks comprised the majority of the 
organization’s lawyers.260 
In addition, LDF was responsive to SCLC’s changing legal needs. Dr. King 
and Jack Greenberg shared the same conception of the appropriate lawyer-client 
relationships.261 Dr. King and his colleagues needed to be able to make the final 
decisions about strategies and tactics.262 Jack Greenberg perceived the role of LDF 
as laying out the law and the implications of taking alternative routes, without 
pressing its views about what SCLC should do.263 LDF lawyers willingly carried 
out whatever tasks Dr. King asked of them. Since the lawyers’ roles changed 
significantly with the movement’s strategic shifts, LDF’s flexibility proved 
valuable.264 
LDF also had the geographical flexibility necessary to support the SCLC 
campaigns.265 The organizations’ structures and methods of operation mirrored 
each other’s. Each had a base, with LDF in New York and SCLC in Atlanta, and 
each pursued its goals in many places, with LDF’s local cooperating lawyers and 
SCLC’s affiliate organizations throughout the region.266  
Still another significant attraction of LDF was that the non-profit organization 
did not charge fees to its clients. LDF relied on its own fund-raising efforts to 
sustain its staff and network of cooperating lawyers. 267  That was extremely 
important in light of SCLC’s recurring financial challenges.268 
ii. NAACP 
In response to Fred Gray’s request, NAACP General Counsel Robert Carter 
provided legal backup in Montgomery early on.269 He assisted local lawyers both 
                                                
259 See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 306–08, 362, 463; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 158–59. 
260 See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 154–55. 
261 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 374. 
262 See id. 
263 See id.; id. at 380. 
264 See, e.g., discussion infra Section III.B.3.i (discussing example of LDF respecting Dr. King’s 
decision to violate a state court injunction in Birmingham in 1963). 
265 See Rabin, supra note 75, at 216–17. See generally GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 291–92, 298, 
323, 374, 394 (discussing LDF’s network of cooperating lawyers and alliance with SCLC). 
266 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 71; GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 17; sources cited supra 
note 265. 
267 For insights into LDF’s fundraising strategies, see GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 395–403. In 
appreciation for the services, Dr. King contributed to LDF, with apologies for the modest size of the 
contributions. See Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Thurgood Marshall (Feb. 6, 1958), in 4 THE 
PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: SYMBOLS OF THE MOVEMENT, JANUARY 1957–DECEMBER 1958, 
at 360, 360 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 2000). 
268 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 47, 142. 
269 See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 302; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 682. Robert 
L. Carter graduated from Howard Law School in 1940 and earned an LL.M. from Columbia Law 
School in 1941. Howard Univ. Sch. of Law, Robert L. Carter (1917–2012), BROWN@50, http://www
.brownat50.org/brownbios/biojudgerbtcarter.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). He served in the Army 
from 1941 to 1944, where he first experienced harsh racism and became determined to end racial 
discrimination. ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE OF 
EQUAL RIGHTS 36, 49–50 (2005). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2016 
536 
in defending Rosa Parks for refusing to give up her seat and in Martin Luther King, 
Jr.’s prosecution under the state anti-boycott statute.270 The NAACP also joined in 
the challenge to the constitutionality of the state and local bus segregation laws 
along with LDF and Fred Gray.271 
After Montgomery, the NAACP had much less interaction with Dr. King and 
SCLC than LDF. It had a much smaller legal staff than LDF, and it had to direct 
substantial resources to defending itself against legal attacks from southern 
states.272 
iii. American Civil Liberties Union  
In addition to its own small staff, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
operated through a network of “cooperating attorneys.”273 In April 1968, the head 
of the ACLU’s southern region called on a Memphis law firm to provide pro bono 
                                                
After leaving the Army, Carter joined LDF in 1944 as Thurgood Marshall’s legal assistant, and then 
became an assistant special counsel the following year. Roy Reed, Robert L. Carter, 94, Leading 
Strategist Against Segregation and U.S. Judge, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012, at A17; Black History 
Month Spotlight: Robert L. Carter, NAACP LDF (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release
/black-history-month-spotlight-robert-l-carter [hereinafter Carter Spotlight]; see also KLUGER, supra 
note 13, at 271 (referring to Carter as Thurgood Marshall’s “key assistant” and describing him as 
“limber, quiet, and strongly self-disciplined”). He played a critical role in the long series of school 
desegregation cases, including working as a lead attorney in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 
(1950) (holding the University of Texas’s refusal to admit a Black student to its law school because of 
his race unconstitutional, where separate facility provided for Blacks was inferior in several respects), 
and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Carter Spotlight, supra; see also 
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 166, 180, 422–23. In 1956, Carter became NAACP’s general counsel. 
See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 150; see also TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 310. During his tenure as a 
civil rights attorney, Carter argued twenty-two cases before the Supreme Court, winning twenty-one of 
them. Carter Spotlight, supra. 
Carter resigned from the NAACP in 1968. CARTER, supra, at 202. He began a yearlong fellowship at 
Columbia University, after which he became a partner at a small New York City law firm. See id. at 
204, 207. In 1972, Carter was appointed by President Nixon to the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, where he served until retiring in 2009 as a senior judge. Dennis McLellan, 
Robert L. Carter, 1917–2012; NAACP Attorney Fought Segregation, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, at AA6; 
Carter Spotlight, supra. Carter died in 2012, at age 94. McLellan, supra. 
270 See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 302–03. 
271 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 71–72; see also Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per curiam), aff’g 
142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); discussion infra Section II.B.1. In addition to providing lawyers 
and helping with legal costs, the NAACP supported the boycott by raising funds for the MIA. National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://
kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_national_association_for_the
_advancement_of_colored_people_naacp1/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2015). Dr. King wrote NAACP 
Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins in May 1956 to thank him for encouraging these efforts: 
[T]he whole Executive Board of the Montgomery Improvement Association is deeply 
gratified to know of the support that the National Office consented to give for our 
struggle. All of the offers that were made concerning the three legal matters are 
satisfactory to us. I assure you that this will go a long, long way in lifting the legal burden 
that we confront. Moreover, this deep spirit of cooperation from the NAACP will give us 
renewed courage and vigor to carry on. 
Letter from M.L. King, Jr., President, Montgomery Improvement Ass’n, to Roy Wilkins, Exec. Sec’y, 
NAACP (May 1, 1956), in 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 243, 243–
44. 
272 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 237, 261. 
273 See Rabin, supra note 75, at 223–24. 
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representation to Dr. King and the local striking sanitation workers in seeking the 
court’s permission to carry out a protest march.274 
iv. National Lawyers Guild   
In 1937, a group of lawyers organized the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) as 
an alternative to the politically conservative and racially exclusionary American 
Bar Association.275 It had a “general commitment to progressive government and 
the use of the law as an instrument for social change.”276 It was the first white-
organized lawyers’ organization to accept Black members.277 
Dr. King recognized the Guild’s important contributions to the Civil Rights 
Movement.278 At the same time, there was reason for Dr. King to be wary of having 
too close and too public ties to NLG. The federal government viewed the 
organization as closely tied to the Communist Party.279 Since opponents of the Civil 
                                                
274 See BEIFUSS, supra note 65, at 268; Cody, supra note 118, at 703–04; see also W.J. Michael 
Cody, Burch, Porter & Johnson (Memphis), Remarks at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and 
Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the 
March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 679, 683 (2016) 
[hereinafter Cody Remarks]; discussion infra Section III.B.3.v. 
275 See SMITH, supra note 142, at 550. See generally TASK FORCE ON MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 14–16 (1986); THE NATIONAL 
LAWYERS GUILD: FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (Ann Fagan Ginger & Eugene M. Tobin eds., 
1988); Our History, NAT’L LAW. GUILD, http://www.nlg.org/our-history (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
By the time Martin Luther King, Jr.’s career began, NLG had become the first racially integrated 
organization of lawyers to have a Black president. See ROBERT J. BLAKELY WITH MARCUS SHEPARD, 
EARL B. DICKERSON: A VOICE FOR FREEDOM AND EQUALITY, at xviii (2006). Earl Dickerson, a Chicago 
activist, lawyer, and businessman, led NLG from 1951 to 1954. John T. McQuiston, Earl B. Dickerson 
Dies at 95; Lawyer and Rights Advocate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1986, at B12; The Early Years, NAT’L 
LAW. GUILD, http://www.nlg.org/early-years (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
276 STEVE BABSON, DAVE RIDDLE & DAVID ELSILA, THE COLOR OF LAW: ERNIE GOODMAN, DETROIT, 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LABOR AND CIVIL RIGHTS 80 (2010). 
277 See SMITH, supra note 142, at 550. More than a dozen Black lawyers attended NLG’s first annual 
meeting. Id. It took the form of a membership organization rather than housing a staff of lawyers like 
LDF and the NAACP. See Our History, supra note 275. The organization was structured around local 
chapters. See The Early Years, supra note 275. Members participated through committees and projects. 
See id. At the first annual meeting, pioneering civil rights lawyer Charles Hamilton Houston was 
elected to serve as the New York chapter’s second vice-president, making him “the first black lawyer to 
hold office in a nationally affiliated association founded by white lawyers.” SMITH, supra note 142, at 
550; see also Houston an Officer of Lawyers’ Guild, 44 CRISIS 48 (1937). 
278 See King, supra note 1, at xxv. In 1962, NLG created the “Committee to Assist Southern 
Lawyers.” THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 275, at 187–88. It announced the committee’s 
formation at a meeting held under the auspices of SCLC, at a Virginia church. Id. at 188. Dr. King was 
the main speaker. Id. 
Also in 1962, SCLC co-sponsored an NLG “Workshop Seminar for Lawyers on Civil Rights and 
Negligence Law.” BABSON, RIDDLE & ELSILA, supra note 276, at 303. This was a major step in NLG’s 
southern campaign, attracting nearly sixty Black and white lawyers from every state in the South, and 
from the North, as well. Id. Once again, Dr. King spoke at the event. See id. 
279 The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) published a report in 1950, entitled 
National Lawyers Guild: Legal Bulwark of the Communist Party, that “decimated the ranks of the 
[NLG].” Blacklist Resistance: The NLG Fights for Its Life, NAT’L LAW. GUILD http://www.nlg.org
/about/history/blacklist-resistance-nlg-fights-its-life (last visited Sept. 21, 2015). 
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Rights Movement consistently tried to discredit the movement by painting it as a 
tool of the Communist Party, associating with NLG posed risks.280 
Nevertheless, a number of the lawyers that Dr. King enlisted were prominent 
members of the National Lawyers Guild. Clifford Durr, who worked with Fred 
Gray on the bus boycott,281 served as president of the Guild from 1949 to 1950.282 
Hubert Delany, who served as co-lead counsel in Dr. King’s 1960 perjury trial, was 
elected to NLG’s national board in 1939.283 William Kunstler, who was special 
counsel to SCLC at one point, was also a Guild member.284  
5. An Inner Circle 
While Dr. King headed Atlanta-based SCLC, he formed an informal inner 
circle of advisers and confidants based in New York.285 The group granted him 
refuge from the institutional challenges and tensions within the SCLC.286 It served 
him both personally and in his institutional role as president of SCLC.287 
While SCLC’s Board and top staff members were comprised largely of 
southern Black ministers,288 Dr. King’s inner circle was racially integrated, with 
                                                
280 When he became head of LDF, Jack Greenberg continued LDF’s previous policies and practices 
by consistently declining to cooperate with NLG. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 376–80. He 
declined NLG’s invitation to its workshop on civil rights “in a terse two-line note . . . that conveyed, by 
its brevity, the wariness of [LDF] toward [NLG].” BABSON, RIDDLE & ELSILA, supra note 276, at 303. 
The perceived taint of communist sympathies loomed large. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 378. 
281 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 44. 
282 See Sarah Hart Brown, Clifford Durr, ENCYCLOPEDIA ALA. (July 31, 2007), http://www
.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1254. Starting in 1949, Durr served as President of NLG for 
eighteen months, forever marking him as a radical, tying him to the communist party, and causing both 
personal and professional ostracism. See BROWN, supra note 114, at 24, 82–84. 
283 SMITH, supra note 142, at 551; see discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.b. Delany and Earl Dickerson, 
who was elected to the board at the same time, were the first Black lawyers who served on the board of 
a national white-organized bar organization. SMITH, supra note 142, at 551. 
However, when faced with questions from President Johnson’s administration about “subversives,” 
Dr. King made it clear that one NLG member had no affiliation with SCLC. See supra note 152. 
284 LANGUM, supra note 84, at 64–65. 
285 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 5, 38. Clarence Jones says that, in addition to himself, Dr. 
King’s inner circle included Bayard Rustin, Stanley Levison, Harry Wachtel, Professor Lawrence 
Reddick, Cleveland Robinson, and Reverends Ralph Abernathy, Walter Fauntroy, Thomas Kilgore, 
Wyatt Tee Walker, and Andy Young. JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 4–6. 
286 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 860; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 38–41, 168. 
287 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 50–51, 165–66, 169–73; GARROW, supra note 2, passim; 
JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5, 44–45. 
288 See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 4–5; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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Northerners as well as Southerners,289 and ministers290 and activists,291 as well as 
three lawyers. 292  The lawyers included Stanley Levison, a prosperous white 
businessman and attorney, Harry Wachtel, a white New York corporate lawyer, and 
Clarence Jones, the Black lawyer Dr. King recruited for his perjury defense team.293 
                                                
289 See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 4–6. 
290 See id. at 5–6. After completing his undergraduate and master’s degrees, Ralph David Abernathy 
accepted a call to be the pastor at First Baptist Church in Montgomery in 1951. RALPH DAVID 
ABERNATHY, AND THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 93, 97–99 (1989); 
Richard Severo, Ralph David Abernathy, Rights Pioneer, is Dead at 64, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1990, at 
B7. He and Martin Luther King, Jr. met when Dr. King visited Montgomery’s Dexter Avenue Church 
for the first time, and the two became fast friends. See ABERNATHY, supra, at 123–24, 128–29. During 
the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Abernathy served Dr. King as a second-in-command. STEPHEN B. 
OATES, LET THE TRUMPET SOUND: A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 74 (1st HarperPerennial ed. 
1994). Later, Abernathy served as vice president of SCLC, and was Dr. King’s chosen heir since “no 
one articulate[d his] ideas more thoroughly than Ralph Abernathy.” BRANCH, supra note 59, at 197. 
Abernathy worked with Dr. King throughout all of his major movements, going to jail with him 
seventeen times and cradling him after he was shot. Severo, supra. 
After Dr. King’s death, Abernathy became president of SCLC, having previously been designated 
his “automatic successor.” FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 257, 385. He spearheaded the Poor People’s 
Campaign. ABERNATHY, supra, at 494, 499. In 1977, Abernathy resigned from his role as president of 
SCLC to launch a campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives. See id. at 583–84. After losing that 
election, Abernathy returned to his work as a minister. See id. at 585–86. He died in 1990, at the age of 
64. Severo, supra. 
291 See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 4–6. Bayard Rustin was one of Martin Luther King, 
Jr.’s closest advisors, starting with the Montgomery Bus Boycott. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 
24–25, 29–33, 38–42. In 1937, Rustin became a member of a communist organization, which he left in 
1941 when he began working as a race relations organizer for an international justice organization. See 
DANIEL LEVINE, BAYARD RUSTIN AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 18–20, 25–26, 28–30 (2000). In 
1946, he organized and participated in an early version of the Freedom Rides. Id. at 52–56. In 1953, 
Rustin was arrested on a “morals charge” for performing a homosexual act and later convicted, which 
ultimately cost him his job. See id. at 70–72 (“Within a week, Bayard had resigned or been asked to 
resign . . . .”). He then became the executive secretary for a pacifist organization, which was his only 
official job for the next twelve years, though he was frequently on loan to the Civil Rights Movement. 
See JERVIS ANDERSON, BAYARD RUSTIN: TROUBLES I’VE SEEN: A BIOGRAPHY 172–73, 286–87 (Univ. 
of Cal. Press 1998) (1997); LEVINE, supra, at 91, 153–55. 
A few days after the Montgomery Bus Boycott began, an anti-segregationist author called Rustin to 
encourage him to work with Dr. King and vice versa. See id. at 78. Rustin was forced to leave 
Montgomery a few days after he arrived due to concerns about his homosexuality and his communist 
ties hurting the movement. See HARVARD SITKOFF, KING: PILGRIMAGE TO THE MOUNTAINTOP 43–44 
(2008). However, Dr. King and Rustin had formed an immediate connection, and Rustin became a 
trusted advisor, teaching him about Gandhi and nonviolence. Id. at 43. From the time of the boycott 
until Dr. King’s death, Rustin worked with Dr. King as a ghostwriter, strategic advisor, and fundraiser, 
as well as working to increase publicity and northern support for Dr. King’s movements. See 
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 38–40, 51, 170–71; LEVINE, supra, at 84–85, 91; SITKOFF, supra, at 49–
50. Rustin also worked on a team of advisors that helped create the SCLC, calling a group of Black 
activists together, and fighting for the all-Black, top-down structure of the organization. Id. at 58–59. 
Rustin’s best-known contribution to the Civil Rights Movement was his organization of the 1963 
March on Washington, which was attended by 250,000 people. See LEVINE, supra, at 131, 144–46. 
Rustin was also helping Dr. King plan the Poor People’s Campaign before Dr. King died. See id. at 
202–04. 
292 See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5–6. The non-lawyers in the inner circle included 
Bayard Rustin, Cleveland Robinson, Professor Lawrence Reddick, and Reverends Thomas Kilgore, 
Walter Fauntroy, Wyatt Tee Walker, Ralph Abernathy, and Andrew Young. Id. 
293 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 30, 97–98; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5–6; see supra 
notes 86–87 and accompanying text. Professor Fairclough describes Wachtel as “a wealthy corporation 
lawyer, the general counsel and executive vice-president of the McCrory Corporation, the well-known 
chain store.” FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 97. In 1984, Wachtel helped found Gold & Wachtel, a 
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Like the other members of the inner circle, the lawyers took on roles as strategists, 
counselors, writers, fundraisers, and confidants.294 
Stanley Levison met Dr. King very early in the minister’s career, in 1956, and 
quickly became part of his inner circle.295 Levison was forty-four, and Martin 
Luther King, Jr. was twenty-seven at the time.296 The relationship developed into 
Dr. King’s “closest friendship with a white person.”297 Levison was more of a 
confidant and advisor than a traditional lawyer to Dr. King. His contributions 
included strategizing about movements, providing political advice, assisting with 
drafting SCLC’s founding documents, negotiating book contracts, editing Dr. 
King’s writings, fundraising, and even preparing Dr. King’s income tax returns.298 
He was also “one of the few people willing to criticize King to his face.”299 
Martin Luther King, Jr. kept trying to compensate Levison for his invaluable 
assistance, but Levison explained his refusal in terms of the benefits he received 
from their relationship: 
My skills were acquired not only in a cloistered academic 
environment, but also in the commercial jungle. . . . Although our 
culture approves, and even honors th[ose] practices, to me they were 
always abhorrent. Hence, I looked forward to the time when I could 
use these skills not for myself but for socially constructive ends. The 
liberation struggle is the most positive and rewarding area of work 
anyone could experience.300 
Some years before meeting Dr. King, Levison had been directly tied to the 
Communist Party.301 The Kennedy administration was aware of Levison’s prior 
activities.302 In 1963, President Kennedy personally urged Dr. King to cut ties with 
Levison to avoid tainting the Civil Rights Movement and undermining the 
administration’s ability to get civil rights legislation through Congress. 303 
                                                
midsize Manhattan law firm specializing in litigation and corporate work. Wolfgang Saxon, Harry H. 
Wachtel, 79, Confidant and Legal Counsel to Dr. King, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at B10; see also 
BRANCH, supra note 59, at 28 (calling Wachtel “a Wall Street law partner”). 
294 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 172–73; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5, 25–27, 68–
71, 78; JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 6–7, 25; Saxon, supra note 293. 
295 See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 5. Civil rights activists Ella Baker and Bayard Rustin 
introduced them. Garrow, supra note 88, at 80, 85. 
296 Garrow, supra note 88, at 85. 
297 Id. Professor Garrow suggests that the FBI wiretap on Levison’s phone “attest[s] to what a 
valuable, insightful, and influential friend Stanley Levison remained to King right up to King’s death.” 
Id. at 86. Clarence Jones, a fellow member of Dr. King’s inner circle, said “Stanley Levison is someone 
who deserves a statue for his devotion to Martin and [his] work for the civil rights movement.” JONES & 
ENGEL, supra note 86, at 7. 
298 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 30–32, 38–48, 66, 97–98, 172, 199–200, 287, 361, 369; 
GARROW, supra note 2, at 102, 116. Commenting on Levison’s level of commitment, Clarence Jones 
said, “[I]t’s safe to say that if Stanley had ever been convinced that complete civil rights for Negroes 
could have been accomplished somehow by his own impoverishment and death, Stanley would’ve 
considered it a bargain.” JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 6–7. 
299 GARROW, supra note 2, at 105. 
300 Id. at 117. 
301 See id. at 194–95. 
302 See id. 
303 Id. at 272–73; see JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 179, 184–86. 
Vol. 10:3]  Leonard S. Rubinowitz 
  541 
Levison’s loyalty to Martin Luther King, Jr. and to the movement led Levison to 
readily agree to cut off their relationship.304 With great reluctance, Dr. King ceased 
direct contact with Levison. 305  However, he continued their extensive 
communication by using Clarence Jones as an intermediary, and then resumed 
direct contact eighteen months later.306 Dr. King’s willingness to take the risks 
involved in continuing that relationship attests to its importance to him. 
As discussed earlier, Dr. King recruited Clarence Jones to join his defense 
team for the 1960 perjury trial. That beginning soon led to a very close professional 
and personal relationship. Jones went from reluctant participant to a self-described 
“disciple” of Martin Luther King, Jr. 307  After his “conversion,” Jones became 
devoted to Dr. King.308 He served as lawyer, advisor, confidant, and speechwriter, 
with intense and continuous involvement until Dr. King’s death in 1968.309 Jones’s 
contributions also included helping write the “I Have a Dream” speech and assisting 
with critical fund-raising for bail and for SCLC generally.310 
While Harry Wachtel’s relationship with Martin Luther King, Jr. was not as 
long or as close as those of Stanley Levison or Clarence Jones, it also developed 
quickly into a personal one.311 Wachtel met Dr. King at a New York fundraiser and 
                                                
304 JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 40–41. Levison did not participate in the March on 
Washington, to avoid the risk of being seen with anyone connected with Dr. King, but he agreed to be 
available by phone from New York if his input was needed. See id. at 42. 
305 See id. at 41. When members of the Kennedy administration began informing Dr. King about their 
concerns with Levison, he listened, thanked them for their concern, and said “he was not one to 
question” Levison’s motives. GARROW, supra note 2, at 195. He only unwillingly ceased direct contact 
over a year later, at Levison’s encouragement. See id. at 275. 
306 BRANCH, supra note 59, at 27; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 275; JONES & CONNELLY, supra 
note 53, at 40 & 195 n.15. In March 1965, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover hand-delivered a “classified” 
letter to President Johnson in the White House, reporting that Dr. King was resuming contact with 
Levison a year and a half after breaking off all communication under heavy pressure from President 
Kennedy. BRANCH, supra note 59, at 27. 
307 See supra note 87. 
308 JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 44, 121. 
309 See id. at 44–45, 54–55, 57–59; JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, passim. 
310 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 462, 480, 535–36; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at xvi; 
JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 181. Jones even made his New York City home available as a refuge 
for Dr. King in the lead-up to the 1963 March on Washington. JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 
12. 
While Clarence Jones had great success in both law and business long after Dr. King’s death, he 
remained loyal to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s memory even a half century later. He was the first Black 
partner in a Wall Street investment banking firm, founded many successful business ventures, and has 
“provided strategic legal and financial consulting services to several governments around the world.” 
Clarence B. Jones, AM. PROGRAM BUREAU, http://www.apbspeakers.com/speaker/clarence-b-jones (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2015). He also taught courses at Stanford University, where he went on to become a 
scholar writer in residence at the Martin Luther King Research and Education Institute, along with 
becoming a diversity scholar and visiting professor at the University of San Francisco. See id. He has 
also co-authored two books related to Dr. King. Id.; see JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53; JONES & 
ENGEL, supra note 86. 
311 See Saxon, supra note 293. Harry Wachtel graduated from Columbia Law School in 1940, and 
began working at a law firm in New York City. See Wachtel, Harry H. (1917–1997), KING INST. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_watchel_harry_h
_1917_1997/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Wachtel]. Aside from serving in the military 
during World War II, he remained in private practice in New York his entire life. Id. After meeting Dr. 
King, he immediately began working to create the Gandhi Society for Human Rights, to further 
fundraising efforts for Dr. King’s movements. Id.; see also discussion infra Section II.A.3. Wachtel 
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volunteered his help.312 Like Levison, he assisted in a variety of ways, including 
fundraising, arranging meetings for Dr. King with important public officials, and 
advising him on a range of issues.313 He also refused any compensation for his 
work.314 
Membership in the inner circle depended in part on the willingness and ability 
to carry out a variety of tasks effectively. Loyalty to Dr. King and trustworthiness 
also seemed to be critical. The relationships were deeply personal as well as 
professional, so these lawyer-advisors played a crucial role in supporting Dr. King 
and his work. They also all worked closely with Dr. King for a significant period 
of time, covering both the early and later years of Dr. King’s career. 
II. DEPLOYING THE LAWYERS: THE EARLY YEARS (1955–1962) 
In the early years of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s career, the activists often 
engaged in “persuasive nonviolence,” which was designed to raise consciousness 
and change the minds of white officials and the white community through their 
protests. 315  The lawyers played two distinct roles. First, most of their 
responsibilities were new ones that grew out of the movement’s central focus on 
nonviolent direct action. 316  As activists engaged in boycotts, marches, 
demonstrations, and other forms of protest, the lawyers’ assignments primarily 
involved supporting, facilitating, and protecting those strategies and tactics. 
Second, the lawyers also continued to play the more traditional role of civil 
rights lawyers—challenging the constitutionality of racially discriminatory laws in 
federal court. When clients found that nonviolent direct action alone was not 
                                                
quickly became a member of Dr. King’s inner circle, and remained a close advisor until Dr. King’s 
death. Wachtel, supra. He also served on the defense team for New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and he 
traveled with Dr. King to Norway when he won the Nobel Prize. Id. 
After Dr. King’s death, Wachtel remained involved with Dr. King’s legacy. He became the personal 
lawyer for Coretta Scott King, was vice president and counsel for the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for 
Nonviolent Social Change from 1969 to 1982, and served as a SCLC trustee. Saxon, supra note 293. 
312 Saxon, supra note 293. 
313 See id. 
314 Id. 
315 See KING, supra note 7, at 192–94. See generally MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 157–58 (describing 
how Dr. King’s “civil disobedience . . . added a new, but also synergistic, dimension” to Blacks’ 
historic struggle for equal rights). Dr. King explained that while the law intends to regulate behavior, 
nonviolence fills the gap in actually achieving that aim: 
In the end, for laws to be obeyed, men must believe they are right. 
 Here nonviolence comes in as the ultimate form of persuasion. It is the method 
which seeks to implement the just law by appealing to the conscience of the great decent 
majority who through blindness, fear, pride, or irrationality have allowed their 
consciences to sleep. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [P]araphrasing the words of Gandhi: “We will match your capacity to inflict 
suffering with our capacity to endure suffering. We will meet your physical force with 
soul force. We will not hate you, but we cannot in all good conscience obey your unjust 
laws. Do to us what you will and we will still love you. . . . But we will soon wear you 
down by our capacity to suffer. And in winning our freedom we will so appeal to your 
heart and conscience that we will win you in the process.” 
KING, supra note 7, at 192–94. 
316 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
Vol. 10:3]  Leonard S. Rubinowitz 
  543 
enough to achieve their goals, they sent their lawyers to court to proceed with 
“complementary desegregation litigation.”317 The goal was to add leverage for 
change by combining direct action and traditional civil rights litigation. 
This Part examines both “support efforts” and “complementary desegregation 
litigation” by the lawyers in the early years. Since the initial activism in each 
movement involved nonviolent direct action, the discussion focuses on the lawyers’ 
support efforts first. In addition to movements they initiated, Dr. King and the 
protesters encountered criminal prosecutions and civil suits requiring legal 
assistance during that period. 
The discussion of “complementary desegregation litigation” begins with a 
brief history of civil rights litigation and a discussion of Dr. King’s views about the 
courts’ role. It then turns to the Montgomery and the Albany (Georgia) movements, 
the two major movements of the early period where the leaders had their lawyers 
initiate “complementary desegregation litigation.”  
A. Support for Nonviolent Direct Action 
From Rosa Parks’ arrest on, lawyers were ever present throughout Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s career. They provided some sort of support in virtually every 
movement and major event in which Dr. King was involved. By providing 
extensive, critical assistance to facilitate the activists’ nonviolent direct action, they 
contributed significantly to whatever measure of success the movements achieved. 
The lawyers’ main job was to make it possible for the activists to carry out their 
boycotts, marches, demonstrations, and other protest tactics. 318  That entailed: 
(1) defending Dr. King, his organizations, and the protesters in both criminal and 
civil litigation;319  (2) seeking necessary permissions, challenging court-ordered 
injunctions preventing or limiting protest activities, and requesting their own 
injunctions against public officials and private actors impeding protests;320 and 
(3) securing funding for these purposes.321 
From the outset, local and state officials turned to the legal system to resist 
movements for change. They used criminal prosecutions and civil suits in an effort 
to undermine the movements and nullify the activists’ initiatives.322 They also 
sought injunctions to block the protest activities at the core of nonviolent direct 
action.323 These two dominant responses repeatedly forced the activists and their 
lawyers into a reactive posture.324 The lawyers defended Dr. King, his colleagues, 
and the protesters on numerous occasions, and they fought and appealed opponents’ 
efforts to enjoin their nonviolent tactics. 
                                                
317 See discussion infra Section II.B.  
318 See supra note 230. 
319 See infra Section II.A.1. 
320 See infra Section II.A.2. 
321 See infra Section II.A.3. 
322 See discussion infra Section II.A.1. 
323 See discussion infra Section II.A.2. 
324 See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 234. 
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1. Defending Dr. King, His Organizations, and the Protesters 
Public officials used both criminal prosecutions and civil suits as key parts of 
their strategic arsenal to resist change and maintain the status quo.325  In turn, 
movement lawyers played important roles in defending the activists and enabling 
them to pursue their nonviolent direct action.326 
The lawyers had significant successes, but also some losses. Two of the most 
critical cases civil rights lawyers won during this time were the 1960 prosecution 
of Dr. King for perjury in Alabama,327 and a libel case that could have crippled the 
movement.328 While the lawyers sometimes lost their cases, even a conviction 
could have benefits by building support and solidarity in a movement.329 
i. Criminal Defense 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s description of himself as a “frequenter of jails”330 
suggests that the southern criminal justice system caught him—and his fellow 
protesters—in its web repeatedly. The idea of using the criminal justice system to 
defeat local civil rights campaigns surfaced early on. Local officials in Montgomery 
believed that successful prosecutions would have a powerful chilling effect on civil 
rights activism.331 
The deployment of civil rights lawyers began on December 1, 1955, when 
Rosa Parks enlisted Fred Gray as her defense counsel after she was arrested for 
refusing to give up her bus seat.332 In a matter of days, Gray went from being a 
young lawyer struggling to build a solo practice to Rosa Parks’ defense counsel and 
attorney for the newly formed Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA).333 
Gray lost that first case.334  Prosecutors initially charged Rosa Parks with 
violating the city’s bus segregation ordinance, but when this proved problematic, 
                                                
325 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1028–47 (discussing public officials’ efforts to break the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott); see also discussion infra Sections II.A.1.i, II.A.1.ii.  
326 With respect to arrests and jailing of King, other leaders, and protesters, the lawyers once again 
responded to the decisions of the activists. Sometimes that meant providing defense or assisting with 
bail. See, e.g., HARRY BELAFONTE WITH MICHAEL SHNAYERSON, MY SONG: A MEMOIR 254–65 (2011) 
(describing lawyer Clarence Jones’s involvement in raising bail money for the Birmingham 
movement); see also discussion infra Section II.A.1.i. On other occasions, the movement used mass 
arrests to build public support, and adopted a “jail, no bail” stance. See BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON, 
supra, at 258–64. See generally Martin Luther King, Jr., “A Creative Protest,” Address to Student 
Protesters at White Rock Baptist Church (Feb. 16, 1960) (“Let us not fear going to jail. If the officials 
threaten to arrest us for standing up for our rights, we must answer by saying that we are willing and 
prepared to fill up the jails of the South. Maybe it will take this willingness to stay in jail to arouse the 
dozing conscience of our nation.”), in 5 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: THRESHOLD OF A 
NEW DECADE, JANUARY 1959-DECEMBER 1960, at 367, 369 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 2005). 
327 See infra Section II.A.1.i.b. 
328 See infra Section II.A.1.ii. 
329 See discussion infra Section II.A.1.i.a. 
330 King, supra note 1, at xxi. 
331 See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 678–80. 
332 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 32–33; JEANNE THEOHARIS, THE REBELLIOUS LIFE OF MRS. ROSA 
PARKS 60–66, 75–77 (2013). 
333 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 49–53. 
334 See infra notes 337–338 and accompanying text. 
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she was charged with violating the state bus segregation law.335 Her defense was 
that her conduct on the bus constituted a protest against the segregation 
ordinance.336 The local judge rejected Gray’s argument that the law under which 
officials prosecuted her was unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection.337 
Parks was found guilty of violating a Montgomery ordinance making it unlawful to 
commit any state-law misdemeanor in the city, and Gray lost the right to appeal the 
constitutional issue on procedural grounds.338 
a. Montgomery Boycott Prosecution (1956) 
After the bus boycott was well underway, Montgomery officials resorted to a 
seldom-used 1921 Alabama anti-boycott statute in an attempt to derail it.339 They 
secured indictments against Martin Luther King, Jr. and eighty-nine other boycott 
leaders for conspiring to hinder a business “without a just cause or legal excuse.”340 
In announcing Dr. King’s indictment, the grand jury said: “We are committed to 
segregation by custom and by law, [and] we intend to maintain it.”341 Consequently, 
                                                
335 GARROW, supra note 2, at 21; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 62. Montgomery’s bus segregation 
ordinance provided that “it shall be unlawful for any passenger to refuse or fail to take a seat among 
those assigned to the race to which he belongs, at the request of any such employee in charge, if there is 
such a seat vacant.” MONTGOMERY, ALA., CODE ch. 6, § 11 (1952); see also Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. 
Supp. 707, 711 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1956). As Fred Gray explains, “The problem for the city was that the 
evidence indicated that all the seats were occupied, so there was no vacant seat to which Mrs. Parks 
could have moved.” GRAY, supra note 7, at 56 n.5. Prosecutor D. Eugene Loe got around this problem 
by amending the charging documents to allege that Parks had violated the state segregation statute. Id. 
That statute compelled bus companies to segregate bus seating, terminals, ticket windows, and other 
facilities. THORNTON, supra note 27, at 44. With this amendment, Prosecutor Loe was able to proceed 
under a city ordinance that made a violation of the state bus segregation statute also a municipal 
offense. GRAY, supra note 7, at 56 n.5 (citing MONTGOMERY, ALA., CODE ch. 1, § 8 (1952)). As Gray 
points out, the amended complaint was also problematic because the state statute did not apply to 
municipal bus lines. Id. at 57 n.5. 
336 Jonathan L. Entin, Assoc. Dean for Acad. Affairs, David L. Brennan Professor of Law & 
Professor of Political Sci., Case W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law, Remarks at the Northwestern Law 
Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin Luther King’s Lawyers: From 
Montgomery to the March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 
640, 649 (2016). 
337 See Transcript of Record at 5–7, Parks v. City of Montgomery, 92 So. 2d 683 (Ala. Ct. App. 
1957) (No. 3 Div. 5); GRAY, supra note 7, at 56; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 674. 
Fred Gray states that the constitutional issues he raised were denied summarily: “I knew that this was 
not the forum to challenge the segregation ordinances because of complications in how the city’s 
ordinances related to state statutes and the way [Parks] was originally charged.” GRAY, supra note 7, at 
56. 
338 GRAY, supra note 7, at 56 & n.5. 
339 The Alabama statute read, in relevant part:  
Two or more persons who, without a just cause or legal excuse for so doing, enter into 
any combination, conspiracy, agreement, arrangement, or understanding for the purpose 
of hindering, delaying, or preventing any other persons, firms, corporation, or association 
of persons from carrying on any lawful business shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.  
ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 54 (1940) (current version at ALA. CODE § 13A-11-122 (2015)). For a detailed 
discussion of this prosecution, see GRAY, supra note 7, at 84–89, and Kennedy, supra note 112, at 
1029–43. 
340 Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1029. 
341 GARROW, supra note 2, at 64. 
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actions like the bus boycott, which was based on opposition to segregation, could 
not be based on a “just cause.” 
Prosecutors proceeded to trial only with Dr. King.342 The State’s theory was 
that King controlled the MIA, which had been formed for the exclusive purpose of 
sustaining the boycott—thus hindering the business of the bus company.343 The 
prosecutors also tried to show that Blacks had stopped riding the buses mostly 
because of physical intimidation and violence, which—in their view—was 
sanctioned by Dr. King and the MIA.344 
Alabama’s leading Black lawyers—Fred Gray, Charles Langford, Arthur 
Shores, Peter Hall, and Orzell Billingsley—represented Dr. King. 345  NAACP 
General Counsel Robert Carter, from New York, assisted, but Judge Eugene W. 
Carter would not permit him to examine witnesses.346 Because both sides consented 
to a bench trial, segregationist Judge Carter acted as the fact finder while presiding 
over the four-day trial.347 As expected, he found Dr. King guilty, even though the 
prosecution had presented no evidence linking either Dr. King or the MIA to the 
alleged intimidation and violence. 348  Nevertheless, Dr. King’s Black lawyers 
offered a strong defense, demonstrating their superior skills and talent inside the 
courtroom.349 In the process, they even secured a modicum of respect from white 
segregationists.350 
                                                
342 Thornton, supra note 112, at 227. 
343 See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031. 
344 Id. at 1031–32. 
345 GRAY, supra note 7, at 88; cf. Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1030 (omitting Charles Langford).  
346 Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031. Judge Carter said he limited Robert Carter’s participation 
because (i) the case involved only a misdemeanor, (ii) Carter was not admitted to the Alabama Bar, and 
(iii) Dr. King had adequate representation by local counsel. Id. 
347 Id. at 1029. On his own motion, Judge Carter asked the grand jury to consider a possible violation 
of Alabama’s antiboycott statute. Id. at 1029–30; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 63 (“Montgomery 
newspapers reported that [Judge Carter] had instructed solicitor William Thetford and the current grand 
jury to consider whether the MIA’s protest was a violation of Alabama’s antiboycott statute.”). 
348 Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031–32, 1034; Thornton, supra note 112, at 227.  
349 See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1034. As Professor Kennedy notes:  
[King’s lawyers] raised a variety of constitutional objections to his prosecution, the most 
persuasive of which included the following: (1) the anti-boycotting statute deprived King 
of due process of law by failing to apprise him precisely of the wrong he was charged 
with committing; (2) because King was "selectively" prosecuted, the application of the 
law denied him due process and equal protection; and (3) the statute on its face and as 
applied abridged rights protected by the First Amendment. 
Id. at 1036 (footnotes omitted). Dr. King’s lawyers stood their best chance of prevailing on these claims 
in a federal forum, but the case never made it there. See id. at 1043. While the lawyers gave notice of 
appeal at the time judgment was entered, they missed a filing deadline to perfect the appeal, and on this 
technicality the Court of Appeals of Alabama granted the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal. See 
King v. State, 98 So. 2d 443, 444 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957); see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 89. This in turn 
closed off the route to a federal forum by way of appealing the case through the Alabama state courts 
and then petitioning for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
350 Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1034 (describing how Mayor Gayle answered “No, sir” to a question 
posed by a Black attorney, after which “[s]ilent applause erupted from the blacks in the courtroom”). 
See generally Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges’ Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers as 
Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161, 180 (1994) (reviewing SMITH, supra note 142) (“[B]lack 
lawyers undermined the pervasive psychology of racism. . . . Even in defeat, a black lawyer could 
demonstrate the competence of African-Americans to white judges, lawyers, jurors, and spectators who 
otherwise might have resisted notions of racial equality. The mere presence of black lawyers—
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After delivering his verdict, Judge Carter announced that he would fine Dr. 
King $500 and assess an additional $500 for court costs.351 The judge knew of Dr. 
King’s deep commitment to nonviolence, and he gave this as his reason for not 
imposing a prison sentence.352 
As suggested earlier, even though prosecutors had secured a conviction 
against Dr. King, they did not go to trial with any of the other people indicted.353 
The authorities realized that their prosecution of Dr. King had backfired, because 
the legal attack on Dr. King further solidified the Black community’s commitment 
to the boycott.354 Also, the mass indictments put Dr. King and the entire movement 
on the national stage, drawing attention from the New York Times, the New York 
Herald Tribune, and television networks such as ABC.355 The media coverage 
resulted in both greater external support and internal solidarity,356 which would be 
critical in facing the battles ahead.  
                                                
especially in the South—chipped away at segregation.” (footnote omitted)). At the same time, there 
were problematic aspects of defense counsel’s performance, including inadequate witness preparation 
and elicitation of testimony that was ostensibly dubious, including Dr. King’s—which was evasive, at 
best. Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1034–36; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 184. 
351 GARROW, supra note 2, at 74; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 184; GRAY, supra note 7, at 89. 
352 Thornton, supra note 112, at 227. When Dr. King refused to pay the fine, however, Judge Carter 
sentenced him to “386 days of [hard] labor in the Montgomery County Jail.” 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 16; see also Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1034 n.217. The 
sentence was ultimately suspended after King’s lawyers gave notice of appeal to the Alabama Court of 
Appeals, and King was then released on bond. GARROW, supra note 2, at 74; 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 16. 
353 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 202. But see GRAY, supra note 7, at 88 (stating that the prosecutors 
and the court agreed early on that Dr. King’s case would be the only case tried, and that “[t]he other 
cases would be resolved depending on the outcome of his case”). The other cases were dismissed as 
charges were simultaneously dropped against multiple whites accused of bombing a Black taxi stand 
and the homes of numerous MIA leaders. BRANCH, supra note 32, at 199–202. But Fred Gray suggests 
that the charges against the other eighty-nine defendants were dropped because “the defense mounted 
on King’s behalf [showed authorities] it would simply be too expensive to proceed against the others.” 
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1043 n.266. 
354 See RICHARD LENTZ, SYMBOLS, THE NEWS MAGAZINES, AND MARTIN LUTHER KING 27 (1990); 
Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1029. When the indictments were announced, many of those indicted 
proudly turned themselves in to the sheriff. Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1029 & n.187. Being on the 
list of indicted protesters became a “badge of honor.” Id. at 1029; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 85–
86 (explaining how some people involved in the boycott became disappointed when they were not 
arrested). Moreover, the prosecution may have made martyrs of the movement’s leaders. Kennedy, 
supra note 112, at 1029 n.186. The prosecution also gave the boycott a national and international media 
prominence that it had previously lacked. Id. at 1029; see also 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, 
JR., supra note 137, at 15. 
The city also embarked on a so-called “get tough” policy designed to deplete the movement’s 
resources and wear down its will. Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 678; Kennedy, supra 
note 112, at 1026; see also THORNTON, supra note 27, at 73–77. Police systematically harassed car pool 
drivers, writing them tickets for minor or non-existent violations. BRANCH, supra note 32, at 159; see 
also GARROW, supra note 2, at 55; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1028; Get Tough Policy, NEWSL. FROM 
M.I.A. (Montgomery Improvement Ass’n, Montgomery, Ala.), June 7, 1956, at 2, 3, http://
kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/primarydocuments/560607_001.pdf. 
355 GARROW, supra note 2, at 66; see also LENTZ, supra note 354, at 27 (noting coverage from 
Newsweek magazine). 
356 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 66–67; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1029. 
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b. Dr. King’s Alabama Perjury Trial (1960) 
The worst Alabama prosecution was yet to come. The state’s effort to 
criminalize Martin Luther King, Jr. and remove him from his leadership position 
reached its apex in 1960, when segregationist Governor John Patterson directed the 
local prosecutor to seek indictments against Dr. King for perjury based on his state 
income taxes.357 Charging perjury rather than tax evasion served to ratchet up the 
crime (and the possible punishment) from a misdemeanor to a felony.358 Dr. King’s 
indictment was the first of its kind ever brought in Alabama, which suggests that 
the state sought to deprive the movement of Dr. King’s leadership for as long as 
possible.359 
The perjury prosecution represented a potential turning point in Dr. King’s 
career and the Civil Rights Movement with which he was associated.360 The stakes 
were high. If convicted, Dr. King would have faced a prison sentence of two to five 
years for each of two crimes361—an eternity in a movement like this. With a 
segregationist judge presiding, only white witnesses for the State, and an all-white 
jury in a segregated courtroom, the odds were stacked against Dr. King. 362 
Moreover, the public accusations challenging his honesty and integrity forced him 
to endure the most humiliating encounter thus far in his career.363 As Dr. King later 
recollected: “Passions were inflamed. Feelings ran high. The press and other 
communications media were hostile. Defeat seemed certain[,] and we in the 
freedom struggle braced ourselves for the inevitable.”364 
Between February and March 1960, a “Committee to Defend Martin Luther 
King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South” assembled a highly accomplished 
legal team of more than half a dozen Black lawyers.365  Some came from the 
North—William Ming and Chauncey Eskridge from Chicago, former Judge Hubert 
Delany from New York, and Clarence Jones, from Los Angeles.366  Ming and 
Delany served as co-lead counsel based on their extensive experience in important 
                                                
357 See Dyer, supra note 38, at 247; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 146 (stating his belief that the 
charges were “part of the plan of Governor John Patterson, or someone in his administration, to harass 
and intimidate African Americans in general, and King in particular, for political reasons”); THORNTON, 
supra note 27, at 117, 615 n.147. 
358 Dyer, supra note 38, at 248. 
359 See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1991). 
360 King, supra note 1, at xxiii–xxiv. 
361 The statute provided for a punishment of between two and five years’ imprisonment in the state 
penitentiary. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 382 (1940). See generally MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 
141 (“The white Southern power structure . . . indicted me for perjury and openly proclaimed that I 
would be imprisoned for at least ten years.”). 
362 See King, supra note 1, at xxiv. 
363 GARROW, supra note 2, at 130. A conviction would have cast a huge cloud over Dr. King. Entin, 
supra note 336, at 655. Even if he had been able to get a conviction overturned on appeal, “the 
argument would be [that] he got off on [a] technicality . . . .” Id. 
364 King, supra note 1, at xxiv. 
365 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 149 (naming Hubert Delany, William Ming, Arthur Shores, Solomon 
Seay Jr., and himself as the lawyers selected to represent Dr. King, and stating that Ming added 
Chauncey Eskridge as a tax expert); JONES & ENGEL, supra note 86, at 6–7, 10–16 (naming Clarence 
Jones as part of Dr. King’s perjury defense team); Dyer, supra note 38, at 251. 
366 Dyer, supra note 38, at 251; see also discussion supra Section I.B. Ming added Chauncey 
Eskridge, a young tax expert from his office. GRAY, supra note 7, at 149. 
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litigation.367 Alabamians rounded out the team, including Fred Gray, Solomon Seay 
Jr., and Arthur Shores.368 
Dr. King’s counsel effectively undercut the State’s case both through cross-
examination of the State’s witnesses and through careful presentation of the facts 
through their own witnesses. For example, William Ming’s cross-examination of 
the State’s auditor helped expose the trumped-up nature of the charges. The auditor 
acknowledged that after a detailed review of Dr. King’s tax documents for the years 
in question (1956 and 1958), he informed Dr. King he had found no evidence of 
fraud in his tax returns.369 
Dr. King’s lawyers also brought out strong supportive testimony from their 
own witnesses.370 In the end, the jury took less than four hours to return a verdict 
of acquittal.371 In his statement to the press outside the Montgomery courtroom, Dr. 
King said, “I certainly want to commend all of the lawyers, this brilliant array of 
lawyers who represented me in this case. And I’m sure that their brilliant and 
profound arguments and that factual evidence played a great part in the ultimate 
decision, which was one of not guilty.”372 
Dr. King later paid homage to his defense team again, singling out the co-lead 
counsel for special praise: 
 There were two men among us who persevered with the 
conviction that it was possible, in this context, to marshal facts and 
law and thus win vindication. These men were our lawyers, Negro 
lawyers—Negro lawyers from the North: William Ming of Chicago 
and Hubert Delaney from New York. 
 They brought to the courtroom wisdom, courage, and a highly 
developed art of advocacy; but most important, they brought the 
                                                
367 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 149–50 (calling Ming “an excellent trial lawyer with substantial 
experience in tax law,” and referring to Delaney as both “an expert in research and appellate law” and a 
“masterful jurist”); MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 141; Dyer, supra note 38, at 252; see also 
supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
368 See discussion supra Sections I.A, I.B.1.i; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 148–49. The 
committee selected the members of the team from nominations and offers of assistance they received. 
Dyer, supra note 38, at 251. Dr. King added Clarence Jones to the team. See supra notes 86–87 and 
accompanying text. 
369 Dyer, supra note 38, at 255. 
370 The defense called R.D. Nesbitt Sr., who served as a deacon and clerk at Dexter Avenue Baptist 
Church when Dr. King was pastor there. GRAY, supra note 7, at 153. Nesbitt testified to many of the 
transactions between Dr. King and the church, and pointed out that Dr. King had refused an increase in 
pay. Id. As their final witness, the defense called Black bank president Jesse B. Blayton Sr. Dyer, supra 
note 38, at 256. Blayton was also certified public accountant. Id. He had audited Dr. King’s financials 
after Dr. King was indicted and was able to account for every cent of his tax returns. Id. Fred Gray 
described Blayton as “a real wizard”: “I don’t think any of those white jurors had ever listened to a 
person, African American or white, who knew as much about facts and figures and accounting as Mr. 
Blanton [sic]. He completely mesmerized the jurors.” GRAY, supra note 7, at 153. 
371 See Dyer, supra note 38, at 258. According to Gray, the entire team was “joyfully surprised . . . . 
No one would have predicted that an all-white jury in Montgomery, Alabama, the Cradle of the 
Confederacy, in May 1960, . . . would exonerate Martin Luther King Jr. But it really happened.” GRAY, 
supra note 7, at 154. 
372 Martin Luther King, Jr., Statement on Perjury Acquittal (May 28, 1960), in 5 THE PAPERS OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 326, at 462, 462. 
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lawyers’ indomitable determination to win. After a trial of three 
days, by the sheer strength of their legal arsenal, they overcame the 
most vicious Southern taboos festering in a virulent and inflamed 
atmosphere and they persuaded an all-white jury to accept the word 
of a Negro over that of white men.373 
c. Dr. King’s Incarceration in Georgia (1960) 
Later in 1960, Dr. King faced still another state court prosecution. This time 
it was in the Georgia courts, in an episode steeped in racial undertones from start 
to finish. Once again, the stakes were high. Rather than humiliation and the risk of 
a lengthy prison sentence, this time there was a very serious threat to Dr. King’s 
personal safety from racist prison guards and white prisoners in a maximum-
security prison.374  
Earlier that year, Dr. King had resigned his Montgomery ministry and returned 
home to Atlanta to serve as associate pastor at his father’s large and prominent 
Ebenezer Baptist Church.375 After moving back to Georgia, Dr. King neglected to 
get a Georgia driver’s license within the ninety-day period allowed by law.376 
In May 1960, local police in DeKalb County stopped Dr. King and cited him 
for driving without a valid driver’s license.377 At the time he was stopped, Dr. King 
was driving Lillian Smith, the white southern author of the anti-racist novel Strange 
Fruit, from his house in Atlanta back to Emory University Hospital in neighboring 
DeKalb County.378 The police stopped him because he was a Black man driving 
with a white woman sitting in the front seat with him.379 For the minor traffic 
violation, Judge Oscar Mitchell of the DeKalb Civil and Criminal Court fined Dr. 
King $25 and sentenced him to twelve months of labor in the public works camp.380 
Judge Mitchell suspended that sentence, however, and placed Dr. King on 
probation for a year.381 
                                                
373 King, supra note 1, at xxiv. 
374 See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 116–17; GARROW, supra note 2, at 146; LEWIS, supra note 47, at 
126–27.  
375 BRANCH, supra note 32, at 266–67. 
376 GARROW, supra note 2, at 135–36. 
377 Id.; see also DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 166. Dr. King was also cited for having 
expired license plates on the borrowed car he was driving. GARROW, supra note 2, at 135, 143.  
378 GARROW, supra note 2, at 135; GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 301; LEWIS, supra note 47, at 121; 
see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 356–57; Judge Horace Ward, N. Dist. of Ga., Remarks at the 
Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin Luther King’s 
Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. 
& SOC. POL’Y 657, 664 (2016). Lillian Smith was receiving cancer treatments from Emory University 
Hospital. BRANCH, supra note 32, at 356. 
379 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 356–57; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 135; Ward, supra note 
378, at 664. It was a customary practice for police to conduct traffic stops when they spotted 
“interracial groups of travelers.” BRANCH, supra note 32, at 356–57. 
380 See King v. State, 119 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961); see also DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra 
note 141, at 166. 
381 GARROW, supra note 2, at 143; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 357. According to Professor 
Garrow, Dr. King heard Judge Mitchell impose the $25 fine but did not see the paperwork detailing the 
terms of his probation, which required that King “not violate any Federal or State penal statutes or 
municipal ordinances.” GARROW, supra note 2, at 143; see also King, 119 S.E.2d at 79 (quoting this 
language in Judge Mitchell’s sentence). 
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Shortly thereafter, young local activists urged Dr. King to join them in a sit-
in, seeking luncheon service at one of Atlanta’s major department stores.382 They 
were protesting the Jim Crow practices at the restaurants in those stores.383 Though 
initially hesitant, Dr. King eventually submitted to the student protest leaders’ 
renewed requests and agreed to join the sit-in.384 Dr. King was promptly arrested 
for trespass, along with more than fifty other demonstrators.385 When Dr. King 
refused bail, he spent the night in jail for the first time in his life.386 
Based on this arrest, Judge Mitchell revoked Dr. King’s probation and 
sentenced him to four months of hard labor for the original traffic violation.387 What 
made matters even worse is that officials took Dr. King from the county jail in the 
middle of the night, “put him in leg irons and handcuffs, . . . laid him on the floor 
in the back of a paddy wagon with nobody back there but a German Shepherd,” and 
drove 300 miles over bad country roads to a state maximum-security prison.388 Dr. 
King described it as the worst night of his life.389 Once imprisoned at that facility, 
Dr. King was at the mercy of white racist prison guards and inmates convicted of 
very serious crimes. 
Dr. King had already enlisted Atlanta civil rights lawyer Donald Hollowell 
and his associate Horace Ward as defense counsel to appeal his sentence and secure 
                                                
382 GARROW, supra note 2, at 143. 
383 DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 166. 
384 GARROW, supra note 2, at 143. 
385 See DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 166. 
386 Id. at 166–67; see also DANIELS, supra note 41, at 110–11; GARROW, supra note 2, at 143–44. 
387 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 115. The sentence for the original traffic violation included twelve 
months in the public works camp, which Judge Oscar Mitchell immediately suspended, placing Dr. 
King on probation for one year. See supra note 381 and accompanying text. After Dr. King’s arrest in 
Atlanta, Judge Mitchell ordered him to show cause why he should not serve the twelve-month sentence 
for violating the terms of his probation. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 115. 
388 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 116–17; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 146.  
389 See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 117. 
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his release.390 During the appeal, Dr. King’s lawyers secured his release from the 
maximum-security prison on bond.391 He had spent eight days incarcerated.392 
On appeal, Hollowell argued that the original sentence of twelve months 
exceeded the statutory maximum of six months for the traffic offense and was 
therefore invalid.393 If Hollowell’s arguments were correct, the sentence originally 
entered by Judge Mitchell was illegal, meaning Dr. King was not under any 
probationary sentence that could be revoked.394 
                                                
390 See id. at 115. After the student arrests in Atlanta, Thurgood Marshall of the LDF promised to pay 
the legal expenses and “appeal every fine.” Id. at 108. Marshall eventually hired Donald Hollowell and 
his partners, promising “unlimited financial support.” Id. 
Horace T. Ward joined Hollowell’s law office as an associate in 1960 and became partner in 1962. 
DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 165. Hollowell and Ward knew each other from when 
Hollowell represented Ward in his case challenging the University of Georgia School of Law’s 
rejection of his application for admission. See id. at 30–35, 40, 77. Ward lost his case and ultimately 
graduated from Northwestern University School of law in 1959. Id. at 111, 118. He began to work with 
Hollowell shortly thereafter. See id. at 118. 
On his own initiative, Martin Luther King Sr. enlisted Morris Abram, a prominent white Atlanta 
attorney, to work on Dr. King’s defense, as well. His father believed that a white lawyer might have an 
advantage in operating within “the virtually all-white criminal justice system.” DANIELS, supra note 41, 
at 116; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 353, 362. In fact, Hollowell did endure blatant racism as a 
Black lawyer in Georgia in the 1960s: “The trial judge listened very attentively to the lawyers who 
represented the state of Georgia. When Donald Hollowell got up to speak, to argue . . . the trial judge 
spun around and turned his back on Hollowell.” DANIELS, supra note 41, at 122. 
391 DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 168; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 119. Before Dr. 
King was jailed, Hollowell filed an appeal of his original traffic conviction. See id. at 115. Hollowell 
used this appeal to argue that Dr. King should be released for his arrest in Atlanta while his conviction 
was being appealed. Id. After Judge Mitchell rejected Hollowell’s argument and sentenced Dr. King, 
Robert Kennedy personally called Judge Mitchell to express his disagreement with the judge’s decision. 
GARROW, supra note 2, at 147. After filing a writ of habeas corpus, Hollowell again argued that Dr. 
King should be released while his traffic conviction was being appealed. This time, Judge Mitchell 
agreed. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 116, 119. 
392 DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 141, at 168; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 119. 
393 See King v. State, 119 S.E.2d 77, 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961); DANIELS, HORACE WARD, supra note 
141, at 168–69; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 120. 
394 Hollowell raised the same argument in a hearing before Judge Mitchell six days after Dr. King 
was arrested: 
The statutes expressly and particularly limit the amount of imprisonment sentence which 
can be issued or imposed by the court, that the maximum sentence shall not exceed six 
months to work on the chain gang or public road and I submit to Your Honor that in his 
Order of the 23rd of September, Your Honor sentenced the defendant to 12 months on the 
Public Works Camp and that inasmuch as the sentence of the Court exceeds that which 
the statute provided, then that sentence is a nullity, and if said sentence is a nullity, then 
this particular hearing, your Honor, which is based upon that sentence, would be 
dismissed because there is nothing upon which to base it, Sir. 
DANIELS, supra note 41, at 115. When Judge Mitchell sentenced King to four months of hard labor, 
Hollowell objected to the unusually harsh treatment: 
We Submit Your Honor that the judgment which we are asking Your Honor to vacate, in 
all legal fairness, and in all conscionable fairness, we would submit that it should be 
vacated and this man ought to be at liberty. I don’t think the Solicitor could bring me in 
one case . . . which shows that there has ever been in the history of the State of Georgia, 
from the time of its inception, been an individual who was sentenced to serve four 
months on the public works for failing to have a driver’s license. 
Id. at 115–16. 
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At the same time that Hollowell was seeking Dr. King’s release in court, 
Senator John Kennedy, who was nearing the final stages of his run for the 
presidency, intervened.395 He called Coretta Scott King to express his concern 
about her husband’s plight.396 Through continuing involvement by both Senator 
Kennedy and his brother Robert, Judge Mitchell agreed to release Dr. King.397 As 
a result, candidate Kennedy received much of the credit for Dr. King’s release.398 
However, Donald Hollowell and Horace Ward provided the legal basis for the 
release. Following Dr. King’s release, they appealed his sentence to the Court of 
Appeals of Georgia.399 Ultimately, the appellate court vindicated their claim.400 
The court agreed that Judge Mitchell’s initial sentence of twelve months was 
illegal: 
Since the sentence as originally entered was, as to that part of it 
relating to imprisonment, illegal and therefore a nullity, it could not 
be enforced by any subsequent order such as that passed revoking 
its probationary feature. The probationary feature of the sentence 
being void, the defendant was not under probation at the time he 
allegedly committed the crime [trespass] for which the purported 
probationary sentence was sought to be revoked. Accordingly, no 
probationary sentence may be revoked for the commission of this 
crime. The judgment of revocation in case No. 38718 is reversed.401 
The lawyers had done their job. The threat to Dr. King’s personal safety in a 
maximum-security prison and on a chain gang had passed. However, there would 
be more arrests still to come. 
d. The Albany (Georgia) Movement (1961–1962) 
A year later, Donald Hollowell found himself, along with local civil rights 
lawyer Chevene Bowers (C.B.) King, defending Dr. King and hundreds of 
demonstrators arrested in the southwest Georgia city of Albany.402 In 1961, Albany 
                                                
395 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 117–18. 
396 Id. at 118; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 362. 
397 According to then-Georgia Governor Ernest Vandiver, Senator Kennedy called to ask if there was 
anything he could do to get Dr. King out of jail. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 118. Vandiver enlisted 
former Georgia Secretary of State George Stewart to talk to Judge Mitchell, who agreed to let Dr. King 
go if either Robert or Senator Kennedy relayed the message. Id.; see also supra note 391 (discussing 
Robert Kennedy’s phone call to Judge Mitchell). 
398 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 118–19. 
399 Id. at 120. 
400 See King v. State, 119 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961). The Court of Appeals held that “[t]he 
sentence was not an alternative sentence entitling [Dr. King] to an absolute discharge on payment of the 
fine assessed against him,” but because its imprisonment feature exceeded the maximum term permitted 
by statute, the “illegal sentence of probation” could not “form a basis for [any] subsequent order of 
revocation.” Id. at 79. 
401 Id. at 81. 
402 See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 130–59 (detailing Donald Hollowell’s and C.B. King’s 
involvement in the Albany Movement). Professor Daniels points out that “the southwest region of 
Georgia was one of the most notoriously racist parts of the state, well known for its violence against 
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had 60,000 residents, about forty percent of whom were Black.403 Albany was 
characterized by pervasive, rigid segregation, with the white majority unwilling to 
allow even modest reform.404 
In October 1961, two field staff of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC, pronounced “Snick”) began to organize the Black community 
to challenge the city’s structure of segregation.405 SNCC had been formed a year 
earlier by young sit-in protesters who saw themselves as the vanguard of the 
freedom struggle in the South.406 Their initial small sit-in garnered attention from 
Albany’s Black community, whose leaders then formed the “Albany 
Movement.”407 The coalition of organizations that joined forces favored different 
strategies and tactics, resulting in significant internal tensions.408 The campaign 
used demonstrations, bus boycotts, sit-ins, and jail-ins to challenge the status 
quo.409 
As the movement carried out protests, Police Chief Laurie Pritchett ordered 
hundreds of arrests for minor violations such as disturbing the peace, disorderly 
conduct, trespassing, and carrying out a parade without a permit.410 He avoided 
applying state and local segregation laws to prevent appeals to the federal courts.411 
He also instructed his officers to make the arrests peacefully and to avoid the use 
of force that could draw federal attention.412 
                                                
blacks.” Id. at 134. For useful overviews of the Albany Movement, see BRANCH, supra note 32, at 528–
58, 602–39; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 85–91, 100–06; GARROW, supra note 2, at 173–230. 
403 CARSON, supra note 27, at 56. 
404 See id. at 56–58. On the surface, relations between the races seemed quite peaceful; but the deeper 
reality was quite different. See id.; LEWIS, supra note 47, at 140–43. 
405 See CARSON, supra note 27, at 56. The “field secretaries” were Charles Sherrod and Cordell 
Reagon. Id. 
406 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 62–64; GARROW, supra note 2, at 131–34. For an in-depth 
study of SNCC, see CARSON, supra note 27. 
407 See LEWIS, supra note 47, at 144–45. On November 1, 1961, SNCC coordinated a small bus 
station sit-in to protest Albany’s refusal to abide by the Interstate Commerce Commission’s order to 
desegregate transportation facilities. CARSON, supra note 27, at 58; see also KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 
94. For a slightly different account of the Albany Movement’s formation, see BRANCH, supra note 32, 
at 528–29, which describes an incident involving a white sheriff shooting a Black field hand in the neck 
without justification as the impetus behind the movement. 
The participating organizations included SNCC, the NAACP, the Federation of Women’s Clubs, the 
Negro Voters League, the Ministerial Alliance, and the Criterion Club. MORRIS, supra note 188, at 241; 
see also CARSON, supra note 27, at 58; LEWIS, supra note 47, at 145. 
408 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 529. The lack of trust among the several organizations plagued the 
Albany Movement from the outset. See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 139 (explaining that this lack of 
trust was what led the various civil rights groups to form the movement). 
409 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 137. For additional insight into the Albany Movement’s strategies and 
tactics, see BRANCH, supra note 32, at 530–44, GARROW, supra note 2, at 176, and MORRIS, supra note 
188, at 241. 
410 See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 138. 
411 BRANCH, supra note 32, at 527; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 138. 
412 MORRIS, supra note 188, at 250. Nevertheless, there were still incidents of police violence. In one 
instance, a pregnant woman was knocked down and kicked by a police officer while attempting to pass 
food to jailed protesters. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 143. On another occasion, a Black man was 
knocked to the floor and dragged to the back of a courtroom for sitting at the front. Id. 
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C.B. King, Albany’s sole civil rights lawyer, and Atlanta’s Donald Hollowell 
represented protesters that were arrested.413 With the demonstrations continuing, 
the arrests mounted. When the local jail filled up, Pritchett shipped his prisoners to 
surrounding counties’ jails.414 In all, attorneys King and Hollowell represented 
more than 700 jailed demonstrators.415 They worked extraordinary hours to provide 
representation for the protesters. 416  They secured the release of hundreds of 
them.417 They continued to serve their clients after the marches and demonstrations 
ended, trying to clear their records and helping them return to their jobs.418 
In addition to the hundreds of demonstrators, Hollowell and C.B. King 
represented Dr. King and his SCLC colleagues.419 Notwithstanding strong internal 
opposition, the Albany Movement invited Dr. King to come to the aid of their 
faltering movement in December 1961.420 He needed legal representation almost 
immediately because he was arrested while leading a prayer vigil to city hall the 
day after he arrived.421 Police Chief Pritchett arrested Dr. King and the participants 
                                                
413 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 137, 156. C.B. King and Hollowell had met by chance in 1949, when 
King was an undergraduate at Fisk University and Hollowell a law student at Loyola Law School in 
Chicago. Id. at 132. During that meeting, they discovered their shared passion for using the law to 
achieve racial justice. Id. 
LDF lawyer Constance Baker Motley joined the team later. See id. at 154–55; see also MOTLEY, 
supra note 13, at 138–39. 
C.B. King and Hollowell began representing Albany protesters in November 1961, with the trial of 
five youths jailed for refusing to leave the white waiting room at the local bus terminal. DANIELS, supra 
note 41, at 139–41; GARROW, supra note 2, at 177. While the lawyers were able to prevent further jail 
time, the judge convicted their clients, fined them each $100, and placed them on probation for a brief 
period. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 141–42; GARROW, supra note 2, at 178. 
414 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 536; GARROW, supra note 2, at 208. Professor Daniels gives a less 
benign account of Pritchett’s tactics: “In a clever effort to avoid filling the jails, a strategy often 
employed by civil rights leaders to force officials to concede to some of their demands, Chief Pritchett 
negotiated agreements for additional jail space with surrounding counties . . . notorious for their cruel 
treatment of blacks.” DANIELS, supra note 41, at 142. 
415 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 141. They also participated in negotiations with Albany officials to 
end segregation in the city. Id. at 137. 
416 Id. at 143–44. John Lewis, a civil rights activist and later congressman from Atlanta, credited 
King and Hollowell as the central lawyers representing the demonstrators: “C.B. King and Don 
Hollowell . . . more than any other two lawyers, played a major role in defending the people that were 
arrested, people who had been beaten in jail in Albany . . . .” Id. at 137. Hollowell rarely took credit for 
his achievements; but at C.B. King’s burial, he acknowledged, “No one knows how hard we worked.” 
Id. at 159. 
417 Id. at 145. Hollowell and King did a number of things to get protesters released, including bailing 
them out, id. at 151–52, and negotiating agreements with Albany officials to release protesters on their 
own recognizance, id. at 146, 152, 154. 
418 Id. at 156. Activist Joseph Lowery recalled that the young demonstrators would say, “King is our 
leader, Hollowell is our lawyer. We shall not be moved.” Id. 
419 See id. at 150 (stating that Hollowell was chief lawyer to Dr. King, Ralph Abernathy, and other 
movement leaders); GARROW, supra note 2, at 185–86, 196, 211 (discussing Hollowell and C.B. King 
representing Dr. King and the Albany Movement). Hollowell managed to maintain trust and credibility 
with all of the factions involved in the Albany Movement. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 151. Ultimately, 
this may have created a rift with Dr. King because Hollowell supported the more radical SNCC, which 
openly opposed King’s leadership. Id. at 148, 151. 
420 GARROW, supra note 2, at 180–81. 
421 See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 144–45; GARROW, supra note 2, at 184. 
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for parading without a permit.422 Once again, Donald Hollowell and C.B. King 
represented Dr. King, as well as others who had joined the vigil.423 
Months later, Dr. King and Reverend Abernathy went before Judge A.N. 
Durden Sr. for sentencing.424 He imposed a $178 fine or forty-five days in jail.425 
Since the defendants believed that their conviction was unjust, they refused to pay 
the fine and opted for imprisonment.426 City officials were concerned about the 
attention the incarceration might receive, including possible federal intervention, 
and arranged to have King’s and Abernathy’s fines paid surreptitiously, under the 
pretense that “an anonymous black donor had paid [them].”427 
While the Albany Movement failed to achieve its immediate goals, it laid the 
groundwork for subsequent movements. Many give credit to Donald Hollowell and 
C.B. King for helping to underpin the movement, and for providing the support and 
hope needed to sustain it.428 
* * * 
Years later, Dr. King expressed his respect, admiration, and appreciation for 
the services of his numerous defense counsel who represented him in his many 
encounters with state prosecutors: “I cannot help but wish in my heart that the same 
kind of skill and devotion which Bob Ming and Hubert Delaney accorded to me 
could be available to thousands of civil rights workers, to thousands of ordinary 
Negros, who are every day facing prejudiced courtrooms.”429 
                                                
422 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 145; GARROW, supra note 2, at 184. 
423 See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 151 (pointing out that Dr. King and Abernathy were released from 
jail on bond after Hollowell, C.B. King, and city officials reached an agreement); GARROW, supra note 
2, at 195–96 (stating that Hollowell and C.B. King represented Dr. King when he returned to Albany in 
late February to stand trial for his December arrest). Dr. King was initially brought to trial two days 
after his arrest, but proceedings were postponed once negotiations began that morning between 
Hollowell, C.B. King, and Albany officials. Id. at 185. Hollowell and C.B King eventually negotiated 
with Albany officials a “gentlemen’s understanding that none of the jailed demonstrators would be 
brought to trial, although their release would not include dropping charges.” Id. at 186. The city later 
denied that there was ever an agreement. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 152. 
424 GARROW, supra note 2, at 201–02. 
425 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 152. 
426 See id. at 153. 
427 Id. at 154; see also LEWIS, supra note 47, at 159–60. Dr. King expressed his disappointment with 
the situation: “[T]his is one time that I’m out of jail and I’m not happy to be out . . . I do not appreciate 
the subtle and conniving tactics used to get us out of jail.” GARROW, supra note 2, at 203. 
428 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 156. Civil rights leader Joseph Lowery gave the following assessment 
of Hollowell’s and C.B. King’s importance in the Albany Movement: 
When the Albany Movement heated up in ’61 when King got arrested, it was [Hollowell 
and C.B. King] who stepped into the breach, who filed lawsuits, who tried to fight off the 
attempts of Chief of Police Laurie Pritchett to suspend the First Amendment in Albany. 
Hollowell and C.B. King raised the legal questions and forced the government at the 
local, state, and national levels to face the issues of segregation and discrimination and 
brutality on the part of law enforcement officials. They did it brilliantly, and Albany was 
never the same. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
429 King, supra note 1, at xxiv. 
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ii. Civil Actions: Libel Cases 
Another team of lawyers represented civil rights leaders, including Dr. King, 
and the New York Times, in libel litigation that was a direct outgrowth of Dr. King’s 
Alabama perjury prosecution.430 The perjury trial required resources that were not 
readily available to the movement.431 In an effort to raise money for Dr. King’s 
defense, his supporters formed the “Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and 
the Struggle for Freedom in the South.” 432  The committee ran a full-page 
advertisement in the New York Times on March 29, 1960.433 Without naming any 
public officials, it made both general and specific charges about southern racist 
policies and practices.434 It also made an urgent plea for donations.435 A number of 
activists’, celebrities’, and ministers’ names appeared in support of the fundraising 
effort.436 The advertisement had the desired effect, attracting donations several 
times its cost.437 
However, when word of the advertisement reached Alabama, public officials 
reacted swiftly and furiously. Montgomery Police Commissioner L.B. Sullivan 
sued the New York Times and four Black Alabama ministers named in the ad for 
libel.438 He sought $500,000 in damages,439 an amount that would translate into 
millions of dollars in twenty-first century terms. He did not include Martin Luther 
King, Jr. as a defendant, apparently because his name did not appear as an endorser. 
However, Alabama Governor Patterson quickly followed up with his own suit, 
naming Dr. King among the defendants.440 Patterson sought $1 million dollars in 
damages.441 
                                                
430 See Dyer, supra note 38, at 249–50; Entin, supra note 128, at 262. The lawyers were a 
combination of New York Times lawyers—both locally-based and from New York—and civil rights 
lawyers. See GRAY, supra note 7, at 157; LEWIS, supra note 359, at 23–24, 27. For a discussion of the 
lawyers and the extent to which they focused their advocacy on race, see Carlo A. Pedrioli, New York 
Times v. Sullivan and the Rhetorics of Race: A Look at the Briefs, Oral Arguments, and Opinions, 7 
GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 109, 119–20 (2015). 
431 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 130; see also Dyer, supra note 38, at 249. 
432 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 257 (1964); Fred D. Gray, The Sullivan Case: A 
Direct Product of the Civil Rights Movement, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1223, 1225 (1992). 
433 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–57; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 288–89; GRAY, supra note 7, at 
148, 156. 
434 See LEWIS, supra note 359, at 6–7. 
435 See Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at L25, reprinted in LEWIS, supra note 
359, at 2–3. 
436 See id. 
437 BRANCH, supra note 32, at 288–89; see also LEWIS, supra note 359, at 7. 
438 LEWIS, supra note 359, at 10, 12. None of the endorsers other than the four ministers were from 
Alabama. The ministers were included as defendants to preclude removal to federal court. See id. at 13–
14. Including the four Alabama ministers was also designed to deter their activism. Gray, supra note 
432, at 1226. 
439 LEWIS, supra note 359, at 12. 
440 BRANCH, supra note 32, at 312; LEWIS, supra note 359, at 13. Besides Sullivan and Patterson, 
three other officials filed libel suits: “Earl James, the mayor of Montgomery; Frank Parks, another city 
commissioner; and Clyde Sellers, a former commissioner.” Id. Each sought $500,000 in damages from 
the New York Times and the four ministers. Id. 
441 LEWIS, supra note 359, at 13. 
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For the New York Times, even that sum was less of a problem than the threat 
the suit posed to the future of a free press.442 Sullivan hoped that a large monetary 
judgment would intimidate the media and keep them from covering racial events in 
Alabama.443 The libel suits by the governor and two other commissioners were part 
of the same strategy.444 
For SCLC, the suit endangered the very survival of the organization.445 While 
the legal issues in the litigation focused on the First Amendment, the outcome of 
the case had profound implications for the future of the Civil Rights Movement. As 
a result, the defense lawyers included both litigators protective of the New York 
Times and the media’s freedoms, and civil rights lawyers seeking to avoid the fiscal 
disaster that could accompany an adverse decision.446 
Fred Gray, a member of the Black ministers’ legal team, described his view 
of the case: 
There was not a scintilla of evidence against our clients. They had 
no knowledge of the advertisement. They had not written it. They 
had never seen it. They did not know their names would be in it. 
They were not aware of it until they received the letter from 
Commissioner Sullivan requesting a retraction.447 
After a three-day trial, 448  segregationist Judge Walter Burgyn Jones 449 
“instructed the jury that the challenged statements in the [advertisement] were 
‘libelous per se’ ” and that under Alabama law, “a statement that was libelous per 
se was presumed to be false; the defendant could overcome that presumption only 
by proving the statement true in all material respects.”450 As expected, the jury 
found for plaintiff Sullivan and awarded him the full $500,000.451 
Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.452 In an opinion by Justice 
Brennan, the Court held that a libel suit by public officials required proof of actual 
malice, 453  and that the evidence presented was constitutionally insufficient to 
                                                
442 See id. at 34. 
443 Gray, supra note 432, at 1226. 
444 Id. 
445 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 296, 312, 579–80; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 171. 
446 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 162–64; LEWIS, supra note 359, at 7. 
447 Gray, supra note 432, at 1227. In his closing argument, Gray explained why his clients never 
responded to the Commissioner’s letter asking for a retraction: “How could these individual defendants 
retract something—if you’ll pardon the expression—they didn’t tract?” Id.; accord Entin, supra note 
128, at 264. 
448 LEWIS, supra note 359, at 27. 
449 See id. at 25–26. 
450 Id. at 32. 
451 See id. at 33. The plaintiff immediately proceeded to levy on the ministers’ property, taking their 
cars, and forcing the sale of Reverend Abernathy’s interest in family property in the state. Gray, supra 
note 432, at 1227. After the Supreme Court’s reversal, Gray was able to recover for the ministers the 
proceeds from those sales. Id. at 1228; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 163. The Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the Montgomery County Circuit Court, but it was never retried. Gray, supra note 
432, at 1228. 
452 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964). 
453 See id. at 279–80. The Court reasoned that:  
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support the judgment against the defendants.454 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is 
best known as a landmark libel decision; but for civil rights advocates, the decision 
represents the Supreme Court protecting the financial viability of the movement, as 
well.455  This landmark decision was just one of many court cases that would 
majorly impact the effectiveness of the movement. 
2. Permissions and Injunctions 
Dr. King’s adversaries learned early on that injunctions, usually issued by 
segregationist judges, could be a potent weapon against organized protests.456 
Injunctions placed legal restrictions on the movements’ activities in carrying out 
their nonviolent direct action strategies. Each injunction posed a dilemma for Dr. 
King and presented hard choices involving both principle and practical aspects. The 
lawyers provided advice and counsel about the possible paths to pursue.457 
The choices that Dr. King and his associates made in responding to an 
injunction determined the assignments for the lawyers. Activists’ options included: 
(1) comply, with no appeal, which required no action by the lawyers; (2) comply 
and appeal, with lawyers taking the appeal; or (3) violate the injunction and face 
contempt of court sanctions, with lawyers handling the appeal of the contempt 
citation (while perhaps also appealing the injunction).458 
In the early years, responses to injunctions were fairly straightforward. 
Officials sought and secured injunctions against activists’ action, and the leaders 
either complied without appealing (as in the Montgomery Bus Boycott),459  or 
complied and appealed to get the injunction dissolved (as in the Albany 
Movement).460  In some campaigns, lawyers also participated in the process of 
                                                
The constitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that prohibits a public official 
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. 
Id. 
454 Id. at 285–88. 
455 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 579–80; GRAY, supra note 7, at 162–63. 
456 Montgomery officials waited a long time to seek an injunction against the MIA’s car pool system. 
Stopping the car pool earlier could have been a devastating blow to the boycott. See GRAY, supra note 
7, at 92; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 74–75, 91–93. See generally Bayard Rustin, Montgomery Diary, 
LIBERATION, Apr. 1956, at 7, 9 (“The success of the car pool is at the heart of the movement.”), 
reprinted in DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 164, 167. 
457 See infra notes 482–483, 491, 495–498 and accompanying text. 
458 Dr. King chose each of those options with one or more injunctions. In Montgomery (1956) and 
Chicago (1966), he complied with an injunction without appealing it. See discussion infra Sections 
II.A.2.i (Montgomery), III.B.3.iv (Chicago). In Albany, Georgia (1962) and St. Augustine, Florida 
(1963–1964), he complied with and appealed the injunction. See discussion infra Sections II.A.2.ii 
(Albany), III.B.3.ii (St. Augustine). In Selma, Alabama (1965), he walked a tightrope and managed to 
comply. See discussion infra Section III.B.3.iii. In Birmingham (1963), he violated the injunction, faced 
a contempt citation, and appealed the contempt citation to the Supreme Court. See discussion infra 
Section III.B.3.i; see also Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 311–15 (1967). In Memphis 
(1968), he said that he was prepared to violate an injunction if necessary; but the judge modified the 
injunction and permitted the planned demonstration to take place. See discussion infra Section III.B.3.v. 
459 See discussion infra Section II.A.2.i. 
460 See discussion infra Section II.A.2.ii. 
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seeking local approvals for the planned direct action activities.461 As with other 
assignments, lawyers’ efforts to secure necessary approvals started with the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott and continued throughout Dr. King’s career. 
i. Montgomery: Permissions and Injunction (1955–1956) 
The bus boycott did not involve marches or demonstrations like many of the 
later movements. The boycott of local buses formed the core strategy to address the 
discriminatory policies and practices. To enable Black residents to get to school, to 
work, or to shopping areas without taking a bus, the MIA created an elaborate “car 
pool” system.462 Thousands of Black Montgomerians rode back and forth on a daily 
basis for many months in donated cars driven by volunteers.463 
The City of Montgomery had a franchise process that transit systems were 
required to follow to operate in the city.464 The city bus line that the MIA was 
boycotting had such a franchise and served the whole city with its bus routes.465 
Since the MIA established its car pool system without securing a franchise from 
the city, movement leaders feared that the city would at some point turn to the courts 
to enjoin the operation of the car pool system.466 Such an injunction could have a 
devastating impact on the movement.467 
In anticipation of a possible legal challenge to its operation, the MIA 
preemptively applied for a transit franchise for the car pool system.468 In early 
January 1962, the MIA’s leadership asked Fred Gray and Charles Langford to draft 
and submit an application to operate the car pool as a jitney service.469 City officials 
rejected it on the grounds that the city did not need another transit system.470 Later, 
the MIA tried again, as one last effort to secure the permission that would protect 
it against a possible injunction.471 As expected, the city responded the same way it 
had to the first request.472 Those turndowns left the MIA vulnerable to an injunction 
prohibiting the operation of the car pool, which came soon thereafter.473 
                                                
461 See discussion infra Sections II.A.2.i, III.B.3.i, III.B.3.vi. 
462 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 145–46; GARROW, supra note 2, at 27, 29; Coleman, Nee & 
Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 675–76. 
463 See sources cited supra note 462. Yancey Martin, who was part of the cadre of college-aged 
drivers that helped sustain the boycott over holiday breaks, recounts his experience: “[W]e saw the 
transportation end really kinda being the backbone of the movement because folks had to work and they 
had to have that little money.” HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP 
SOUTH REMEMBERED 60 (1977). 
464 See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 74–75; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 58; Kennedy, supra 
note 112, at 1047. 
465 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 59; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 56, 604 n.96. 
466 See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 676 & 711 n.72. 
467 See supra note 456 and accompanying text. 
468 See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 74–75. 
469 Id. at 74; see also Donald T. Ferron, Notes on MIA Executive Board Meeting (Jan. 23, 1956), in 
DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 121, 123–24. 
470 Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 677; “All-White” Bus Service Planned, NEWSL. 
FROM M.I.A. (Montgomery Improvement Ass’n, Montgomery, Ala.), Mar. 8, 1957, at 3, 3, http://www
.crmvet.org/docs/mia/570308_mia_newsletter.pdf. 
471 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 75. 
472 See id. 
473 See supra note 456 and accompanying text. 
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On November 5, 1956, the city filed a lawsuit against the MIA, Dr. King, and 
other protest leaders in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County to enjoin the 
operation of the “car pool.”474 Judge Eugene Carter, an ardent segregationist,475 
presided over the case.476 In an effort to get the case out of Judge Carter’s hands, 
Fred Gray and the other MIA lawyers asked the federal district court to enjoin the 
city from filing or prosecuting any action in state court against the car pool.477 Judge 
Frank Johnson, a frequent ally of civil rights advocates,478 rejected the motion as 
failing to claim any injury beyond that which flows from the enforcement of local 
ordinances.479 
In the November 13 circuit court hearing, Fred Gray led the MIA’s legal team, 
which included three other prominent Black Alabama lawyers—Orzell Billingsley, 
Peter Hall, and Arthur Shores.480 The court’s hearing provided an early example of 
Dr. King and his associates turning to lawyers to protect and facilitate the 
movement. Not surprisingly, the lawyers’ efforts to oppose the issuance of an 
injunction were to no avail. Judge Carter granted the order prohibiting the 
continuation of the car pool system.481 
At that point, three options presented themselves: (1) comply with the 
injunction and shut down the car pool system; (2) comply with the injunction, 
appeal it, and suspend operation of the car pool in the meantime; and (3) violate the 
injunction as an act of civil disobedience, based on a claim that it was an unjust 
order. MIA’s lawyers “advised compliance with [the] injunction.”482 With a weak 
case on the merits and a recalcitrant segregationist appellate judiciary, an appeal 
would have been an exercise in futility.483 Dr. King took their advice. 
                                                
474 GRAY, supra note 7, at 92. Fred Gray, lead counsel for the MIA, noted that: “It is interesting that 
the city had not filed such a lawsuit earlier. If such a case had been filed in December 1955 or January 
1956, the Bus Protest might never have garnered the necessary support, financial or otherwise, to 
sustain itself.” Id. 
475 Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1030. 
476 GRAY, supra note 7, at 92. 
477 KING, supra note 7, at 138; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1047. 
478 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 244. 
479 See Browder v. City of Montgomery, 146 F. Supp. 127, 131 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (“The court is of 
the opinion that the petitioners have not been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to the 
enforcement of city ordinances, or that this court by issuing the relief prayed for could afford petitioners 
protection which could not be secured by hearing in the State court proceeding and an appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court.”). 
480 GRAY, supra note 7, at 92–93; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1030. 
481 Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1047 (citing City of Montgomery v. Montgomery Improvement 
Ass’n, No. 31075 (Montgomery Cty. Cir. Ct. Nov. 13, 1956), reprinted in 2 Race Rel. L. Rep. 123 
(1956)). During the hearing on the injunction, word arrived from Washington that the Supreme Court 
had struck down the segregation laws without a hearing, in a very brief per curiam opinion. Id. at 1051 
(citing Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956)). 
482 LEWIS, supra note 47, at 80. 
483 Even before the judge’s decision, Dr. King seemed to assume that the MIA would obey the 
expected injunction. In Stride Toward Freedom, Dr. King’s account of the boycott, he told of his sense 
of doom the night before the hearing. KING, supra note 7, at 138. He anticipated that the judge would 
grant the injunction. Id. He acknowledged that it was not feasible to ask the thousands of protesters to 
undergo even greater sacrifice by walking to and from their jobs and schools: 
I knew that they had willingly suffered for nearly twelve months, but how could they 
function at all with the car pool destroyed? Could we ask them to walk back and forth 
every day to their jobs? And if not, would we then be forced to admit that the protest had 
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ii. Albany, Georgia: Injunction (1961–1962) 
The Albany Movement had extreme challenges on many levels, not the least 
of which was Dr. King’s decision about whether to comply with an injunction. 
Segregation was deeply embedded in all aspects of social and political life, the 
police chief had a very effective method of resisting the movement nonviolently, 
and significant internal tensions plagued the movement.484 Even without the court’s 
intervention, activists faced great hardships in trying to accomplish their very broad 
and ambitious goals.485 
In July 1962, the Albany Movement finally seemed to be gaining some 
momentum. 486  At that point, city officials sought an injunction against the 
movement’s demonstrations from Federal District Judge J. Robert Elliott.487 On 
July 20, just hours before a planned march to city hall, the acknowledged 
                                                
failed in the end? For the first time in our long struggle together, I almost shrank from 
appearing before them. 
Id. He seemed resigned to complying with the expected injunction and shutting down the transportation 
system. 
As it turned out, the injunction was largely moot as soon as it was issued because the Supreme Court 
struck down the bus segregation laws the day the local court issued the injunction. See id. at 138–40. 
But that was fortuitous, and Dr. King’s thinking before the Court’s decision did not seem to include the 
possibility of violating the expected injunction. Since the Supreme Court decision would become final 
soon, the MIA shut down the system and carried out makeshift transportation arrangements in the 
interim. GARROW, supra note 2, at 81; see also KING, supra note 7, at 142; Martin Luther King, Jr., 
Address to MIA Mass Meeting at Holt Street Baptist Church (Nov. 14, 1956), in 3 THE PAPERS OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 424, 425–27; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 
34, at 677; cf. BRANCH, supra note 32, at 194 (stating that boycotters endured the delay until the 
integration orders reached Montgomery by walking: “In effect, they would struggle through a victory 
lap.”). 
The car pool’s purpose and scale suggested that it was serving as a transit system, and it was doing 
so without a city franchise. See GRAY, supra note 7, at 91–92; KING, supra note 7, at 58–59; Coleman, 
Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 676–77; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 193 (noting a city 
witness’s testimony in the injunction hearing that “the MIA had deposited $189,000 in his Montgomery 
bank, a sum that city lawyers used to ridicule King’s contention that the car pool was a voluntary, 
‘share-a-ride’ cooperative.”). The MIA’s two applications for a franchise showed their awareness of 
that fact. Moreover, the city’s claim that there was no need for an additional transit system seemed 
borne out by the fact that the bus system had accommodated the Black ridership before the boycott. In 
fact, Black passengers constituted the majority of the patrons of the system. See GARROW, supra note 2, 
at 26; KING, supra note 7, at 91–92; JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS 
YEARS, 1954–1965, at 62 (25th anniversary ed. 2013). See generally BRANCH, supra note 32, at 150 
(discussing financial strain bus system experienced on account of decreased Black patronage). 
484 See supra notes 402–404, 408 and accompanying text. 
485 Because the Albany movement was a compilation of various organizations, this meant that there 
were competing agendas and personalities, making it difficult to have a cohesive and consistent 
message. Additionally, the police chief had learned from prior movements and schooled his officers in 
the use of nonviolent tactics for subduing protesters, making it impossible for the movement to garner 
the media attention that had served it well in the past. See supra notes 408–412 and accompanying text. 
486 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 45; see also LEWIS, supra note 47, at 159–61. 
487 GARROW, supra note 2, at 206. President Kennedy had appointed Judge Elliott to the district court 
bench, along with a number of other segregationists in the South. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING 
FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REGAN 167 (1997); see also 
BRANCH, supra note 32, at 609, 699–700. Elliott had been a leader behind the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt 
from the Democratic Party. UC Davis Sch. of Law, Remembering Our Roots: Celebrating Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr., YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2013), https://youtu.be/fMPRvSnywVU (keynote address by 
Clarence B. Jones). 
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segregationist judge issued a temporary restraining order without notifying Dr. 
King or Albany Movement leaders. 488  The order barred Dr. King and other 
movement supporters from “engaging in ‘unlawful picketing, congregating, or 
marching in the streets’ and from doing anything else ‘designed to provoke 
breaches of the peace.’ ”489 
This extremely broad injunction prohibited virtually all of the activities that 
the movement contemplated.490 Dr. King’s lawyers advised him that the injunction 
was almost certainly invalid, because of its sweeping infringement of First 
Amendment rights of speech and assembly.491 Initially, Dr. King contemplated 
violating the injunction because he believed that it was an “unjust law.”492 For him, 
the injunction was a “law that the majority inflicted on the minority that was not 
binding on itself.” 493  Moreover, it did not square with the moral law of the 
universe.494 
But Clarence Jones, Dr. King’s lawyer and confidant, implored him to obey 
the injunction.495 He argued that the federal courts had generally been favorable to 
the Civil Rights Movement and had upheld the constitutional rights of Blacks.496 
Jones also suggested that Dr. King would lose his moral standing and “his 
credentials to complain about state governors and various officials throughout the 
South who had announced their intention to disobey instances of federal court 
ordered injunctions under the Brown decision.”497 
Ultimately, Dr. King decided to comply with the injunction.498 For him, it was 
critical that this injunction came from a federal judge. He made a sharp distinction 
                                                
488 See LEWIS, supra note 47, at 161; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 138. 
489 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 45; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 206. Judge Elliott 
reasoned that the protests and the police response to them would deny white people their equal 
protection rights by depriving them of police officers and other resources. DANIELS, supra note 41, at 
154. 
490 The movement planned several marches in Albany to bring attention to segregation and the 
infringement on Blacks’ rights, which would be compromised if the injunction were sustained. See 
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 45 (pointing out that obeying the injunction “would halt the 
Movement’s momentum”); see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 103 (noting that Dr. King canceled 
the impending marches); KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 102 (recalling Dr. King saying, “I don’t mind 
violating an unjust state injunction, but I won’t violate a federal one”). 
491 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 45. William Kunstler later recalled his belief at the time 
that the restraining order was unlawful: “I constantly stressed the fact that I considered the injunction 
illegal. While I did not advise King to violate it, I made it quite clear that I did not think he was bound 
by it.” KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 102. 
492 UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 207. 
493 UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487. 
494 Id. Dr. King elaborated on the “just law” question in his Letter from Birmingham Jail. See infra 
note 659 and accompanying text. 
495 UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487. Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Burke Marshall, 
head of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, also urged Dr. King to obey the injunction. 
Id.; see GARROW, supra note 2, at 207. 
496 UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487. 
497 Id. 
498 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 103. Clarence Jones recounted, “Eventually, after a heated 
discussion with me and a continued heated discussion with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had 
made the same point I had made about his undermining and forfeiting his moral credibility by 
disobeying Judge Elliott’s injunction, he agreed to abide by the injunction.” UC Davis Sch. of Law, 
supra note 487. 
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between the federal and state courts.499 He agreed that federal courts had served as 
frequent allies in the civil rights struggle, with judges having sufficient 
independence from local politics and pressures to give the movement a number of 
important victories. 500  Dr. King made this distinction notwithstanding his 
awareness of the presence of a number of segregationists on the Deep South’s 
federal bench during this period, including Judge Elliott.501 Disobeying the order 
would also have risked alienating the Justice Department, which was committed to 
compliance with federal court orders.502 
So Dr. King had his lawyers appeal the injunction as violating First 
Amendment rights of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of 
speech.503 Donald Hollowell and C.B. King sought the assistance of veteran LDF 
lawyer Constance Baker Motley with the appeal.504 Dr. King and his team of 
lawyers promptly went to Atlanta to ask Judge Elbert Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals to dissolve the injunction.505 Judge Tuttle vacated Judge Elliott’s 
temporary restraining order on July 24, 1962, holding that it violated the First 
Amendment rights of Dr. King and other movement supporters.506 
But in a movement that was already reeling from extremely strong and 
effective resistance, as well as constantly quarreling factions, even the four-day 
                                                
499 Kunstler recalled King saying, “The federal courts have given us our greatest victories and I 
cannot, in good conscience, declare war on them. Elliott may be a segregationist, but he is still a United 
States District Judge, and I’ll rely on the upper courts to reverse him.” KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 102. 
500 MORRIS, supra note 188, at 247; UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487. SCLC aide Andrew 
Young described King’s perspective: 
It was a federal injunction, and Dr. King felt that the federal courts were our only real 
ally nationally. They had challenged segregated law schools, dining cars, etc., then the 
1954 school decision, and had helped in Montgomery. Breaking a federal court injunction 
in Albany was a slap in the face of the federal courts that he couldn’t bring himself to 
make. 
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 59. 
501 For example, in Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), where a three-judge 
federal court ruled Montgomery’s bus segregation laws unconstitutional, segregationist Judge Seybourn 
Harris Lynne dissented. He began his dissenting opinion by stating, “Only a profound, philosophical 
disagreement with the ultimate conclusion of the majority ‘that the separate but equal doctrine can no 
longer be safely followed as a correct statement of the law’ would prompt this, my first dissent.” Id. at 
717 (Lynne, J., dissenting). 
When Dr. King first found out about the injunction, he called Burke Marshall of the Justice 
Department and demanded to know why a recent Kennedy appointee was working with city officials to 
end the movement. GARROW, supra note 2, at 206. 
Although President Kennedy did not want to appoint segregationists, he appointed segregationists 
William Harold Cox, J. Robert Elliot, and Pat Mehaffy. GOLDMAN, supra note 487, at 167–68. Still, Pat 
Mehaffy was the only appointee that the administration knew was a segregationist. Id. at 168. 
502 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 45. When Dr. King spoke with Burke Marshall of the 
Justice Department after the injunction was issued, Marshall instructed Dr. King that he would have to 
seek a reversal through the appeals process, and that in the meantime he would have to obey the 
injunction. GARROW, supra note 2, at 206. 
503 MORRIS, supra note 188, at 248; UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487. Dr. King also 
distinguished between local segregation laws, which he challenged, and federal law, which he 
respected. See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 46. 
504 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 154; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 138–39. 
505 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 154–55; see also MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 139. The team also 
included Clarence Jones and Orzell Billingsley. UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487. 
506 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 46; UC Davis Sch. of Law, supra note 487; see also 
MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 138–39. 
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delay it experienced added to the movement’s woes. 507  The movement never 
regained its credibility or momentum.508 
In hindsight, Dr. King viewed his decision not to violate the Albany injunction 
as a strategic mistake. 509  That experience became a lesson learned for future 
campaigns, especially for the next major campaign, in Birmingham, in 1963.510 
3. Fundraising 
While fundraising is not a traditional responsibility for lawyers, some of Dr. 
King’s lawyers took on that assignment as well.511 Financial needs ranged from 
recurring expenses, such as those growing out of encounters with the legal 
system—lawyers’ fees, court costs, bail, and fines—to MIA and SCLC staff 
salaries, to other frequent expenses like travel.512  There were also movement-
specific expenses. In the early years, creating and maintaining Montgomery’s 
yearlong “car pool” system was the primary example of such a financial 
challenge.513 
Dr. King was a consummate fundraiser and held center stage in that domain.514 
However, even his monumental efforts fell short of the movements’ overall 
requirements.515 In 1962, New York lawyers Harry Wachtel, Clarence Jones, and 
Theodore Kheel stepped in to help bridge the gap.516 They founded the Gandhi 
Society for Human Rights in an effort to provide financial and legal support for the 
movement.517 Dr. King served as honorary president, and Clarence Jones filled the 
roles of general counsel and acting executive director.518 The society’s mission 
statement defined its role as “legal defense and aid for civil rights cases, educational 
                                                
507 See MORRIS, supra note 188, at 248; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 46. 
508 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 46. See generally FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 105–06 
(describing reports that towards the end of July the movement was “running out of steam”). 
509 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 59–60. An SCLC aide reflected on Dr. King’s reaction: 
“But after the Albany campaign collapsed, Dr. King lamented the fact that he had abided by the 
injunction, and he entered the planning for Birmingham ready to defy even a federal court rather than 
see the Albany collapse repeated. And if he had allowed himself to be halted in his tracks in 
Birmingham [from an injunction], it would have become the technique used against the movement 
everywhere throughout the South.” Id. 
510 KING, supra note 22, at 35. 
511 See discussion supra Section I.B.5. 
512 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 153, 159, 185–86; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 96–97, 117, 
142–44, 178; see also Interview by Glenn E. Smiley with Martin Luther King, Minister, Dexter Ave. 
Baptist Church, in Montgomery, Ala. (Mar. 1, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document
/mlk-interview-glenn-e-smiley. 
513 See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 675, 676 & 710 nn.66 & 69–70. 
514 See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 32, at 149, 254, 300, 321, 352, 381–83, 573–75, 578, 581, 589, 
595–96, 641, 683, 803, 805–06, 870; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 49, 70, 96–97, 256, 287, 345; 
GARROW, supra note 2, at 151, 153, 155, 234, 429, 461–63; LEWIS, supra note 47, at 120, 156. 
515 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 299–300, 515, 571; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 47–48, 142. 
516 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 198. 
517 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 97–98; GARROW, supra note 2, at 198. 
518Gandhi Society for Human Rights, KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://kingencyclopedia.stanford
.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_gandhi_society_for_human_rights/index.html (last visited Jan. 18, 
2016). The board of directors included, among others, Mordecai Johnson, President Emeritus of 
Howard University, William Kunstler, special counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union, and 
Benjamin Mays, President of Morehouse College. Id. 
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materials propagating nonviolent methods and voter registration activities, and 
financial assistance to other organizations for civil rights projects.”519 
In recognizing both the importance and the cost of legal representation, Dr. 
King urged that a major focus of the Gandhi Society’s efforts should be breaking 
barriers to justice through greater access to legal defense, particularly for those 
engaging in efforts to assert their constitutional rights: 
Many people who are poor find themselves in legal actions, and the 
heavy cost of defense is a crippling difficulty, thus hindering the 
progress of citizens who may be informed of their rights but lack the 
means to carry on. Also, there are areas where positive legal steps 
should be taken in the form of injunctive suits or other actions to 
remove illegal obstacles, and again where the financial means do not 
exist to see a project to completion.520 
B. Complementary Desegregation Litigation 
Starting in the 1930s, one of the prominent strands of civil rights work was 
constitutional litigation challenging state-imposed segregation laws in the South.521 
The initial focus was on the exclusion of Blacks from law schools and graduate 
schools. 522  Brown v. Board of Education 523  represents the culmination of a 
litigation campaign to challenge racial exclusion and segregation in all levels of 
public education.524 Throughout the campaign, the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Education Fund (LDF) relied almost exclusively on the courts to bring about the 
changes they were seeking. The LDF’s theory was that the law—state constitutional 
provisions, state statutes, and local ordinances—was the problem, and the courts 
could provide the solution. The assumption was that there was no need for mass 
                                                
519 Id. However, the organization quickly fell on hard times. See discussion infra Section III.B.4. 
520 Letter from Martin Luther King Jr. to Harry Wachtel (Feb. 12, 1962), in 7 THE PAPERS OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.: TO SAVE THE SOUL OF AMERICA, JANUARY 1961-AUGUST 1962, at 397, 398 
(Clayborne Carson & Tenisha Armstrong eds., 2014). 
521 See generally KLARMAN, supra note 13, at 148–52, 160–62 (discussing school equalization 
cases); KLUGER, supra note 13, at 132–37 (discussing Nathan Margold’s strategic vision for the 
NAACP’s legal drive); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED 
EDUCATION, 1925–1950, at 21–33 (1987) (examining the legal background of racial discrimination in 
the 1930s and the Margold Report, which emphasized a direct challenge to segregation on 
constitutional grounds); Rabin, supra note 75, at 215–16 (discussing the NAACP’s litigation campaign 
plan). 
For discussion of central, but less publicized, aspects of civil rights lawyering in the first half of the 
twentieth century, focused on “racial uplift,” see MACK, supra note 161, at 1–11. 
522 See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment required that Black student be admitted to publicly-funded law school that restricted access 
to whites, where separate facility provided for Blacks was inferior in several respects); Sipuel v. Bd. of 
Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (Black student denied admission to the state’s only law school because of 
her race entitled to secure legal education from a state institution that was equal to that afforded to 
whites); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (State must offer Blacks facilities for 
graduate education “substantially equal” to those afforded for whites); see also KLUGER, supra note 13, 
at 185–92, 201–03, 257–68 (examining cases challenging segregated universities); TUSHNET, supra 
note 13, at 121–49 (same). 
523 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
524 See KLUGER, supra note 13, at 293–94; TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 150–67. 
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movements or other strategies such as nonviolent direct action.525 This series of 
“test cases” became the prototype of a freestanding judicial strategy.526 
For activists like Martin Luther King, Jr., the pre-existence of those litigation 
strategies and the Court’s decision in Brown raised important questions about the 
extent to which, if any, they should consider joining forces with the lawyers who 
had relied so heavily on the courts. Dr. King had complicated views about the role 
of the courts in civil rights.527 Ideally, nonviolent direct action would achieve the 
movement’s objectives, and there would be no need for litigation. However, in the 
messy real world of social movements, Dr. King saw that nonviolent direct action 
had a very difficult road to hoe.528 Additional strategies, including litigation, could 
add power to a movement facing daunting legal and extra-legal opposition. 
While Brown did not accompany a social movement, it helped create the 
possibility of coordinated multiple strategies that included similar lawsuits. 529 
Those lawsuits could use the Brown decision as the central precedent for arguing 
that the racially discriminatory laws being challenged were unconstitutional.530 
As a result, Dr. King recognized the important role of litigation strategies in 
the Civil Rights Movement. At the same time, he expressed great concern about 
over-reliance on the courts to address problems of segregation and discrimination. 
His seemingly contradictory statements about the courts suggest his ambivalence 
about the place of litigation strategies in the Civil Rights Movement. 
On the one hand, Dr. King emphasized the usefulness of the courts: 
 Let us never succumb to the temptation of believing that 
legislation and judicial decrees play only minor roles in solving this 
problem. Morality cannot be legislated, but behavior can be 
regulated. Judicial decrees may not change the heart, but they can 
restrain the heartless. . . . The habits, if not the hearts, of people have 
been and are being altered every day by legislative acts, judicial 
decisions and executive orders. Let us not be misled by those who 
argue that segregation cannot be ended by the force of law.531 
                                                
525 The closest thing to extra-legal activism was a boycott by high school students in rural Prince 
Edward County, Virginia, which developed into one of the four cases consolidated in Brown. In April 
1951, the students walked out to protest the separate and unequal county schools, and sought 
representation by civil rights lawyer Oliver Hill. See KLUGER, supra note 13, at 464–72, 476–80. 
526 See KLARMAN, supra note 13, at 378–79; TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 126–27. 
527 Dr. King’s views on the appropriate role of litigation strategies evolved over his career. See 
discussion infra Section III.A. 
528 See KING, supra note 22, at 15–38. 
529 See Rabin, supra note 75, at 218; see also BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 142, at 115–23 (examining 
coordinated strategies that leveraged Brown in efforts to end segregation in recreational facilities and 
public transportation). 
530 See discussion infra Section II.B.1. The SCLC also made major efforts to secure federal civil 
rights legislation. For more on those efforts, see FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 134–37, 149–53, 178–
79, and GARROW, supra note 2, at 267–69. 
531 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., The Ethical Demands for Integration (Dec. 27, 1962), in A 
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 117, 124 
(James M. Washington ed., 1986). For similar statements made elsewhere by Dr. King, see MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., An Address Before the National Press Club (July 19, 1962), in A TESTAMENT OF 
HOPE, supra, at 99, 100–01 [hereinafter KING, Press Club Address]; MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 
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Acknowledging both the value and the limitations of the courts, Dr. King 
argued that: 
In our nation, under the guidance of the superb legal staff of the 
NAACP [LDF], we have been able, through the courts, to remove 
the legal basis of segregation. This is by far one of the most 
marvelous achievements of our generation. . . . We must not, 
however, remain satisfied with a court “victory” over our white 
brothers.532 
But in light of his deep commitment to nonviolent direct action, it is not 
surprising that Dr. King would define his ideal approach as being in the streets and 
out of the courts: “Wherever it is possible, we want to avoid court cases in this 
integration struggle.”533 When he approved turning to the courts, he did so with 
great reluctance.534 
Nonviolent direct action required mass participation. Mobilizing rank-and-file 
Blacks was a central theme of Dr. King’s movements, and doing so represented a 
high form of democracy.535 Court cases risked undermining that thrust: “[W]hen 
legal contests were the sole form of activity[,] . . . the ordinary Negro was involved 
as a passive spectator[, and] . . . his energies were unemployed.” 536  Using the 
courts was an elite strategy that relied on legal expertise and procedures that played 
out in a venue that could not engage the masses. Moreover, because of the complex 
procedures and technical legal language, movement leaders lost a degree of control 
to the lawyers once the process moved into the courts.537 
Dr. King also had pragmatic concerns. Courts generally proceeded at a very 
slow pace, which delayed progress and provided opportunities for adversaries to 
take advantage of the fact that time was on their side.538 Moreover, the slow process 
                                                
Commencement Address at Lincoln University: The American Dream (June 6, 1961), in A TESTAMENT 
OF HOPE, supra, at 208, 213; Martin Luther King, Jr., The Case Against “Tokenism,” N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Aug. 5, 1962, at 11, reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra, at 106, 107. 
532 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Give Us the Ballot—We Will Transform the South, Keynote Address 
at the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom (May 17, 1957), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 531, at 
197, 200. 
533 Dr. King made that statement in 1957. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 87 & 645 n.4. 
534 See discussion infra Sections II.B.1–2. 
535 See, e.g., Gunnar Jahn, Chairman, Nobel Peace Prize Comm., Award Presentation Speech (Dec. 
10, 1946), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1964/press.html (discussing the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott and observing that “[d]uring the morning of December 5, as bus after bus 
without a single Negro passenger passed his window, [Dr. King] realized that the boycott had proved a 
hundred percent effective”); see also ESKEW, supra note 50, at 230–34. 
536 MORRIS, supra note 188, at 123. At the same time, filing a case and surviving motions to dismiss 
and for summary judgment could help sustain a movement by providing hope and inspiration. It could 
also add to the pressure on adversaries to seek a resolution. See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 163; 
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 681 & 714 n.107. 
537 See, e.g., infra Section II.B.1 (discussing the Montgomery Bus Boycott, where the lawsuit filed 
sought broader relief than the activists’ initial demands); cf. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Saul Alinsky and the 
Litigation Campaign to Win the Right to Same-Sex Marriage, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 643, 664–69 
(2009) (critiquing litigation strategy in the same-sex marriage movement). 
538 GARROW, supra note 2, at 91–92; King, supra note 1, at xxii. 
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of the courts could sap the energy and enthusiasm of the movement.539 While the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott extended for over a year, Dr. King’s movements usually 
contemplated months rather than years of direct action. Litigation was more likely 
to take years, so there was a high probability of direct action and court processes 
being out of sync, time-wise. 
Litigation was also costly, and the expenses incurred in carrying out direct 
action campaigns often pressed the movements’ fundraising capacities to the 
limit.540 Securing resources for litigation would add another burden and financial 
strain on the movement.541 
However, in his book Why We Can’t Wait, Dr. King suggested a quite 
interdependent relationship between court-based strategies and direct action: 
 Direct action is not a substitute for work in the courts and the 
halls of government. . . . [P]leading cases before the courts of the 
land[] does not eliminate the necessity for bringing about the mass 
dramatization of injustice in front of a city hall. Indeed, direct action 
and legal action complement one another; when skillfully employed, 
each becomes more effective.542 
Dr. King also emphasized the limitations of the courts and the law and 
therefore the need for direct-action strategies: 
 Fortunately, the Negro has been willing to grapple with a 
creative and powerful force in his struggle for racial justice, namely, 
nonviolent resistance. This does not mean that a new method has 
come into being to serve as a substitute for litigation and legislation. 
Certainly we must continue to work through the courts and 
legislative channels. But those who adhere to the method of 
nonviolent direct action recognize that legislation and court orders 
tend only to declare rights; they can never thoroughly deliver them. 
Only when the people themselves begin to act are rights on paper 
given lifeblood. A catalyst is needed to breathe life experience into 
                                                
539 See generally JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 33 (1978) 
(discussing costs that attenuate the likelihood of success in using the legal system to achieve social 
change). 
540 See discussion infra Section II.A.3. 
541 This objection was not so much to the use of the courts as it was to the movement having to bear 
the financial burden of doing so. See KING, supra note 22, at 157 (suggesting that the federal 
government should take the responsibility for carrying out civil rights litigation, including providing the 
required resources). 
542 Id. at 33. The idea of joining litigation and nonviolent direct action predated Dr. King’s era by at 
least sixty years. The organizers of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), considered boycotting the 
trains while they pursued their test case challenging the constitutionality of the Louisiana railroad 
segregation statute. See Cheryl I. Harris, The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson: The Death and Resurrection 
of Racial Formalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 181, 201–02 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004). 
Louis Martinet, one of the leaders, proposed the joint strategy. See id. 
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a judicial decision by the persistent exercise of the rights until they 
become usual and ordinary in human contact.543 
In short, Dr. King respected the contributions litigators and the courts made 
but committed himself and his movements to nonviolent direct action. At the same 
time, his recognition of the power of the courts opened his mind to turning to them 
as a complementary strategy. 
1. The Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955–1957)544 
Even before Rosa Parks refused a bus driver’s order to give up her seat to a 
white man on December 1, 1955, several of Montgomery’s Black leaders had begun 
searching for a plaintiff to launch a “test case” challenging the constitutionality of 
the bus segregation laws. 545  The first such effort failed. An appellate judge 
dismissed the charge against a teenage girl, Claudette Colvin, for violating the 
segregation law when she refused to give up her seat to a white rider. 546 
Nevertheless, challenging the constitutionality of bus segregation laws had become 
part of the Black community’s tactical arsenal—if only to be held in reserve in case 
it was ever necessary to use it.547 
A possible opportunity for another constitutional challenge appeared when 
Rosa Parks was arrested. She asked Fred Gray, her friend, frequent lunch partner, 
and NAACP colleague, to represent her.548 At the urging of long-time local civil 
rights activist E.D. Nixon, Rosa Parks agreed to have her case used “to challenge 
the constitutionality of [the] bus segregation laws.”549 Nixon viewed this as the 
opportunity for which he had been waiting—to combine direct action and litigation 
                                                
543 KING, Press Club Address, supra note 531, at 102. 
544 This account of the Montgomery Bus Boycott’s use of complementary litigation is drawn largely 
from Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, and sources cited there. 
545 See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, ROSA PARKS 88, 90 (2000); see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 43–47; 
SALMOND, supra note 115, at 173; WILLIAMS, supra note 483, at 63; David J. Garrow, The Origins of 
the Montgomery Bus Boycott, S. CHANGES, Oct.–Dec. 1985, at 21, reprinted in THE WALKING CITY: 
THE MONTGOMERY BUS BOYCOTT, 1955–1956, at 607, 613 (David J. Garrow ed., 1989). 
546 See DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 77 (noting that the appellate judge’s ruling 
“prevented the lawyers from using Colvin’s arrest as a test case to challenge the bus segregation laws”). 
By some accounts, the circuit solicitor prosecuting the case informed the court that the State was 
dropping the charge for violating the city bus segregation ordinance after the appellate judge denied 
Claudette Colvin’s motion to dismiss that charge on constitutional grounds, and then set the case for 
trial. See, e.g., THORNTON, supra note 27, at 54. The judge upheld Colvin’s conviction for assaulting a 
police officer when the officer tried to remove her from the bus. See DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra 
note 32, at 77. 
547 The Colvin case confirmed that Alabama state courts were not a hospitable place to bring bus 
desegregation litigation. Consequently, Fred Gray and Clifford Durr began to consider filing a suit in 
federal court, alleging that bus segregation laws violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. GRAY, supra note 7, at 70–71; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 54–55. That possibility 
seemed even more promising after NAACP lawyers obtained a Fourth Circuit decision in Flemming v. 
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., striking down South Carolina’s bus segregation laws, in July 1955. 
See 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S. 901 (1956). 
548 GRAY, supra note 7, at 31, 50; see also THEOHARIS, supra note 332, at 34, 60–61, 77. 
549 DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 9; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 121, 130–31. 
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to challenge the Jim Crow regime on the buses: “This is the case. We can boycott 
the bus lines with this and at the same time go to the Supreme Court.”550 
For Fred Gray, Rosa Parks’ arrest provided an early chance to act on his 
mission to destroy segregation wherever he found it.551 Gray’s goal was to get the 
Supreme Court to extend the principle in Brown to the segregation of transportation 
facilities. 552  In light of the possibility of basing Rosa Parks’ defense on the 
unconstitutionality of the bus segregation laws, Fred Gray enlisted Thurgood 
Marshall and Robert Carter in New York, the most experienced civil rights lawyers 
in the country.553 Gray also recruited local lawyers to work on the case.554 
As expected, the trial judge rejected the unconstitutionality defense and found 
Rosa Parks guilty of violating the bus segregation laws. 555  Gray’s strategy 
contemplated appeals through the state courts, which would almost certainly affirm 
the trial court and set the stage for an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 556 
However, a procedural mishap precluded the state appeal, thus ending the case.557 
While Fred Gray was preparing Rosa Parks’ defense, Dr. King accepted the 
leadership position at the Montgomery Improvement Association. 558  As the 
movement’s leader, his views about the role of litigation became critical. 
                                                
550 GARROW, supra note 2, at 14. Notwithstanding Nixon’s call for simultaneous implementation of 
the two strategies, that did not happen in Montgomery, or in any other movement. See discussion infra 
Sections II.B.1–2, III.A. 
551 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 51, 74. In fact, matters proceeded in fits and starts, with no 
constitutional challenge initiated until the following year. See infra note 578 and accompanying text. 
552 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 76–77. 
553 See id. at 72–73, 77; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 71, 75; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra 
note 34, at 682 & 715 n.113; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1031 n.199. 
554 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 54, 72; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 714 n.112. 
555 Parks was “found guilty of violating Chapter 1, Section 8 of the City Code of Montgomery, 
Alabama,” Parks v. City of Montgomery, 92 So. 2d 683, 684 (Ala. Ct. App. 1957), which made a 
violation of the state bus segregation statute also a municipal offense. See discussion supra Section 
II.A.1.i. 
To secure the Supreme Court decision the protesters were seeking, the lower courts needed to reject 
the unconstitutionality defense. This approach echoes the lawyers’ strategy more than a half century 
earlier with their “test case” in Plessy v. Ferguson, where Homer Plessy’s lawyer challenged the 
prosecution as based on an unconstitutional railroad segregation statute. That case made it to the 
Supreme Court, and became the first decision to affirm the constitutionality of segregation laws. See 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See generally LOFGREN, supra note 144 (assessing the Plessy 
decision in view of its relevant facts and the prevailing doctrines). While Rosa Parks had not planned to 
refuse to give up her seat in order to challenge the segregation laws, the case seemed to provide an 
opportunity to bring the question before the Court. 
556 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 56, 71. 
557 See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1047. Parks was charged with violating a municipal ordinance, 
not a state law. The Court of Appeals of Alabama said that prosecutions for such violations were only 
“quasi criminal” in nature, and were thus governed by the rules that applied to civil, rather than to 
criminal, appeals. Parks, 92 So. 2d at 684. And while the criminal appellate rules dispensed with 
assignments of error, the civil appellate rules required them. Id. at 684–85. Because no errors were 
assigned in Parks’ appeal, the court of appeals concluded there was nothing for it to review, and 
affirmed Parks’ conviction. Id. at 685. 
At that point, Fred Gray and his associates were willing to put desegregation litigation on the back 
burner because they still believed that the city would agree to changes: “Really what happened is when 
we talked to the bus company officials and the city officials and they promised that things would be 
better, we just let them out talk us.” Interview by Christopher Coleman with Fred Gray in Tuskegee, 
Ala. (Aug. 21, 2001). 
558 KING, supra note 7, at 41–43; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 52–53. 
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The Montgomery Bus Boycott began in the shadow of Brown, a year and a 
half after the first decision and just months after Brown II, the remedial decision.559 
Early on, Dr. King praised and celebrated the Brown decision, notwithstanding his 
consistent philosophical and pragmatic position to never rely exclusively on the 
courts.560 Brown was a classic example of that one-dimensional strategy of stand-
alone litigation.561 
Dr. King acknowledged several critical benefits of the Court’s school 
desegregation decision: providing legitimacy for the Civil Rights Movement; 
inspiring Blacks, as well as whites, to join the movement; and making available an 
important legal precedent that could be useful in future cases that were part of a 
broader social movement.562 In his initial speech before the bus boycott began, Dr. 
King invoked the Brown decision, without naming it, to establish the legitimacy of 
the movement’s enterprise.563 In seeking the moral and political high ground, he 
urged that: “We are not wrong. . . . [I]f we are wrong, the Supreme Court of this 
Nation is wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution of the United States is wrong.”564 
Montgomery’s Black community was contemplating collective resistance to the 
previously accepted authority of the city and the bus company, so it was critical to 
have a way of framing that initiative as right and justified.565 Moreover, the path 
Montgomery’s Black community was contemplating was uncharted territory, with 
great risks individually and collectively. At least one branch of the federal 
                                                
559 Brown I was decided in May 1954, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Brown II in May 1955, 349 U.S. 
294 (1955) (mandating school desegregation with “all deliberate speed”). 
560 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 78, 87, 91–92; KING, supra note 7, at 167–68. 
561 See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 686 & 718 nn.143–44; Kennedy, supra note 
112, at 1012. 
562 See KING, supra note 7, at 50, 168; MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Facing the Challenge of a New 
Age, Address Before the First Annual Institute on Non-Violence and Social Change (Dec. 3, 1956), in 
A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 531, at 135, 137–38; Martin Luther King, Jr., The Burning Truth in 
the South, PROGRESSIVE, May 1960, at 8, reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 531, at 94, 
95; Martin Luther King, Jr., “Desegregation and the Future,” Address Delivered at the Annual 
Luncheon of the National Committee for Rural Schools (Dec. 15, 1956), in 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 471, 472–75; Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Golden 
Anniversary Conference of National Urban League 2–3 (Sept. 6, 1960), http://www.thekingcenter.org
/archive/document/address-mlk-golden-anniversary-conference-national-urban-league; Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Address to the National Bar Association 3–5 (Aug. 20, 1959), http://www.thekingcenter.org
/archive/document/address-national-bar-association. 
563 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 140. 
564 Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1000. 
565 In Dr. King’s account of the Montgomery Bus Boycott in Stride Toward Freedom, published 
shortly after the boycott ended, he emphasized the importance of Brown: 
For all men of good will May 17, 1954, marked a joyous end to the long night of 
enforced segregation. In unequivocal language the Court affirmed that “separate but 
equal” facilities are inherently unequal, and that to segregate a child on the basis of his 
race is to deny that child equal protection of the law. This decision brought hope to 
millions of disinherited Negroes who had formerly dared only to dream of freedom. It 
further enhanced the Negro’s sense of dignity and gave him even greater determination to 
achieve justice. 
KING, supra note 7, at 168. 
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government, however, seemed to be on their side, making the effort less treacherous 
and success seemingly more possible.566 
Notwithstanding the potentially powerful precedent that Brown provided, a 
legal challenge to the bus segregation laws moved to the back burner after the denial 
of Rosa Parks’ appeal.567 It remained on the back burner for the first two months of 
the boycott.568  Dr. King showed no interest in pursuing a legal strategy.569 In 
addition, there was very little support among Montgomery’s Blacks for an 
immediate resort to the courts.570 Despite the well-publicized precedents of Brown 
and a Fourth Circuit decision striking down South Carolina’s bus segregation laws, 
federal litigation remained an unsure and possibly dangerous tactic.571 Moreover, 
going to court would almost certainly have ended any possibility of a successful 
negotiation of their grievances with local officials, leaving bus conditions 
unchanged while the suit traveled what could be a long and uncertain journey 
through the federal courts.572 Worse still, even a favorable Supreme Court ruling 
could not guarantee integration on the city’s buses.573 
In late January 1956, the City Commission announced that it would no longer 
negotiate with the MIA until Black riders returned to the buses.574 That persuaded 
                                                
566 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 71; KING, supra note 7, at 131–32; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, 
supra note 34, at 682. 
567 The scope of the principle articulated by the Court in 1954 was uncertain, because the opinion 
referred specifically to the “field of public education,” rather than addressing state-imposed segregation 
more generally. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491, 495 (1954); see Kennedy, supra note 112, at 
1049–50. But subsequent per curiam decisions showed the Court was prepared to extend the principle 
much more broadly. Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 684 & 717 nn.132–33; see also 
cases cited infra note 650. 
Notwithstanding the risks of uncertainty, Fred Gray and local lawyer Clifford Durr were prepared to 
proceed with litigation seeking a declaratory judgment or an injunction against the bus segregation 
laws. See Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1047–49. However, the movement’s leaders were reluctant to 
pursue such judicial relief because they actually believed that the white opposition leaders would 
quickly offer a compromise once they realized “the depth of [the protesters’] dissatisfaction with the 
situation on the buses.” Id. at 1048. Adding to their reluctance was the then-prominent social perception 
associated with using the courts to resolve disputes—King and the MIA knew “that white Alabama 
would react to [the filing of a suit] as the social equivalent of atomic warfare.” Id. at 1049. 
The prevailing tension was caused in part by white southerners viewing the Court’s decision in 
Brown as a threat to the southern “way of life.” See Bayard Rustin, Report on Montgomery, Alabama 
(Mar. 21, 1956), in DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 208, 208. 
568 See infra notes 575–579 and accompanying text. 
569 Dr. King did not seem to discuss the possibility until events on the ground pushed toward 
consideration of a lawsuit. See infra notes 574–578, 595 and accompanying text. 
570 Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 672; see also THORNTON, supra note 27, at 41 
(“At a meeting of his Citizens' Coordinating Committee in August [1955], Rufus Lewis sought to 
persuade the committee to sponsor a federal court suit to seek the integration of the [city's] parks, but 
the majority of the committee voted instead merely to continue efforts to equalize the park facilities 
within the framework of segregation.”); Thornton, supra note 112, at 229 (“Montgomery’s Blacks had 
not yet developed the faith in the federal court[s] which future years would generate.”). 
571 Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 672. 
572 Id. 
573 Id. 
574 Id. at 681 & 714 n.106; see also Thornton, supra note 112, at 214 (quoting Montgomery Mayor 
William A. “Tacky” Gayle as having declared, “When and if the Negro people desire to end the 
boycott, my door is open to them. But until they are ready to end it, there will be no more discussions”). 
On January 22, Mayor Gayle announced that he had struck a deal with three leading Black ministers 
to end the boycott on the city’s proposed terms. The ministers involved were not part of the MIA. The 
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MIA leaders that the City Commissioners would never agree to any substantial 
concessions.575 The stalemate was one of several factors that led the organization 
to file the constitutional lawsuit a few days later, despite the initial hesitance 
towards pursuing litigation. Dr. King cited three reasons for bringing the case: “the 
intransigence of the city’s commission, the crudeness of the ‘get tough’ policy 
[intense, unfair, and punitive traffic law enforcement], and the viciousness of the 
recent bombings.” 576  The MIA Board’s decision was confirmed when racists 
bombed Dr. King’s house, causing great fear, substantial damage, but no injuries.577 
In early February 1956, Fred Gray filed a class action in federal court on 
behalf of five female plaintiffs and the city’s similarly situated Black residents.578 
The complaint alleged that the Montgomery city ordinances and Alabama state 
statutes requiring segregation on common carriers were unconstitutional under the 
equal protection clause.579 
As the highly visible lead local counsel, Fred Gray bore the brunt of the severe 
backlash against the litigation. Local officials and white citizens embarked on an 
intensive, sustained, and varied campaign to oust Fred Gray from the civil rights 
picture.580 Presumably, they hoped that doing so would also deter other lawyers 
from participating, thus ending the threat of adverse judicial action. 
When Gray first filed Browder v. Gayle asking the court to declare the bus 
segregation statutes unconstitutional, local officials tried to prevent him from 
                                                
MIA denounced the city’s actions, and announced that it would continue the boycott. In response, 
Mayor Gayle announced that there would be no more negotiations until Black people returned to the 
buses. Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 678; see also KING, supra note 7, at 104–107 
(“In obvious indignation, the mayor went on television and denounced the boycott. He threatened that 
the commission was going to ‘stop pussy-footing around with the boycott.’ The vast majority of white 
Montgomerians, he declared, did not care if a Negro ever rode the buses again.”). 
575 Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 681 & 714 n.106; Thornton, supra note 112, at 
214–15. As Ralph Abernathy, an MIA leader, said: 
Our first demand was to have more courtesy on the part of the bus drivers, to eliminate 
them calling our women names . . . we could not solve the problem because they were not 
willing to cooperate . . . all they had to do was change the law and make it permissible for 
black people to ride on the buses under those conditions . . . but that was the most 
important lesson of the boycott . . . the city leaders were not going to compromise, so 
consequently we needed a ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court. 
WILLIAMS, supra note 483, at 85. 
576 KING, supra note 7, at 131. 
577 Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 714 n.106; see also ROBINSON MEMOIR, supra 
note 139, at 135–36. See generally GRAY, supra note 7, at 67 (discussing the bombing of Dr. King’s 
home). Taylor Branch emphasizes instead the strains on the MIA’s car pool system, which transported 
thousands of Blacks each day, as a major precipitating factor in filing the lawsuit. BRANCH, supra note 
32, at 159. 
In addition, Martin Luther King, Jr. had a level of faith in the federal courts that he did not feel about 
the state courts. See JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. 
JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH’S FIGHT OVER CIVIL RIGHTS 109 (1993); KING, supra note 7, at 131–32, 
175–76, 198. 
578 See Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); 
Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 681; see also Thornton, supra note 112, at 215. This 
was three days after the bombing of Dr. King’s home. Entin, supra note 128, at 257. 
579 See Browder, 142 F. Supp. at 710–12. 
580 See infra notes 581–593 and accompanying text. 
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pursuing the legal challenge.581 Some officials hinted that if Gray could get his 
clients to drop the suit, or if he stalled to prevent an actual ruling, he would “have 
all the legal cases [he] could handle,” allowing Gray to build a substantial 
practice.582 Although these offers came at a time when Gray “had nothing,” he 
wrote that accepting the offers “would have been contrary to my goal of ‘destroying 
everything segregated I could find.’ ”583 
After he rejected these offers, white officials made Fred Gray a target of 
harassment. He had an exemption from the military because he had been a 
minister—a “boy preacher”—well before he became a lawyer, and he served as 
assistant pastor at a Montgomery church.584 The local draft board reclassified his 
exempt draft status and issued an induction order.585 Gray successfully petitioned 
the director of the Selective Service System to have the order cancelled, which 
happened the night before he was to report for duty.586 
A Montgomery County grand jury also charged Gray with barratry, or 
maliciously stirring up lawsuits587—an offense that could have cost him his law 
license.588 The indictment alleged that Gray fraudulently named Jeanetta Reese as 
a plaintiff in Browder v. Gayle because she allegedly had not agreed to be a 
plaintiff.589 Reese claimed she had no knowledge of the suit, after she was subjected 
to intense pressure from white authorities.590 
Gray had fully documented Reese’s agreement to be represented in the case,591 
so the charge against him was ultimately dismissed.592  Gray also faced bomb 
threats, harassing letters and telephone calls, and an attempted stabbing.593 While 
                                                
581 GRAY, supra note 7, at 73 (“Numerous local, county, state, and federal officials in all three 
branches of government attempted to prevail upon me not to pursue the case.”). 
582 Id. at 73–74. 
583 Id. at 74. 
584 Id. at 77–78, 271–72. 
585 Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1028 & n.180; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 77 (pointing out that 
his draft status was reclassified from 4-D to 1-A). 
586 GRAY, supra note 7, at 78. 
587 Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1028 & n.181. See generally GRAY, supra note 7, at 81–83 
(discussing the “politically motivated criminal prosecution”). 
588 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 81 (“The state statute under which I was indicted called for automatic 
disbarment upon conviction.”); see also Entin, supra note 128, at 257. 
589 GRAY, supra note 7, at 81. 
590 Id.; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1028 n.181; see also BRANCH, supra note 32, at 167 (pointing 
out how “visitors of both races trampled a path to [Reese’s] door, urging her to stick to the contrary 
assurances she had given them”); DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 128 (observing that Reese 
apparently withdrew from the suit after intense pressure from white authorities). Bayard Rustin reported 
that Reese told him, “I had to do what I did or I wouldn’t be alive today.” Bayard Rustin, Montgomery 
Diary, LIBERATION, Apr. 1956, at 7, 8, reprinted in DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 164, 
166. Rustin also reported, “Although the police had provided no protection for King and Nixon after 
their houses had been bombed, . . . two squad cars [were] parked before Mrs. Reese’s home[, and] a 
policeman was patrolling the area with a machine gun.” Id. 
591 GRAY, supra note 7, at 81. 
592 Id. at 83. As Gray recounts: 
Solicitor William Thetford, at the opening of the hearing in state circuit court, recognized 
that he could not secure a conviction so he asked the court to dismiss the indictment on 
the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction and that he would refer the matter to 
the United States Attorney. I never heard anything else on this matter. 
Id. 
593 Id. at 77. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2016 
576 
Fred Gray was not deterred by such tactics, he realized that in order to mount a 
successful constitutional challenge, they would need help from lawyers with greater 
experience and expertise in civil rights cases. NAACP General Counsel Robert 
Carter agreed to work with the MIA once they decided to challenge the segregation 
laws directly.594 
At that point, the litigation strategy moved center stage in the protest. Dr. King 
said that “we are now depending on the courts to give the final answer.”595 Later, 
he said that the MIA was “waiting and hoping. Our whole strategy is based on the 
May 11 trial.”596 With this acknowledgement that the boycott could not achieve the 
MIA’s objectives by itself, Dr. King even considered calling off the boycott.597 On 
June 5, 1956, in a 2-1 decision, a three-judge district court held the state and local 
bus segregation laws unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection.598 Writing for 
the majority, Judge Rives concluded that the Brown decision, followed by per 
curiam decisions extending it to other public facilities, sounded the death knell for 
the “separate but equal” doctrine.599 With the Court having repudiated Plessy, it 
stood implicitly overruled, and the district court was no longer bound to follow it.600 
Local officials sought review by the Supreme Court. 601  Because of the 
increased cooperation between the MIA and the NAACP, Robert Carter prepared 
the brief opposing Supreme Court review.602 The Court accepted the case, but did 
not schedule oral argument. On November 13, 1956, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the three-judge district court in a one line per curiam decision.603 The Court thus 
                                                
594 TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 302; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 682 & 715 
n.115. The original demands had been modest, limited to incremental changes in the segregation 
arrangements and better treatment by bus drivers. Id. at 678 & 712 n.81, 681–82. 
595 GARROW, supra note 2, at 63. 
596 Id. at 76. 
597 See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 81. Two considerations seem to have motivated Dr. King’s 
decision to continue the boycott. First, there was uncertainty about the outcome of the lawsuit. Second, 
Dr. King believed that the Black community was so committed to the boycott that they would not have 
gotten back on the buses. Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 681. 
598 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707, 717 (M.D. Ala.), aff’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956). See 
generally Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1050–51 (discussing the district court’s decision). 
599 Browder, 142 F. Supp. at 716. 
600 The majority concluded that in light of the decision in Brown and the Supreme Court decisions 
following it “there is now no rational basis upon which the separate but equal doctrine can be validly 
applied to public carrier transportation within the City of Montgomery and its police jurisdiction.” Id. at 
717. 
Dissenting Judge Lynne argued that the Plessy decision applied precisely to the facts in the case, that 
the Supreme Court had not overruled Plessy with respect to intrastate transportation, and that lower 
court judges were bound by that decision until the Supreme Court did so. Id. at 718–20 (Lynne, J., 
dissenting). 
601 Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 683; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1051. 
602 TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 304. 
603 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (“The motion to affirm is granted and the 
judgment is affirmed.” (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Mayor of Baltimore City v. 
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955))). This was one of a 
series of per curiam decisions extending Brown’s rationale to other public facilities and laws providing 
for the segregation of private facilities and services. Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 717 
n.133; Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1051–52. 
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overruled Plessy and struck down state and local laws mandating segregation on 
buses.604 
There is substantial evidence of synergy between the litigation and the 
boycott.605 That coordinated approach seemed to produce more change on the buses 
than either strategy could have produced on its own. It is likely that neither would 
have accomplished much on the ground without the other. The boycott faced strong 
and unyielding resistance, which only grew more entrenched over time.606 The 
litigation helped to sustain the momentum of the protest, and the three-judge district 
court decision gave the MIA hope that the Supreme Court would follow suit.607 The 
boycott gave the Black community courage that enabled them to return to the buses 
with dignity and confidence when the Supreme Court affirmed the local court’s 
decision.608 Absent the litigation, the boycott may well have failed.609 Absent the 
boycott, the Court’s decision may have changed little on the ground.610 
                                                
604 See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 684. The Supreme Court denied the 
defendants’ motion for rehearing on December 17, 1956, and the mandate issued on December 20. See 
DAYBREAK OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 49. 
605 See generally Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 675–83 (discussing synergy in 
Montgomery Bus Boycott). 
606 See id. at 677–80; Martin Luther King, Jr., Address by MLK at 47th NAACP Annual Convention, 
KING CTR. 7 (June 27, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/address-mlk-47th-naacp-
annual-convention. 
607 See GRAY, supra note 7, at 70–71; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 682, 683 & 
716 n.125. 
608 See KING, supra note 7, at 143, 147–51; Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 687–88; 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Annual Address by MLK for the Montgomery Improvement Association, KING 
CTR. 2 (Dec. 3, 1959), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/annual-address-mlk-
montgomery-improvement-association; Martin Luther King, Jr., A Realistic Look at Race Relations, 
KING CTR. 4, 7 (May 17, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/realistic-look-race-
relations. 
609 As Dr. King later reflected on the lower court’s decision and the city’s subsequent appeal to the 
Supreme Court: “The battle was not yet won. We would have to walk and sacrifice for several more 
months, while the city appealed the case. But at least we could walk with new hope. Now it was only a 
matter of time.” KING, supra note 7, at 133; see also M.L. King, Jr., Statement by the President of the 
Montgomery Improvement Association, KING CTR. 1 (Nov. 14, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org
/archive/document/statement-president-montgomery-improvement-association-1# (“These eleven 
months have not at all been easy. . . . Our feet have often been tired and our automobiles worn, but we 
have kept going with the faith that in our struggles we had cosmic companionship, and that, at bottom, 
the universe is on the side of justice. Just yesterday we experienced a revelation of the eternal validity 
of this faith. It was on this day that the Supreme Court of this nation affirmed that segregation is 
unconstitutional in public transportation. . . . This decision came to all as a joyous daybreak to end the 
long night of enforced segregation in public transportation.”). 
610 See Martin Luther King, Jr., We Are Still Walking, LIBERATION, Dec. 1956, at 6–9, reprinted in 
3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., supra note 137, at 445, 445–47; Coleman, Nee & 
Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 684–89, 692–94, 697; Martin Luther King, Jr., Address by MLK at 47th 
NAACP Annual Convention, KING CTR. 10 (June 27, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive
/document/address-mlk-47th-naacp-annual-convention (“[A]fter the legal battle is won, there is the 
great problem of lifting the noble precepts of our Constitution from the dusty files of unimplemented 
court decisions. The problem of implementation will be carried out mainly by the Negro’s refusal to 
cooperate with segregation.”); M.L. King, Jr., Statement by the President of the Montgomery 
Improvement Association, KING CTR. 1 (Nov. 14, 1956), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive
/document/statement-president-montgomery-improvement-association-1# (“All of us have a basic 
responsibility to seek to impl[e]ment this noble decision. . . . This is Montgomery’s sublime 
opportunity; we can now transform our jangling discords into meaningful symphonies of spiritual 
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2. The Albany (Georgia) Movement (1961–1962)611 
In light of its effectiveness, the Montgomery experience of joining nonviolent 
direct action with desegregation litigation seemed to serve as a model for 
subsequent movements. Yet the joint strategy remained in limbo for half a decade, 
pending an opportunity and a need to try to take advantage of the additional 
leverage the courts might provide. In 1962, Martin Luther King, Jr. and activists 
faced another intransigent local government and turned again to litigation in the 
hope of revitalizing a faltering movement, breaking a stalemate, and achieving a 
measure of desegregation.612 
This time it was in Albany, the southwestern Georgia city discussed earlier.613 
In late 1961, the local leader of the “Albany Movement” invited Dr. King to the 
city to help support the floundering effort.614 Nevertheless, faced with continuing 
strong and effective resistance and serious internal tensions, the movement 
stalled.615 By mid-summer Dr. King and local leaders decided to initiate a broad-
based legal challenge to the pervasive segregation of public facilities in the city.616 
On July 25, C.B. King of Albany, Donald Hollowell of Atlanta, and Constance 
Baker Motley of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund filed Anderson v. 
City of Albany in federal district court.617 C.B. King was the only Black lawyer in 
southwest Georgia, which included Albany.618 He had been actively involved in the 
                                                
harmony.”). For a comprehensive discussion of “litigation as a social process,” see TUSHNET, supra 
note 521, at 143–166. 
611 The years listed represent the movement’s most intense period. Activists continued the struggle 
well beyond that time. See CARSON, supra note 27, at 56, 61–62. 
612 Useful accounts of the Albany Movement include BRANCH, supra note 32, at 609–13, 616–17, 
627–28; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 132–33, 137–39, 141–44, 148–56; GARROW, supra note 2, at 204–
09; KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 98–131; MORRIS, supra note 188, at 247–48; MOTLEY, supra note 13, 
at 138–40. 
613 See supra Sections II.A.1.a.iv, II.A.2.b. 
614 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 180; MORRIS, supra note 188, at 242–44. 
615 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 87–91, 100–04; GARROW, supra note 2, at 204–05. 
616 GARROW, supra note 2, at 208. On July 20, 1962, Albany Mayor Asa Kelley and city attorney 
Grady Rawls secured an injunction from U.S. District Judge J. Robert Elliott to block the mass 
demonstrations that Kelley anticipated in the wake of city’s repeated refusals to meet face-to-face with 
movement leaders. Id. at 205–06; see also KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 101 (recalling that Judge 
Elliott’s “sweeping injunction . . . barred Albany’s Negroes from ‘unlawful picketing, congregating or 
marching in the streets, and from any act designed to provoke breaches of the peace’ ”). After Chief 
Judge Elbert P. Tuttle of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed to hear a 
motion to vacate Judge Elliott’s injunction, the movement’s attorneys drafted the federal lawsuit while 
preparing for that hearing. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 208 (“In addition to preparing for the hearing, 
[the movement’s lawyers] drafted two complaints challenging Albany’s segregated city facilities and its 
policy of arresting peaceful protesters”). William Kunstler described it as “a long overdue federal 
lawsuit to desegregate all of Albany’s public facilities.” KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 112. After 
attending the hearing before Judge Tuttle in Atlanta, Dr. King returned to Albany and “told newsmen 
that henceforth the movement would follow a four-pronged program, with direct action, the new 
lawsuits, and the ongoing boycott being joined by a voter registration drive.” GARROW, supra note 2, at 
209. 
617 Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649, 650, 653 (5th Cir. 1963). Clarence Jones was also part 
of the legal team. He, in turn, invited William Kunstler to assist with the Albany litigation. KUNSTLER, 
supra note 1, at 93. 
618 DANIELS, supra note 41, at 132. 
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Albany Movement from the outset.619 When the movement leaders decided to turn 
to the courts, C.B. King was the obvious choice as counsel.620 C.B. King had 
worked extensively with leading Atlanta civil rights lawyer Donald Hollowell 
before the Albany Movement, so he had enlisted Hollowell’s assistance early in the 
movement.621 Hollowell had been serving as LDF’s local counsel in Atlanta and 
the Southeast region.622 Both then brought in LDF staff attorney Constance Baker 
Motley to work on earlier matters and on the Anderson case.623 
The “omnibus” lawsuit sought to enjoin racial discrimination and segregation 
in city-owned and regulated facilities, including swimming pools, tennis courts, the 
city library, public auditoriums, and transportation facilities. 624  The lawyers 
structured the case as a class action on behalf of the named plaintiffs and “all other 
Negro citizens of the City of Albany, Georgia similarly situated.”625 They prayed 
for injunctive relief from enforcement of racial segregation in public facilities, 
certain private businesses, including transportation and places of public 
amusement, and the threat of arrest or harassment if a member of the class used 
these facilities or businesses.626 
On February 14, 1963, District Judge Elliot dismissed the complaint.627 He 
found that the named plaintiffs, including Slater King and Dr. Anderson, were not 
members of the class they claimed to represent since there was no evidence they 
were denied the use of those facilities based on their race, or threatened with 
arrest.628 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on 
the class action question and reached the merits in a July 26, 1963 opinion.629 
                                                
619 MORRIS, supra note 188, at 241; see, e.g., FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 100, 103; GARROW, 
supra note 2, at 174, 177–79, 185–86, 196; KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 95–96. 
620 For biographical information on C.B. King, see BRANCH, supra note 32, at 524–25; DANIELS, 
supra note 41, at 132–33, 137, 141, 154–56; KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 105; see also supra note 142. 
621 See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 132–33. Their joint efforts began with Anderson v. Courson, 
which desegregated polling places in Albany. See 203 F. Supp. 806 (M.D. Ga. 1962). 
Before filing the desegregation case, King and Hollowell had defended several arrested protesters in 
the movement. See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 137; see also discussion supra Section II.A.1.i.d. 
622 MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 139. 
623 When city officials secured a temporary restraining order against the movement’s demonstrations, 
King and Hollowell called on Constance Baker Motley for assistance. See DANIELS, supra note 41, at 
154. In her autobiography, Motley said that “Chevene Bowers (C.B.) King of Albany, Georgia, and 
Donald Hollowell urged me by phone to come down to help with the legal strategy.” MOTLEY, supra 
note 13, at 138–39. 
624 See Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1964); Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649, 
650, 653 (5th Cir. 1963). 
625 Anderson v. Kelly, 32 F.R.D. 355, 356 (M.D. Ga. 1963). 
626 Id. at 356–57. 
627 Id. at 355, 358. 
628 See id. 
629 See Anderson, 321 F.2d at 653. Judge Tuttle cited a letter city officials wrote to “the Negro 
leaders of Albany” to conclude that the plaintiffs in the case “represent the Negro citizenship of the city 
of Albany.” Id. at 652 (“[T]here is no factual dispute but that the four plaintiffs were members of a class 
whose interests were the basis of demands made by them on the defendants and which the evidence 
clearly shows were rejected.”). Judge Tuttle also referred to the fact that the plaintiffs made numerous 
demands on the city to end segregation before filing the lawsuit. Id. Moreover, he concluded that 
plaintiffs need not be arrested or threatened with arrest to represent “the class of Negro citizens who 
were adversely affected by the State’s policy of racial segregation.” Id. at 653. For these reasons, the 
court held that it was an error for the trial court to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the plaintiffs 
did not represent the class. Id. 
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Writing for the 2-1 majority, Judge Elbert Tuttle held that city-mandated 
segregation of city facilities and public transportation was unconstitutional, citing 
numerous cases stating that enforced segregation in city facilities is 
unconstitutional.630 The court rejected the contention that changed conditions, such 
as the repeal of all segregation ordinances, rendered the lawsuit moot.631 Instead, it 
granted the requested injunctive relief.632 
By the time the Fifth Circuit ruled in the summer of 1963, however, Martin 
Luther King, Jr. had long since left town, and the movement had lost its visibility.633 
Participants and observers alike viewed the Albany experience largely as a failure 
from which to learn lessons for later campaigns.634 Those lessons focused on the 
need for more carefully planned, aggressive nonviolent direct action tactics. The 
campaigns in Birmingham and Selma exemplified the activists’ dramatic changes 
in approach.635 
III. DEPLOYING THE LAWYERS: THE LATER YEARS (1963–1968) 
In the early 1960s, Dr. King and SCLC made significant changes in the 
strategies they used to advance their objectives. After the failure of the Albany, 
Georgia Movement in 1962, Dr. King and his colleagues took stock, knowing that 
they could ill afford another dismal outcome. Since nonviolent direct action 
remained their basic strategy, they searched for ways to make it more effective. The 
movement’s strategy shifted from “persuasive” nonviolence to “coercive” 
nonviolence.636 Dr. King believed “the notion that ethical appeals and persuasion 
alone will bring about justice” was fallacious, and although ethical appeals should 
                                                
Judge Gewin dissented because he felt: 
(1) the opinion is contrary to the established law relating to class actions; (2) the 
presumption in favor of the findings of fact by the trial court has been disregarded, the 
clearly erroneous rule has not been followed, and the majority has made a choice of facts 
from a large volume of testimony where the facts are in conflict; (3) the rules of law with 
respect to the granting of injunctions have not been followed; and (4) the case is moot. 
Id. at 659 (Gewin, J., dissenting). Specifically, he cited case law that said plaintiffs in a class action 
need to prove their individual rights have been denied. Id. The district judge found that this was not the 
case, and Judge Gewin stated that he wanted to follow this finding, since “findings by a trier of facts 
will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.” Id. Also, because all the laws had been repealed, Judge 
Gewin felt the case was moot. Id. at 661–62. 
630 Id. at 654 (majority opinion) (“Since the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit case of 
Dawson v. Mayor of the City of Baltimore, 350 U.S. 877, [aff’g] 220 F.2d 386, it has been ‘obvious that 
racial segregation in recreational activities can no longer be sustained as a proper exercise of the police 
power of the State.’ ”). 
631 Id. at 656–57. 
632 Id. at 657. In explaining the need for an injunction, the court said, “What has been adopted can be 
repealed, and what has been repealed can be re-adopted.” Id. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case “with 
directions that an injunction issue consistent with [the court’s] opinion.” Id. at 658. 
633 See generally GARROW, supra note 2, at 223–26. 
634 See KING, supra note 22, at 34–35, 48; DANIELS, supra note 41, at 156; FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 
21, at 106–09; GARROW, supra note 2, at 226–29; MORRIS, supra note 188, at 248–50. 
635 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
636 On December 5, 1955, Dr. King urged the thousands gathered at Montgomery’s Holt Street 
Baptist Church to approach the protest with caution: “We will be guided by the highest principles of 
law and order. Our method will be that of persuasion, not coercion.” KING, supra note 7, at 48. 
Beginning in the early 1960s, Dr. King’s focus shifted towards coercion. See GARROW, supra note 22, 
at 220–21. 
Vol. 10:3]  Leonard S. Rubinowitz 
  581 
be made, “those appeals must be undergirded by some form of constructive 
coercive power.”637 “If the Negro does not add persistent pressure to his patient 
plea,” Dr. King added, “he will end up empty-handed.” 638  Marches and 
demonstrations became larger, more numerous, more diverse in their participants, 
more provocative, and more varied in their distance, duration, and location.639 
Other new forms of escalation included violating an injunction and initiating a rent 
strike.640 
The strategic changes also meant deploying lawyers in new ways. While 
lawyers continued to play some of the same roles they had played earlier, they also 
assumed important new responsibilities. Moreover, they had opportunities to 
undertake creative initiatives in support of activists’ innovative strategies and 
tactics.641 At the same time, Dr. King and his colleagues no longer called on their 
lawyers to initiate complementary desegregation litigation. They passed up 
opportunities to pursue legal remedies, even when local laws, policies, or practices 
were vulnerable to such challenges. The 1963 Birmingham Movement and the 
Chicago Freedom Movement three years later exemplified this turn away from the 
dual strategy that marked the Montgomery and Albany movements.642 
A. The Abandonment of Complementary Desegregation Litigation 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s views about the utility of desegregation litigation 
evolved over the course of his career. As with other strategic aspects, the turning 
point seemed to be the Birmingham Movement in 1963.643 With the escalation and 
increasing effectiveness of nonviolent direct action after Albany, especially in 
Birmingham (1963) and in Selma (1965), Dr. King and his colleagues saw little 
need to initiate litigation to advance their objectives.644 Moreover, legal strategies 
became less appealing as the courts’ limitations in implementing decrees grew more 
apparent.645 
                                                
637 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR COMMUNITY? 128–29 
(1968). 
638 Id. at 129. 
639 See discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i–iii, III.B.2, III.B.3.i–v. 
640 See discussion infra Sections III.B.2, III.B.3.i. 
641 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
642 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
643 See discussion infra Section III.B. 
644 See, e.g., RALPH, supra note 62, at 143 (noting that one of Dr. King’s favorite themes was 
“nonviolence needs some victories”); see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 54 (“SCLC 
leaders were less interested in test-case litigation than in holding effective protest marches in 
Birmingham that spring.”). 
645 See KLARMAN, supra note 13, at 380 (“Court decisions such as Brown could significantly alter 
social practices only if lower courts aggressively implemented them, Congress and the president 
enforced them, and local officials could be prevented from nullifying them. Each of these conditions 
depended on educating public opinion, which direct action accomplished better than litigation could. As 
King stated, ‘Only when the people themselves begin to act are rights on paper given life blood.’ ”). See 
generally TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 255–56 (“Winning cases . . . accomplished little, at least in the 
short run.”). However, a number of lawyers who had litigated the desegregation cases remained 
involved in the “support” mode, because their basic commitment was to the civil rights objectives, not 
just the litigation strategy. See discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i–iii, III.B.3.i–iii, III.B.4.i–ii. 
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After the Albany Movement, desegregation lawsuits disappeared from the 
strategic arsenal, although they may have remained on the back burner as an option 
to consider if necessary. The 1963 Birmingham Movement relied entirely on 
nonviolent direct action, providing the first clear indication that the joint strategy 
had begun to fade from the movement’s radar. 646  The Birmingham campaign 
ignored viable legal claims that would have provided opportunities for 
desegregation litigation.647 In fact, many local segregation laws remained on the 
books when the Birmingham Movement began. They prohibited Blacks from being 
served in the same restaurants as whites, attending the same schools, or using the 
same elevators, water fountains, or parks.648 They also outlawed Blacks playing 
billiards or baseball with whites, or sitting intermixed in a theatre.649 Even though 
recent Supreme Court precedent had shown those types of ordinances highly 
vulnerable to being overturned, the activists did not file any constitutional 
challenges.650 
By 1966, when Dr. King took his movement north to Chicago, he seemed to 
have completely abandoned the idea of using legal processes along with direct 
action.651 That summer the Chicago Freedom Movement—a joint initiative of a 
coalition of local organizations and SCLC—carried out an open housing campaign 
to address the extreme segregation and pervasive discrimination in the city’s 
neighborhoods.652 While the main focus was on the private housing market, the 
movement also demanded desegregation of the city’s public housing program.653 
                                                
646 See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135. Discussing the Birmingham Movement, LDF lawyer 
Constance Baker Motley suggested that Dr. King and his associates “had always undervalued resort to 
the courts—an indispensable weapon in the struggle—and preferred nonviolent protest demonstrations 
and marches.” Id. 
647 See id. 
648 See Lee E. Bains, Jr., Birmingham, 1963: Confrontation over Civil Rights, in BIRMINGHAM, 
ALABAMA, 1956–1963: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 227, at 150, 165–66. 
649 See BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GEN. CODE §§ 359, 597, 939 (1944) (repealed 1963). 
650 In the years following Brown, the Court extended the desegregation mandate to many more public 
facilities, including beaches and bathhouses (Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) 
(per curiam)), golf courses (Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam)), buses (Gayle 
v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam)), parks (New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. 
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam)), athletic contests (State Athletics Comm’n v. Dorsey, 
359 U.S. 533 (1959) (per curiam)), restaurants (Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per 
curiam)), city auditoriums (Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (per curiam)), and courtrooms 
(Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam)). See generally Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, 
supra note 34, at 682–84. 
651 See generally RALPH, supra note 62. Dr. King and his advisers developed a “three-phase battle 
plan” for Chicago, which concentrated on educating and organizing, focused demonstrations, and 
“massive” protests. Id. at 43–44; see also AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 24–25. Although 
seemingly unsuccessful at first, Dr. King’s nonviolent action strategy in Chicago eventually helped 
secure the passage of federal fair housing legislation in 1968. See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Kathryn 
Shelton, Non-Violent Direct Action and the Legislative Process: The Chicago Freedom Movement and 
the Federal Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 663, 664 (2008). 
652 See generally RALPH, supra note 62, at 92–130. 
653 See id. at 152–54; see also ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX: A STORY OF 
SEGREGATION, HOUSING, AND THE BLACK GHETTO 40 (2006) (“Open housing demands . . . includ[ed] 
two for the CHA: (1) halt public housing construction in the ghetto until a substantial number of units 
were started elsewhere; and (2) create a program to vastly increase the supply of low-cost housing on a 
scattered-site basis.”). See generally ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 62, at 239–40 (listing the 
movement’s nine demands). 
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Two opportunities for using the legal system presented themselves in the open 
housing campaign. First, for racial discrimination in the private housing market, 
there was legal recourse available under Chicago’s 1963 Fair Housing Ordinance, 
which gave the city’s Human Relations Commission enforcement authority.654 As 
Black people encountered discrimination in seeking to buy or rent housing in white 
neighborhoods, they could have filed complaints with the Commission. 
Second, while the city’s public housing agency, the Chicago Housing 
Authority, did not operate under a statute requiring or permitting segregation, its 
policies and practices had produced a highly segregated program.655 That pattern 
made the program potentially vulnerable to a federal lawsuit challenging racial 
discrimination in site selection and tenant assignment under the Equal Protection 
Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.656 The Chicago Freedom 
Movement did not pursue the potential legal remedies involving either the private 
market or the public housing program. 657  Instead, it relied exclusively on a 
nonviolent, direct-action strategy.658 
                                                
654 See CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 198.7-B (1963) (current version at CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL 
CODE ch. 5-8 (2015)); see also Chi. Real Estate Bd. v. Chicago, 224 N.E.2d 793, 797 (Ill. 1967); 
RALPH, supra note 62, at 142 (discussing Commissioner Edward Marciniak’s frustration with the 
Chicago activists who did not first seek redress through the process established by the ordinance). 
655 See RALPH, supra note 62, at 152–54. 
656 Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race in programs receiving federal funds, such as the 
public housing program. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 
252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012)).  
Independently of the Chicago Freedom Movement’s contemporaneous demands for the 
desegregation of public housing, the ACLU filed a federal suit in the summer of 1966 challenging the 
Chicago Housing Authority’s site selection and tenant assignment policies and practices as being 
racially discriminatory. See Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969); see also 
POLIKOFF, supra note 653, at 48–49; RALPH, supra note 62, at 228; LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ & JAMES 
E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA 
23 (2000). Since there were no explicit segregation policies like those in Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), where segregation was written into state constitutions and statutes, and in 
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), where the state statute and local ordinances 
provided for segregation on buses, the outcome of the ACLU’s lawsuit was much more uncertain than 
in the southern situation. 
The Chicago Freedom Movement did not have the kind of visible success that the Birmingham and 
Selma movements experienced. The decision to avoid legal strategies seems to have resulted more from 
the doubts about their efficacy than about the effectiveness of nonviolent direct action making them 
unnecessary. See generally, e.g., MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 157 (observing that in Birmingham Dr. 
King “consciously steered away from legal claims and instead relied on civil disobedience.”). 
It turned out that there was a major timing disconnect, as well. The district court did not grant the 
plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion until 1969, long after the Chicago Freedom Movement had 
ended. See Gautreaux, 296 F. Supp. at 907, 914. Moreover, the remedial process continued well into 
the 21st century. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 491 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2007) (“This 
appeal presents the latest phase of the long-running litigation over racial discrimination in public 
housing in Chicago that bears Dorothy Gautreaux’s name.”); see also POLIKOFF, supra note 653, at 312. 
657 There is no indication that the Chicago Freedom Movement considered pursuing either of these 
legal remedies. See ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 62, at 188–91. See generally GARROW, supra 
note 2, at 431–525 (discussing SCLC campaign in Chicago). 
658 The activists began with vigils at real estate offices in white neighborhoods where brokers refused 
to serve Black home seekers. See RALPH, supra note 62, at 119–20. Then they moved on to a series of 
marches into white neighborhoods to protest and dramatize the exclusion of Black families. See id. at 
122. Even with police protection, neighborhood residents and their supporters met the marchers with 
violence. See id. at 122–23. As Mayor Richard J. Daley witnessed his two major constituencies—
working-class whites and Blacks—confronting each other, he grew increasingly concerned about the 
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Two factors seemed to explain Dr. King and his colleagues forgoing 
opportunities for deploying a legal strategy, starting in 1963. First, as discussed in 
Section B, the need for litigation declined as they turned to more aggressive and 
potentially effective nonviolent direct action tactics. 659  Second, they became 
increasingly skeptical about the courts’ ability to turn their decisions into progress 
on the ground.660 That concern grew out of their own experience with the courts, as 
well as the courts’ involvement in civil rights, more generally.661 
Dr. King and his associates had never initiated nonviolent direct action and 
complementary litigation simultaneously, as a carefully planned two-pronged 
strategy.662 Instead, in both Montgomery and Albany, litigation had been a back-up 
strategy, resorted to reluctantly when a movement was unable to achieve its 
objectives through nonviolent direct action. They encountered growing resistance 
and seemingly insurmountable obstacles that made it clear that the original strategy 
alone was not going to accomplish their goals.663 
In Montgomery, the bus boycott and the litigation challenging the bus 
segregation laws reinforced each other, providing more change than either could 
have accomplished on its own. While the Gayle v. Browder bus desegregation 
decision and the boycott had important synergistic effects, the stars aligned almost 
perfectly in that situation. The boycott and the litigation were very much in sync, 
time wise. The case took less than a year from filing the complaint to a Supreme 
Court decision, an extremely rare occurrence.664 Blacks also sustained the boycott 
                                                
political fallout from continued demonstrations. See id. at 129–30; see also discussion infra Section 
III.B.3.iv. 
659 See discussion infra Section III.B. In April 1963, a group of eight white Birmingham ministers 
issued “The White Ministers’ Good Friday Statement.” See S. JONATHAN BASS, BLESSED ARE THE 
PEACEMAKERS: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., EIGHT WHITE RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND THE “LETTER FROM 
BIRMINGHAM JAIL” app. 2 (2001), for a copy of the statement. They strongly criticized the Birmingham 
Movement’s use of demonstrations and urged the city’s Black citizens to turn to negotiations and the 
courts to assert their rights. See id. at 235–36. At the time, Dr. King was in jail for violating a state 
court injunction prohibiting the demonstrations. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 240–46; see also infra 
Section III.B.3.i. Dr. King wrote a lengthy response to the clergymen, which came to be known as the 
“Letter from Birmingham Jail.” See Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Bishop C.C.J. Carpenter et 
al. (Apr. 16, 1963), http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu:5801/transcription/document_images/undecided
/630416-019.pdf. See generally FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 123–24; GARROW, supra note 2, at 246. 
The letter set forth a detailed defense of nonviolent direct action, including the use of civil disobedience 
as a means of challenging “unjust laws.” See Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Bishop C.C.J. 
Carpenter et al., supra. It also responded to the call for negotiations, arguing that their adversaries had 
refused to negotiate in good faith, and that the demonstrations were designed to apply pressure to bring 
about serious negotiations. Id. The letter did not address the ministers’ call for the protesters to use the 
courts to pursue their rights. 
660 See, e.g., MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 240 (“Our feeling was that [nonviolent direct 
action], more than any other [method], was the best way to raise the problems of the Negro people and 
the injustices of our social order before the court of world opinion, and to require action.”). 
661 See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 568. See generally Civil Rights Movement, JOHN F. KENNEDY 
PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Civil-Rights-
Movement.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2015). 
662 The closest they came was the Montgomery movement’s abortive effort to use Rosa Parks’ 
prosecution as a test case challenging the bus segregation laws. See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra 
note 34, at 700. 
663 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
664 See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 681–84. See generally GREENBERG, supra 
note 51, at 271. The chronology of the distinct steps in the litigation: 
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for more than a year, much longer than the intense, visible stages of most of the 
later campaigns.665 That provided an opportunity for the desegregation litigation to 
reach a resolution through the federal courts while the boycott was ongoing.666 
Thus, it may have been clear to Dr. King that the Montgomery experience 
represented a very tenuous model for the future. A strong, lengthy movement, a 
lawsuit that proceeded through the federal courts at an exceptional pace, an often 
ineffective adversary, and stunningly fortuitous timing came together in a way that 
was not likely to be repeated.667  
Several years later, the Albany, Georgia Movement further exposed the dual 
strategy’s limitations. Unlike in Montgomery, Dr. King was not involved in 
initiating the Albany Movement. Local activists called on him for assistance when 
internal tensions and highly effective local resistance caused the movement to falter 
badly.668 The intensive stage of the Albany Movement was shorter than the bus 
boycott,669 and the federal desegregation litigation proceeded at a more typical 
pace.670 This temporal disconnect added to the movement’s massive problems. 
Unlike in Montgomery, the federal litigation was much too little and much too late 
to save the movement from failure. 671  While the most visible phase of the 
                                                
§ Filing of case: February 1, 1956  
§ District court decision: June 5, 1956  
§ U.S. Supreme Court ruling: November 13, 1956  
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (per curiam), aff’g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); GARROW, 
supra note 2, at 61. For a discussion of the lack of an oral argument or written opinion, see Coleman, 
Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 684 & 717 n.133. 
665 See Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 669, 688–89 (calling the arrest of Rosa Parks 
on December 1, 1955 “the spark that ignited the . . . boycott,” and explaining that the MIA declared the 
boycott officially over with the Supreme Court decision on November 13, 1956, but asked the 
protesters to remain off the buses until the decision became final and effective on December 21). 
Subsequent campaigns generally did not last as long. 
666 Moreover, the Supreme Court handed down its decision holding the bus segregation laws 
unconstitutional on the very day that a local court issued an injunction against the MIA’s “car pool.” 
KING, supra note 7, at 139–40. Dr. King considered that alternative transportation system essential to 
the continuation of the boycott. See id. at 57–63. Without the Supreme Court’s extremely speedy and 
timely favorable decision, the bus boycott may have been doomed to fail. See supra note 474 and 
accompanying text; see also Coleman, Nee & Rubinowitz, supra note 34, at 684–85. 
667 Montgomery officials: (1) engaged in a counter-productive prosecution of Dr. King under a 
boycott statute; (2) approved a resolution based on conversations with ministers not involved in the 
MIA; and (3) delayed in striking an injunction against the car pool. See supra notes 354–356, 474, 574 
and accompanying text. 
668 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 88; GARROW, supra note 2, at 180. The internal tensions even 
led to vigorous disagreement about whether to invite Dr. King to Albany. See MORRIS, supra note 188, 
at 243; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 181. Moreover, the local police chief treated demonstrators 
with a measure of respect as he arrested large numbers of protesters. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 
216–17. He refused to be provoked into over-reactions that would increase public support for the 
activists’ cause. See id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 188, at 250. 
669 The most active part of the Albany Movement lasted approximately nine months, beginning on 
November 17, 1961, and ending on August 10, 1962. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 87, 106. The 
bus boycott lasted more than a year. See supra note 665 and accompanying text. 
670 For the litigation’s procedural history, see Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1964), and 
Anderson v. City of Albany, 321 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963). 
671 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 208 (“Some people wondered why civil rights forces had been so 
slow to file suit, but now the movement was finally taking the legal initiative.”). See generally CARSON, 
supra note 27, at 61–62; MORRIS, supra note 188, at 246–50. 
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movement ran from November 1961 to August 1962,672 activists did not file the 
desegregation lawsuit until July 25, 1962.673 The failure of the Albany Movement 
provided many lessons for later movements, one of which was the serious 
limitations of the dual strategy of nonviolent direct action and complementary 
desegregation litigation.674 As SCLC moved toward a strategy of relatively short, 
intense local campaigns, the time frames of actions on the ground and in the courts 
became increasingly disparate. 675  The potential for synergy between the two 
seemed to disappear. 
The courts’ continued inability to implement their decrees to change 
entrenched policies and practice, along with the mixed lessons of the Montgomery 
and Albany movements, decreased the attraction of litigation as a complementary 
strategy.676 In 1965, Dr. King captured these concerns: 
 The deliberate nature of our legal process is being abused. Legal 
redress for Negroes entails expensive court actions whose victories 
are the signal not for the capitulation of segregationists but rather 
for further bouts with new delaying tactics. . . . The delays inherent 
in test cases, where the U.S. Supreme Court must ultimately rule, 
make sadly pertinent the comment of Chief Justice Earl Warren in 
the school desegregation cases: “Justice delayed is justice 
denied.”677  
                                                
672 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 87, 106. Though demonstrations continued in Albany 
throughout the 1960s, they were always on a much smaller scale. See id. at 106 (describing the 
“growing sense of defeat” within the movement after its initial suspension); see also CARSON, supra 
note 27, at 61–62 (“Although the Albany Movement remained in existence through the late 1960s and 
SNCC continued its activities in Albany for several years, the emotion and sense of hope were never 
recaptured.”). 
673 See Anderson, 321 F.2d at 653; Kelly v. Page, [1964–1965] 9 Race Rel. L. Rep. (Vanderbilt Univ. 
Sch. of Law) 1115–16 (M.D. Ga. June 27, 1963); see also discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
674 See discussion supra Part III. 
675 See supra note 665. 
676 Brown is but one example. The southern states “flagrantly disobeyed” the Supreme Court’s order 
to desegregate public schools. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 52 (2d ed. 2008). 
The experience using the courts in Birmingham in the years leading up to the Birmingham 
Movement also provided grounds for skepticism about the courts’ ability to bring change on the 
ground. The Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights (ACMHR), Birmingham’s civil rights 
movement led by Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, had been leading the local struggle against segregation 
since 1956. ESKEW, supra note 50, at 4. See generally MORRIS, supra note 188, at 68–73. As part of a 
larger strategy, they filed lawsuits, starting with a 1957 case against the city to desegregate the buses. 
See MCWHORTER, supra note 50, at 135. Arthur Shores, who was later one of Dr. King’s attorneys, 
filed the suit. See ESKEW, supra note 50, at 136. The segregationist Police Commissioner Bull Connor 
secured a change in the local ordinance to give control to the bus company over seating, which mooted 
the case. See MCWHORTER, supra note 50, at 135–36. The bus company did not change its policy, and 
ACMHR attempted an unsuccessful boycott soon afterwards. See id. at 136–38. ACMHR later sued the 
city to desegregate the city’s public parks, pools, and golf courses. See id. at 247. In 1962, a federal 
judge ruled that all the parks must be open to Blacks. Id. Bull Connor immediately closed the parks 
rather than integrate them. Id. 
677 Martin Luther King, Jr., Civil Right No. 1: The Right to Vote, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 14, 1965, 
reprinted in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 531, at 182, 186; see also MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, 
supra note 32, at 139 (referring to the “slow court process[es]”). 
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A decade after the Supreme Court decided Brown, virtually no desegregation 
of schools had taken place in the Deep South.678 In Chicago in 1966, Martin Luther 
King, Jr. referred to that fact in rejecting a suggestion that the Chicago Freedom 
Movement abandon its open housing marches into white neighborhoods in favor of 
using the legal process provided by the Chicago Fair Housing ordinance.679 For Dr. 
King, the lack of change in school patterns served as a painful reminder of the 
courts’ limited ability to affect deeply entrenched policies and practices. 
In August 1966, Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley brought together 
representatives of the Chicago Freedom Movement, city officials, and real estate 
and business leaders to address the movement’s demands.680 Ironically, one of the 
city’s representatives was William Ming, who served on the Chicago Commission 
on Human Relations’ board.681 Six years earlier, Ming had been a successful co-
lead defense counsel in Dr. King’s Alabama perjury trial.682 In one of the Summit 
meetings, Ming suggested that the Chicago Freedom Movement pursue legal 
remedies for discrimination under the city’s 1963 Fair Housing ordinance instead 
of continuing its marches and demonstrations.683 But Dr. King strongly resisted 
Ming’s suggestion that the ordinance alone could solve Chicago’s deeply 
entrenched, pervasive housing discrimination problem: 
I hope that people here don’t feel that we are just being recalcitrant, 
but we do have a little history of disappointment and broken 
promises, and I certainly wouldn’t want to argue with Mr. Ming. Mr. 
Ming was my lawyer who saved me in court in Alabama from ten 
years in prison and he’s my great counselor, but I would remind him 
that ten years ago we got a court decision and a law three years ago 
now that says that segregation is illegal and we now have 5.3% of 
the children integrated in the South. And Bob Ming is telling me 
now that the ordinance will do the job. We see a gulf between the 
promise and the fulfillment.684 
                                                
678 Ten years after Brown was decided, only 1.2% of Black schoolchildren attended desegregated 
schools. See ROSENBERG, supra note 676, at 50 tbl.2.1, 99–100; see also MORRIS, supra note 188, at 
28–29 (explaining how Congress repeatedly killed bills intended to facilitate school desegregation in 
the wake of Brown); ROSENBERG, supra note 676, at 78 (discussing a document known as the 
“Southern Manifesto” in which its 101 congressional signatories pledged to reverse Brown); FRANCIS 
M. WILHOIT, THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 41–48 (1973) (describing governmental resistance 
to Brown). 
679 See John McKnight, The Summit Negotiations: Chicago, August 17, 1966—August 26, 1966, in 
CHICAGO 1966, supra note 62, at 111, 127. 
680 These sessions came to be referred to as “Summit meetings.” See RALPH, supra note 62, at 161. 
681 See id. at 158. 
682 See supra Section II.A.1.i.b. 
683 See McKnight, supra note 679, at 124–25. 
684 Id. at 127. Dr. King continued, 
We don’t want to fool people any longer; they feel they have been fooled; so we are 
asking today that Negroes can buy anywhere. When will that be? Tell us, so that we 
won’t fool the people. We need a timetable, something very concrete. We want to know 
what your implementation is. 
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With the shift away from initiating constitutional litigation to complement 
nonviolent direct action, the lawyers were relieved of an assignment they had 
carried out in the early days of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s career. At the same time, 
they began to play an even greater role in providing support for nonviolent direct 
action in both old and new ways. 
B. Support for Nonviolent Direct Action 
As Martin Luther King, Jr.’s commitment to nonviolent direct action 
deepened with greater exposure to the underlying ideas and experience, so did the 
breadth of his vision of possible tactics to employ. 685  He and his colleagues 
developed more aggressive and innovative tactics, which proved more effective 
than the earlier ones. The transition from “nonviolent persuasion” to “coercive 
nonviolence” had a number of aspects, 686  including: (1) engaging in 
confrontational tactics, including violating a court’s injunction, which elicited 
violent responses from public officials and private citizens; (2) increasing the 
scale—the numbers and range of participants in events and movements; 
(3) extending the duration of marches and demonstrations; and (4) expanding the 
sites of activism from local to state and national ones.687 
                                                
Id. The local ordinance provided for the Human Relations Commission as the venue for relief instead of 
the courts. See supra note 654 and accompanying text. Dr. King did not distinguish between the courts 
and administrative forums in their inability to fulfill the promises that they made. 
Moreover, the Chicago Freedom Movement sought systemic reform rather than the case-by-case 
approach to address housing discrimination that the Human Relations Commission offered. See RALPH, 
supra note 62, at 158. The activists sought to change the deeply embedded policies and practices of real 
estate brokers operating in white neighborhoods. See id. at 114–30. 
685 Initially, Dr. King’s commitment to nonviolence was quite limited. For instance, his bodyguards 
carried guns. See YOUNGE, supra note 55, at 114–15; Adam Winkler, MLK and His Guns, HUFFINGTON 
POST BLOG (Jan. 17, 2011, 11:25 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/mlk-and-his-guns
_b_810132.html. But with time, nonviolence became fundamental to him, both in principle and for 
pragmatic reasons. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 32 (“When he made his debut as president of the MIA 
at the initial mass meeting, December 5, he did not mention Gandhi or anything directly relating to 
Mahatma’s theory or practice of social change. . . . By Christmas, however, an emerging emphasis on 
nonviolence was clear. . . . [T]he conscious desire to combine Gandhian precepts with Christian 
principles was growing in both King and the MIA.”); 3 THE PAPERS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 
supra note 137, at 14 ("King had unsuccessfully sought gun permits for his bodyguards, but he 
eventually decided to get rid of all guns, including his own, after discussing with his wife and others the 
inconsistency of leading a nonviolent movement while permitting the use of weapons for protection."); 
see also Winkler, supra (“Eventually, King gave up any hope of armed self-defense and embraced 
nonviolence more completely.”). See generally KING, supra note 7, at 72–88 (discussing Dr. King’s 
“pilgrimage to nonviolence”); Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR. RES. & EDUC. INST. (Apr. 16, 1963), http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu:5801/transcription
/document_images/undecided/630416-019.pdf (championing the tenets of a nonviolent campaign). 
Bayard Rustin became Dr. King’s mentor on nonviolence after serving as his “Gandhian counselor” 
during the Montgomery Bus Boycott. See ANDERSON, supra note 291, at 69, 185–212; see also 
BRANCH, supra note 32, at 250; LEVINE, supra note 291, at 93–98, 121–22. Dr. King traveled to India 
in February 1959, on the encouragement of Rustin and his other advisors, to deepen his understanding 
of Gandhi’s philosophy of nonviolence. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 113–14. See generally BRANCH, 
supra note 32, at 87 (“[Dr. King] came to describe [Reinhold] Niebuhr as a prime influence upon his 
life, and Gandhian nonviolence as ‘merely a Niebuhrian stratagem of power.’ ”). 
686 See GARROW, supra note 22, at 221. 
687 See discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i–iii, III.B.2, III.B.3.i–vi. 
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In virtually every movement and event from 1963 on, there was at least one 
tactic employed that reflected escalation of the nonviolent strategy. 688  With 
activists’ new tactics came additional assignments and opportunities for the lawyers 
to contribute. They had some new clients to represent and many new tasks to 
perform. Their numerous challenges included: (1) appealing Dr. King’s and his 
colleagues’ contempt citations for violating a Birmingham injunction; 
(2) defending Birmingham school children against school officials’ effort to expel 
them for their participation in protests; (3) suing record companies for copyright 
infringement; (4) defending Dr. King against contempt charges for leading a brief 
march in Selma; and (5) designing blueprints and arrangements to secure courts’ 
approval of proposed marches in Selma and Memphis.689 These were daunting 
challenges for the lawyers. Many of the legal questions were uncertain. Southern 
segregationist judges would decide some of them, at least initially. Moreover, these 
matters had very important implications for the movements and events involved. 
1. Defending Dr. King, His Organizations, and the Protesters 
Local officials continued to use arrests as a resistance strategy to try to defeat 
protests. Over time, however, arrests also evolved into a movement tactic. 690 
Activists sometimes tried to fill the jails to raise consciousness about the movement, 
bring public attention to activists’ grievances, and build support for the changes 
they sought.691 The use of arrests as a strategic device required decisions about 
when and why to provoke arrests, who should subject themselves to arrests, and 
whether to stay in jail or get released on bail. If activists decided on bail rather than 
“jail, no bail,” they needed lawyers to make the bail arrangements, which could 
also include securing the necessary funds.692 As a result, the lawyers represented 
thousands of protesters jailed in the various campaigns.693 
Again, Martin Luther King, Jr. described himself as a “frequenter of jails.”694 
He averaged more than two stints in jail a year during his career.695 Still, decisions 
related to arrests, jail, and bail sometimes posed very difficult dilemmas for Dr. 
King, personally. On the one hand, it was symbolically important for him to be on 
the same level with the mass protesters, not above them. If his followers risked 
exposing themselves to mass arrests, he felt he should do the same.696  If his 
followers chose to stay in jail instead of making bail, he should join them in their 
                                                
688 See discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i–iii, III.B.2, III.B.3.i–vi. 
689 See discussion infra Sections III.B.1.i, III.B.3.i, III.B.3.iii, III.B.3.v, III.B.4.ii. 
690 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 382 (“[T]he time had come for King to submit to intentional arrest 
to give the movement a publicity boost.”). 
691 See discussion, infra Section III.B.1.iii. 
692 See, e.g., BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON, supra note 326, at 254–65 (describing lawyer Clarence 
Jones’s involvement in raising bail money for the Birmingham movement). 
693 See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 381 (noting that LDF lawyers and cooperating lawyers in 
Alabama represented more than 3,400 defendants in the Selma protests). 
694 King, supra note 1, at xxi. 
695 See BENNETT, supra note 7, at 243 (listing Dr. King’s “record of arrests”); FAQs, KING CTR., 
http://www.thekingcenter.org/faqs (last visited Oct. 7, 2015) (stating that Dr. King was arrested thirty 
times in his career). 
696 See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 2, at 241–42. 
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sacrifice and suffering.697 On the other hand, any time in jail took him away from 
other major responsibilities such as strategizing and fundraising.698 Dr. King was 
so central to so many campaigns that his time spent in jail could undermine their 
overall strategies.699 
Mass arrests posed both strategic and financial challenges for the movement. 
While filling the local jails often generated broader support for the movement, it 
did not always do so. 700  In the meantime, protesters suffered degrading and 
humiliating conditions in jail, as well as collateral consequences such as loss of jobs 
or, in the case of Birmingham, expulsion from school.701 
i. Birmingham: Defending the Children (1963) 
For the first time in the Civil Rights Movement, the Birmingham Movement 
enlisted school children.702 As the numbers of Black adults willing to demonstrate 
declined, leading to the all-important media interest beginning to wane, leaders 
searched for ways to reinvigorate the movement.703 SCLC leaders persuaded Dr. 
King that a mass influx of youth was what the movement needed.704 Although he 
had originally opposed using children, Dr. King approved inviting them to a mass 
rally on May 2, 1963.705 Hundreds of youth demonstrated, leading to hundreds of 
                                                
697 MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 157 (“We chose to serve our time because we feel so 
deeply about the plight of more than seven hundred others who have yet to be tried.”). 
698 GARROW, supra note 2, at 241; see also MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 157.  
699 See discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. 
700 See, e.g., supra Section II.A.1.i.d, infra Sections III.B.1.i–ii (discussing campaigns in Albany, St. 
Augustine, and Birmingham before the use of children, where filling the jails did not generate broad 
support but instead hindered the movement by raising the cost of participation). 
701 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 54; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 158–59; DAN R. WARREN, IF IT 
TAKES ALL SUMMER: MARTIN LUTHER KING, THE KKK, AND STATES’ RIGHTS IN ST. AUGUSTINE, 1964, 
at 116 (2008); discussion infra Section III.B.1.i. 
702 See THORNTON, supra note 27, at 310. 
703 See KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 189. 
704 See BRANCH, supra note 32, at 752–55. Dr. King’s colleague James Bevel argued that any child 
who could become a church member (as young as six) should be allowed to demonstrate. Id. at 755. If 
children were “old enough to decide their eternal destiny,” they were old enough “to march against 
segregation.” See id. At an earlier meeting, when youth who had been attending workshops volunteered 
for jail, Dr. King repeatedly refused them, saying that jail is no place for a child. See id. at 750–51. 
Some Birmingham movement leaders worried that “school records and lifetime hopes” could be 
affected, and young lives scarred by what happened in jail. Id. at 752–53. Dr. King was also concerned 
about possible charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. See id. at 753. 
However, Dr. King also realized that the new life the youth could bring was crucial to the movement. 
See MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 206 (“If our drive was to be successful, we must involve 
the students of the community. Even though we realized that involving teenagers and high school 
students would bring down upon us a heavy fire of criticism, we felt that we needed this dramatic new 
dimension.”). 
705 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 247. During the rally, Dr. King remained at his hotel, pondering 
whether to use the children in any marches. Id. at 248–49. Other SCLC leaders made the decision 
without him. See id. at 248. 
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arrests, and new life for the movement.706 The success of the march convinced Dr. 
King to continue using schoolchildren.707 
As the movement escalated by enlisting children in demonstrations, local 
officials ratcheted up their resistance tactics, attacking the demonstrators with fire 
hoses and police dogs,708 and using both the jails and the schools to fight back.709 
As a result, the use of children triggered significant additional responsibilities for 
the lawyers.710 Not only did they have larger numbers of demonstrators to defend; 
they also had to protect their clients’ futures.711 
The need to protect the students took an unexpected twist when local officials 
convinced the school board to expel 1,100 students who allegedly had participated 
in a march.712 The expulsions took place one week before graduation for the middle 
school and high school students, and before promotion for the others. 713  The 
students’ parents voiced their deep concerns about this situation to Dr. King and his 
colleagues.714 The leaders turned to LDF lawyers Constance Baker Motley and 
Leroy Clark with a desperate plea for assistance in preventing the school board 
from carrying out its expulsion plan.715 
With little time to act, Motley and her colleagues sought to enjoin the 
expulsion order.716 They appeared before Federal District Court Judge Clarence W. 
Allgood, a segregationist Kennedy appointee.717 The judge denied the lawyers’ 
request for a preliminary injunction, after giving them a lecture in chambers about 
using children in demonstrations.718 
Judge Elbert Tuttle, chief judge of the Fifth Circuit, agreed to hear their appeal 
in Atlanta on an extremely expedited basis—later that day.719 Motley argued that 
                                                
706 See id. at 248–49; cf. THORNTON, supra note 27, at 311 (stating that thousands of “black 
youngsters . . . committed to the crusade” were “taken into custody”). Estimates of the number of 
arrests vary, ranging from 600 according to MCWHORTER, supra note 50, at 368, to “more than five 
hundred,” GARROW, supra note 2, at 249, and only 274 according to the warden’s arrest records, 
ESKEW, supra note 50, at 296. 
707 ESKEW, supra note 50, at 265; see also KING, supra note 22, at 102 (“Looking back, it is clear 
that the introduction of Birmingham’s children into the campaign was one of the wisest moves we 
made. It brought a new impact to the crusade, and the impetus that we needed to win the struggle.”). 
708 THORNTON, supra note 27, at 311. Sheriff Bull Connor’s antics appeared on national television 
and had a significant impact on public opinion. Id.; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 360. As a 
result, the Birmingham movement contributed to the passage of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 363. 
709 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 248–49; MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135. 
710 See discussion infra Section III.B.4.i. 
711 Those were the issues that made Dr. King reluctant to permit children to participate in the first 
place. See supra note 704 and sources cited. All protesters faced such risks; but Dr. King felt especially 
protective of the children. 
712 MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135. For other accounts of this episode, see ESKEW, supra note 50, at 
308–09, and MCWHORTER, supra note 50, at 448–51. 
713 MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 135. 
714 Id. 
715 See id. at 135–36. 
716 Id. at 136. In addition to LDF colleague Leroy Clark, four local lawyers joined her—Arthur 
Shores, Peter Hall, Orzell Billingsley, and Oscar Adams. Id. 
717 Id.; see also Kennedy-Appointed Judges Stall Negroes’ Court Fights, JET, Nov. 14, 1963, at 6, 6–
7. 
718 See MOTLEY, supra note 13, at 136. 
719 Id. Presumably, Judge Tuttle was willing to proceed so quickly because the end of the school year 
was rapidly approaching. The lawyers could not get to the court until the evening, but Judge Tuttle 
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the school board had denied the students due process because it expelled them 
without notice or hearing.720 The judge issued the requested injunction, pending 
appeal.721 Motley viewed Judge Tuttle’s decision as a critical turning point in the 
Birmingham movement: “I think it is fair to say that this was the most critical point 
in what we now call the Birmingham campaign. If Judge Tuttle had not held this 
extraordinary court session, Martin Luther King, Jr. might have gone down in 
Birmingham. Instead, Tuttle’s injunction revitalized King’s efforts[,]”722 allowing 
him to leave Birmingham in a good position to move on to other movements. 
ii. St. Augustine (1963–1964) 
Organized demonstrations began in St. Augustine, Florida during the summer 
of 1963. Blacks wanted SCLC’s help in order to deal with an extremely segregated 
city government.723 Dr. King hoped that demonstrations in St. Augustine would win 
support for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was stalled in a congressional 
filibuster.724 SCLC discovered St. Augustine’s publicity value during an Easter 
protest on March 28, 1964, which included the arrest of Mrs. Malcolm Peabody, 
the mother of the Massachusetts governor.725 During Easter week, Mrs. Peabody 
was one of nearly 300 demonstrators who were arrested.726 Her arrest received 
front-page news in the New York Times.727 
Dr. King made his first visit to St. Augustine on May 18, stating that “he and 
SCLC’s ‘nonviolent army’ were committed to demonstrations in their ‘small 
Birmingham.’ ”728 They would march in the town square where slaves were once 
bought and sold to remind bystanders of the connection between slavery and 
contemporary segregation, as well as a way to interrupt tourist traffic vital to the 
city’s economy.729 To this end, SCLC planned for a regular schedule of night 
marches until early June, at which point demonstrations would grow until the “big 
                                                
agreed to hear the emergency matter at 7:00 p.m. Id. Motley, Clark, and Atlanta local counsel Donald 
Hollowell drew up the papers and appeared before Judge Tuttle. Id. 
720 Id. at 137. 
721 Id. Judge Tuttle also lectured the school board’s lawyers about the importance of school 
authorities’ efforts to keep children in school. Id. 
722 Id. 
723 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 180. Dr. King’s autobiography states that “SCLC came to St. 
Augustine at the request of the local unit which was seeking”: (1) a biracial committee to address 
segregation in the city; (2) “desegregation of public accommodations”; (3) “hiring of [Black] 
policemen, firemen, and office workers in municipal jobs”; and (4) “dropping of charges against 
persons peacefully protesting for their constitutional rights.” MLK AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 32, at 
240. 
724 See WARREN, supra note 701, at 76–78. 
725 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 181. C.T. Vivian and Hosea Williams had organized a week of 
demonstrations that included the Massachusetts Christian Leadership Conference, and Mrs. Peabody 
was part of sixty volunteers who were sent to get arrested and stay in jail for at least three days. Id. 
726 See id. 
727 Id.; see Mother of Massachusetts Governor Jailed in Florida, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 1964), http://
www.nytimes.com/1964/04/01/mother-of-massachusetts-governor-jailed-in-florida.html. 
728 GARROW, supra note 2, at 325. 
729 See id. at 325–26; see also Memorandum from Wyatt Tee Walker to Dr. King, Suggested 
Approach and Chronology for St. Augustine (n.d.), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document
/suggested-approach-and-chronology-st-augustine. 
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push” around June 14.730 Marching in St. Augustine’s darkness through mazes of 
narrow streets, the marchers would be at their most vulnerable to attacks.731 
Before Dr. King even arrived in St. Augustine, attorneys for SCLC had begun 
defending demonstrators who were arrested during protests.732 After the Easter 
protest, Tobias Simon, John M. Pratt, and William Kunstler filed petitions for writs 
of habeas corpus in the federal district court in Jacksonville for release of those 
arrested.733  They also sought removal of the cases to federal court.734  Federal 
District Court Judge Bryan Simpson declined to take jurisdiction of the cases.735 
He ordered the police to accept appearance bonds rather than the cash bonds they 
had demanded. 736  Requiring the full cash amount of the bond was a way of 
deterring demonstrators, and Judge Simpson’s order allowed them to pay state court 
bail bonds that only required 10% face value of the bond to be paid.737 
On June 11, Dr. King chose to intensify the campaign by appearing at the 
whites-only restaurant of Monson Motor Lodge and seeking service.738 When Dr. 
King was asked to leave, he refused, and the police arrested him.739 Dr. King 
declined to post bail and was incarcerated on charges of trespassing with malice, 
conspiracy, and intent to breach the peace.740 
On July 20, Dr. King’s attorneys returned to the federal district court in 
Jacksonville to file a lawsuit on behalf of those arrested during the demonstrations 
in St. Augustine.741 They asked the court to exercise jurisdiction over the several 
hundred cases still pending before Judge Charles Mathis Jr. in St. Johns County 
                                                
730 GARROW, supra note 2, at 326. 
731 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 184–85. These attacks would demonstrate the true nature of the 
police and the “inadequacy of local law enforcement.” Id. at 185. 
732 See WARREN, supra note 701, at 66. 
733 Id. 
734 KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 273. According to William Kunstler, the attorneys sought removal to 
federal court based on what they had learned from earlier cases: 
[W]e had learned during the summer of 1963 that orders remanding removed civil rights 
cases back to state court might be appealable. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit, which included 
Florida, had already granted a stay of such remand orders in a Louisiana case . . . five 
months earlier. It was reasonable to expect that we would get the same treatment in the 
St. Augustine cases. 
Id. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (2012) (permitting civil actions and criminal prosecutions involving 
civil rights to be removed to federal court); id. § 1447(d) (excepting remands in civil rights cases from 
bar to appellate review of district court orders remanding removed cases to state court). Kunstler also 
recounts that Chief Judge Bryan Simpson was intrigued by the removal proceedings the attorneys had 
instituted, telling Kunstler that this would be the first time he had encountered them, and that he 
“look[ed] forward to hearing [their] arguments as to why [he] should retain jurisdiction of all these state 
prosecutions.” KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 273. 
735 WARREN, supra note 701, at 67. 
736 Id. 
737 Id. The lawyers appealed Judge Simpson’s decision against removal of the case to federal court to 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans. Id. On April 5, 1964, Federal Appellate Court Judge 
Elbert Tuttle “ordered local prosecutions postponed until the appeals court could hear the case.” Id. 
738 GARROW, supra note 2, at 330. Dr. King was accompanied by Ralph Abernathy, Bernard Lee, and 
seven others. Id. 
739 Id. at 330–31. 
740 WARREN, supra note 701, at 76. Dr. King was initially “locked up in the crowded St. Johns 
County Jail,” id., but was later moved to the Duvall County Jail in Jacksonville for safety reasons. 
FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 186. He left jail on June 13 to receive an honorary degree from Yale. Id. 
741 WARREN, supra note 701, at 166–67. 
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Court.742 Shortly thereafter, Judge Simpson issued a protective order that kept civil 
rights protesters from being prosecuted in state court, which effectively removed 
all of the protesters’ pending cases to federal court. 743  Later, Judge Simpson 
dismissed the charges against 400 demonstrators.744 
iii. Poor People’s Campaign (1968) 
In the mid-1960s, Martin Luther King, Jr. began to shift his focus from racial 
segregation to addressing economic inequality and widespread poverty.745 After 
Marian Wright Edelman conveyed to Dr. King then-Senator Robert Kennedy’s 
suggestion to “bring the poor to Washington” to educate the public about the 
widespread existence of poverty, Dr. King embraced this as his major initiative for 
1968.746 In November 1967, Dr. King announced his plan to SCLC staff members 
and called it the “Poor People’s Campaign.”747 
Campaign organizers envisioned thousands of poor people from urban and 
rural areas and from different regions of the country going to Washington and 
setting up a tent city on the mall—which came to be called “Resurrection City.”748 
The protest would be racially and ethnically inclusive, with both poor people of 
color and poor whites going to Washington.749 As always, the movement would be 
                                                
742 Id. at 167. Since refusing the attorneys’ request to exercise jurisdiction over the cases of those 
arrested during the Easter protest, Judge Simpson “appeared to have changed his opinion on the quality 
of justice available to the demonstrators in state courts.” Id. at 98. 
743 Id. at 167. 
744 DAVID R. COLBURN, RACIAL CHANGE AND COMMUNITY CRISIS: ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA, 1877–
1980, at 134 (1985). Civil rights demonstrators also raised the issue of prison conditions. See id. at 126. 
Prisoners were placed in hot, confined spaces, and demonstrators alleged that police officers had 
“threatened and mistreated” the prisoners. Id. at 126–27. After a hearing, Judge Simpson ordered that 
officers cease placing prisoners in small, confined areas during high temperatures. Id. at 127. 
745 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 200; see also MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 4. 
746 EDELMAN, supra note 177, at 109; see also HENRY HAMPTON & STEVE FAYER, VOICES OF 
FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 1980S 
453–54 (1991). The idea was that a visible expression of the concern for the poor might be effective in 
gaining White House and congressional support for addressing poverty. See GARROW, supra note 2, at 
573–74. His close advisor Stanley Levison proposed modeling the 1932 protest of the Bonus Army of 
veterans who built shanties on the mall to dramatize the plight of the unemployed during the Great 
Depression. See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463; MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 112. 
In 1932, several thousand World War I veterans went to Washington to demand early payment of 
their war bonuses. President Hoover and the Senate rejected their claims, so they “set[] up nine camps 
across the city to lobby the government.” GORDON K. MANTLER, POWER TO THE POOR: BLACK-BROWN 
COALITION AND THE FIGHT FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE, 1960–1974, at 94 (2013). Within weeks, 20,000 
veterans and family members occupied the camps. See id. A month later, “federal troops . . . tear-gassed 
and burned down the camps . . . .” Id. The veterans did not receive their bonuses for three years; but 
Levison thought that it was a good model for SCLC to use. See id. 
747 King’s Last March, AM. RADIOWORKS, http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/king
/b1.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2016); Poor People’s Campaign, KING INST. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://
kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_poor_peoples_campaign/ (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2016). 
748 See MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 112. 
749 See id. at 83; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 359; GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463. 
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committed to nonviolence. 750  The goal was to pressure Congress and federal 
agencies to commit far greater resources to address the problem of poverty.751 
In mid-March 1968, Dr. King called on LDF Chief Counsel Jack Greenberg 
to come to Atlanta with some of his colleagues to help plan the campaign.752 He 
wanted LDF’s help on two fronts: (1) to defend the protesters against “harassment, 
arrest, prosecution, and other hostile legal action”; and (2) to get permits for 
meetings and parades.753 At Dr. King’s request, LDF agreed to represent SCLC in 
the Poor People’s Campaign.754 
During the six-week campaign, there were 567 arrests,755 including arrests 
related to protests and Resurrection City residents’ illegal activity.756 Organizers 
expected mass arrests for the protest activities,757  and SCLC’s Legal Services 
Committee provided instructions for protesters about arrests. If arrested, they 
should record information about witnesses and arresting officers. 758  The 
                                                
750 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 359; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463; MCKNIGHT, 
supra note 67, at 112. 
751 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 466; see also MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 83–84. 
752 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463. Leroy Clark, Chuck Jones, Lou Pollak, and Mel Zarr 
accompanied Greenberg. Id. 
753 Id. Greenberg made clear that if the protesters engaged in civil disobedience, they would be 
committing a crime. Id. at 464. It could be impossible to defend them successfully in that case. Id. Dr. 
King was prepared, as in the past, to plead guilty and serve a sentence if he decided to engage in civil 
disobedience. See id. 
Greenberg indicated that LDF could play a role in case of refusal of bail, bail set at excessive levels, 
appropriateness of charges, and sentencing. Id. By April 2, LDF staff lawyers Leroy Clark and Jim 
Finney had developed a plan to coordinate LDF staff and volunteer lawyers on possible projects for the 
campaign. Id. at 465. 
754 Id. at 465. Just before Dr. King’s death, with LDF overseeing all legal aspects of the PPC, they 
formed the “Legal Services Committee.” Amy Nathan Wright, Civil Rights “Unfinished Business”: 
Poverty, Race, and the 1968 Poor People’s Campaign 353 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Texas at Austin) (on file with University of Texas Libraries). In addition to dealing with 
arrests and permissions, the group served as legal counsel for the PPC committees. Id. It provided two 
to three lawyers for each committee. Id. Local lawyers served as counsel. Id. Frank D. Reeves, 
Professor of Law at Howard Law School, chaired the committee. Id. at 354. LDF’s Leroy Clark served 
as chief counsel. Id. Marion Wright Edelman headed the Legislative Research Committee and assisted 
the other committees. Id. Law students assisted in legal efforts and participated in daily protests “to 
advise participants of their legal rights,” if needed. Id. 
After Dr. King was assassinated, Ralph Abernathy, his successor, announced that SCLC would 
proceed with the Poor People’s Campaign, and that he wanted LDF to represent it. GREENBERG, supra 
note 51, at 465. 
In addition to the responsibilities Dr. King charged LDF with, LDF played a role in shaping SCLC’s 
positions and demands. Marian Wright Edelman was in Washington, having worked the previous year 
for LDF in Mississippi. See HAMPTON & FAYER, supra note 746, at 451–53, 478. When the protest 
began, she realized that position papers were needed that would identify what the movement wanted 
Congress and the President to do. See id. at 478. She gave herself the job of writing those papers. Id. 
Later in the movement, Marian Wright Edelman worked behind the scenes with government lawyers 
to reshape the movement’s broad and vague demands into a coherent set of priorities. MCKNIGHT, 
supra note 67, at 127; see also Wright, supra, at 434. 
755 MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 130. The majority of the arrests took place during the final week, 
when Resurrection City was a dangerous place, with intensified violence in the form of beatings and 
robberies. See id. 
756 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 466; see also MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 130. 
757 See CHARLES FAGER, UNCERTAIN RESURRECTION: THE POOR PEOPLE’S WASHINGTON CAMPAIGN 
88 (1969). 
758 Wright, supra note 754, at 430. 
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instructions informed them of their rights, and assured them that legal counsel 
would be available to represent them.759 Volunteer lawyers represented them, under 
LDF supervision.760 Frank Reeves, who headed the committee, told demonstrators 
that the official policy was “jail, no bail.”761 He indicated that penalties could be 
ninety-day sentences and $250 fines.762 
2. Other Defense Work: Chicago Evictions (1965–1966) 
A decade after the Montgomery Bus Boycott, Martin Luther King, Jr. took his 
movement to Chicago—his first major initiative outside the South.763  He had 
concluded that systemic racism was not confined to the Deep South, and that his 
nonviolent philosophy was relevant to the nation as a whole.764 What came to be 
called the Chicago Freedom Movement (CFM) joined SCLC with a coalition of 
local organizations addressing racial discrimination.765 CFM had two major goals. 
The first and foremost was a fair housing effort that sought to make housing 
opportunities available for Blacks in white neighborhoods by marching Black and 
white protesters into white working-class neighborhoods “to dramatize the depth of 
housing discrimination.”766 
CFM’s second goal involved an “end the slums” campaign focused on the 
decaying buildings in low-income Black neighborhoods. 767  It drew upon an 
emerging national strategy of organizing Black families in low-income 
neighborhoods into tenant unions.768 The goal was to put pressure on landlords to 
repair and maintain their apartment buildings.769 The tenant unions carried out rent 
strikes, putting their rent money in escrow accounts to use the money to repair the 
buildings until landlords made the repairs necessary to make their apartments 
                                                
759 Id. The final instruction was to sing on the way to jail, to build camaraderie. Id. 
760 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 466. 
761 FAGER, supra note 757, at 89; see also Memorandum from Leroy D. Clark, Chief Counsel, 
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. to Participants, Poor People’s Campaign 2 (June 1968) (on file 
with author). 
762 FAGER, supra note 757, at 89. Some demonstrators objected to the “jail, no bail” strategy. See id. 
763 See discussion supra Section III.A, infra Section III.B.3.iv. 
764 AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 23; RALPH, supra note 62, at 29–30. 
765 The leadership of the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (CCCO) invited Dr. 
King to come to Chicago. AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 24. CCCO had focused primarily on the 
inequality in the Chicago public schools. RALPH, supra note 62, at 43, 65–66. 
766 RALPH, supra note 62, at 92; see also discussion infra Section III.B.3.iv. Chicago was the most 
racially segregated big city in the United States. AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 25; RALPH, supra 
note 62, at 39. 
767 Conditions included lack of hot water, leaking roofs, lack of heat in winter, rotting stairs and 
windows, the absence of locks, and infestation of rats and vermin. AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 
26. To draw attention to these conditions, Dr. King moved into a tenement apartment in the Lawndale 
neighborhood, called “Slumdale” by its residents. Id. at 27; RALPH, supra note 62, at 55. 
768 RALPH, supra note 62, at 58. The CFM used emerging models of tenant union organizing in New 
York City. Interview with Gil Cornfield & Gil Feldman, Founding Partners, Cornfield & Feldman LLP, 
in Chi., Ill. (June 30, 2014) [hereinafter Cornfield & Feldman Interview]. 
769 See Cornfield Remarks, supra note 92, at 669–71; see also ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 
62, at 190–91; AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 25–26; RALPH, supra note 62, at 58; Cornfield & 
Feldman Interview, supra note 768. 
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habitable.770 This tactic put the tenants at immediate risk of eviction. In Chicago’s 
Landlord/Tenant court, there was no defense to non-payment of rent. 771 
Traditionally, eviction cases involved a brief pro forma ritual.772 The judge asked 
the tenants whether they had paid their rent. If they had not, the judge automatically 
granted the landlord the requested relief.773 
Pro bono lawyers, led by law firm partners Gil Cornfield and Gil Feldman, 
began to defend the tenants. 774  Their tactic was to turn the brief pro forma 
procedure into a much more complicated one, with mountains of documentation 
designed to prevent mass evictions and bring the eviction machinery to a 
standstill.775 Defending tenants in eviction court became a massive undertaking. 
There were so many cases that the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 
agreed to set up a Chicago office to enlist additional lawyers to take the cases.776 
Having disrupted the eviction process, Cornfield and Feldman turned to 
another innovative tactic.777 As union lawyers, they borrowed from the labor law 
context the model of the collective bargaining agreement.778 They negotiated a 
number of agreements with landlords providing for payment of rent in return for 
commitments to make the repairs required to bring the buildings up to code.779 
                                                
770 ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 62, at 191; AYERS & DOHRN, supra note 117, at 25–26; 
Cornfield & Feldman Interview, supra note 768. 
771 In the one case they lost, the lawyers challenged the common law principle of no defense for non-
payment of rent as outmoded. See Cornfield Remarks, supra note 92, at 674. Ultimately, the Illinois 
Supreme Court adopted the “warranty of habitability” as an implicit provision in the lease that provided 
an affirmative defense for non-payment of rent. See Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (Ill. 
1972). The development of this implicit provision of habitability grew out of the Chicago Freedom 
Movement. Richard H. Chused, The Roots of Jack Spring v. Little, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 395, 398–
99 (2007). 
772 The eviction court judge granted eviction orders nearly instantaneously, taking “about five 
seconds.” See Cornfield Remarks, supra note 92, at 671. A half century later, Chicago’s eviction court 
still produced rapid evictions unless lawyers were available to represent the tenants. Lizzie Rosenthal: 
My Work Matters, LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUND. (Dec. 27, 2013), https://lafchicago.wordpress.com/2013
/12/27/my-work-matters-23/ (“I work at LAF because low-income tenants get evicted after a ‘trial’ that 
lasts three minutes if they don’t have an attorney.”). 
773 See Cornfield & Feldman Interview, supra note 768. 
774 See Cornfield Remarks, supra note 92, at 672. 
775 See Id. The lawyers “would have people streaming out into the halls [outside the courtroom] for 
every eviction. The whole process of eviction then and the court proceedings became so jammed, it was 
impossible to proceed.” Id. The lawyers characterized the process as “creative [social] disruption.” Id.; 
see also Morris, supra note 221, at 629. 
776 See Bernadine Dohrn, Founder & Former Dir., Children & Family Justice Ctr., Bluhm Legal 
Clinic, Nw. Law, Remarks at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual 
Symposium: Martin Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on Washington to 
Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 667, 674–75 (2016). This process went on 
every day for months, for most of the time that Dr. King was in Chicago. See id. at 673. 
777 Since they were union lawyers with no experience in landlord-tenant law, they consulted with a 
landlord-tenant lawyer. See Cornfield Remarks, supra note 92, at 673–74.  
778 See id. at 674. 
779 See id. Just as opponents tried to undermine attorney Fred Gray’s participation in the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott, city officials put pressure on the unions that Cornfield and Feldman 
represented to get them to cease their participation. There was even an abortive attempt to disbar 
Cornfield because of his activities in eviction court. Id. at 676. 
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3. Permissions and Injunctions 
By the time of the Birmingham Movement, Dr. King had become fully aware 
of the threat that injunctions posed: 
The injunction method has now become the leading instrument of 
the South to block the direct-action civil-rights drive and to prevent 
Negro citizens and their white allies from engaging in peaceable 
assembly, a right guaranteed by the First Amendment. You initiate 
a nonviolent demonstration. The power structure secures an 
injunction against you. It can conceivably take two or three years 
before any disposition of the case is made. The Alabama courts are 
notorious for “sitting on” cases of this nature. This has been a 
maliciously effective, pseudo-legal way of breaking the back of 
legitimate moral protest.780 
In the later years of the Civil Rights Movement, with SCLC’s escalation of its 
nonviolent direct action, the injunction scenarios became more complicated. When 
opponents secured injunctions, non-compliance became an option to consider 
seriously. In Birmingham, non-compliance was the chosen path. 781  In other 
situations, SCLC sought major modifications that permitted planned activities to 
proceed. 782  In still others, SCLC acted proactively and initiated injunction 
proceedings to remove public or private obstacles to protests.783 
i. Birmingham: Permission and Injunction (1963) 
Where local permitting ordinances were available, city officials often used 
their discretion under them to deny permits, thus thwarting marches and other kinds 
of demonstrations. The 1963 Birmingham Movement provides a dramatic example 
of this kind of resistance strategy.784 Movement organizers and lawyers applied to 
the appropriate local official, Commissioner Bull Connor, for a permit to march.785 
                                                
780 KING, supra note 22, at 68–69; see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 74–75. 
781 See discussion infra Section III.B.3.i. 
782 See discussion infra Sections III.B.3.iii, III.B.3.v. 
783 See discussion infra Section III.B.3.ii. 
784 See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 65–71. 
785 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 65–66. Section 1159 
of the Birmingham City Code required a permit for public demonstrations, which could be obtained by 
written application to the city commission stating the demonstration’s purpose, expected size, and 
location: 
 It shall be unlawful to organize or hold, or to assist in organizing or holding, or to 
take part or participate in, any parade or procession or other public demonstration on the 
streets or other public ways of the city, unless a permit therefor has been secured from the 
commission. 
 To secure such permit, written application shall be made to the commission, 
setting forth the probable number of persons, vehicles and animals which will be engaged 
in such parade, procession or other public demonstration, the purpose for which it is to be 
held or had, and the streets or other public ways over, along or in which it is desired to 
have or hold such parade, procession or other public demonstration. The commission 
shall grant a written permit for such parade, procession or other public demonstration, 
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Connor was a rabid segregationist who ordered extremely aggressive and violent 
resistance to the protesters.786 In response to the activists’ application for a permit, 
Connor replied that they would have to apply to the entire city commission,787 a 
requirement that had never been enforced.788 He also made clear that he would 
strenuously oppose a permit for any civil rights activity.789 The permit rejection laid 
the groundwork for a subsequent injunction prohibiting planned demonstrations.790 
In response, Martin Luther King, Jr. decided to violate the injunction.791 In late 
1962 and early 1963, LDF staff and other lawyers met with Dr. King in preparation 
for the Birmingham Movement.792 They discussed the state of the law with respect 
to violations of injunctions.793 The lawyers concluded that disobeying a state court 
injunction which prohibited planned demonstrations would likely result in a 
conviction for contempt of court.794 They further concluded that it was highly 
unlikely they would be able to raise the constitutionality of the ordinance on which 
the injunction was based in the state courts.795 
Those discussions provided Dr. King with a sense of the legal options. But 
other factors remained to consider in contemplating violating an injunction, 
including the likelihood that Birmingham officials would turn to the state courts 
rather than the federal courts for an injunction.796 It was common knowledge that 
the local judges were staunch segregationists, which could build public support for 
the activists and increase the chances of U.S. Supreme Court receptivity to their 
plight.797 
                                                
prescribing the streets or other public ways which may be used therefor, unless in its 
judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or 
convenience require that it be refused. It shall be unlawful to use for such purposes any 
other streets or public ways than those set out in said permit. 
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 309 n.1 (1967) (quoting BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GEN. CODE 
§ 1159). 
786 See ESKEW, supra note 50, at 266–68; see also supra note 708 and accompanying text (discussing 
Bull Connor’s tactics). 
787 ESKEW, supra note 50, at 224; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361; WESTIN & MAHONEY, 
supra note 136, at 66. 
788 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361, 363; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 106. 
789 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 66. 
790 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361; see also infra notes 803–806 and accompanying text. 
791 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361–62; see also discussion supra Section III.B.3. 
792 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 59. 
793 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361. The Supreme Court’s 1962 decision in In re Green provided 
hope that protesters who violated an injunction that deprived them of their First Amendment rights 
could ultimately be vindicated by the Court. In re Green involved an attorney seeking review of the 
denial of requested habeas corpus relief by the Ohio Supreme Court. See 369 U.S. 689 (1962). It was in 
a proceeding that challenged the jurisdiction of the state court that tried to punish him for advising 
union leaders that the restraining order was invalid and that they should continue picketing. Id. at 689–
90. The Court reversed and granted the relief. See id. at 693. 
794 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 59. 
795 Id. But the lawyers suggested that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in In re Green might 
possibly allow this course of action. Id.; see 369 U.S. 689 (1962). 
796 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 60. Birmingham officials would probably have wanted 
to avoid U.S. District Judge Frank Johnson, of the Middle District of Alabama (including Birmingham), 
who was generally supportive of civil rights claims. See id. at 170.  
797 Id. at 59. 
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On the other hand, violating court orders—even from state judges—would 
create tension with the Department of Justice. The Justice Department used 
injunctions extensively to seek compliance with federal civil rights court decisions 
and laws.798 The agency strongly supported obedience to court orders.799 While 
aware of the risks involved, Dr. King remained committed to violating the court’s 
injunction heading into the critical Birmingham movement. 
On April 3, 1963, the Birmingham protest began with sit-ins at lunch counters 
in downtown department stores. 800  Protest organizers planned large-scale 
demonstrations for Good Friday and Easter Sunday, April 12 and 14, 1963.801 They 
selected those dates strategically, with an eye on the symbolic meaning of 
protesting racial segregation on those holy days. 802  On Wednesday, April 10, 
attorneys for the city applied to the state circuit court ex parte for a temporary 
restraining order prohibiting those demonstrations.803 The complaint alleged that 
the respondents, including Dr. King and his associates (including Wyatt T. Walker, 
Ralph Abernathy, and A.D. King) had engaged in various demonstrations over the 
previous week, all of which were “calculated to provoke breaches of the peace in 
the city.”804 That evening the judge signed a broad order prohibiting the activities 
planned for later that week.805 The order was based on a local ordinance that gave 
the city commission virtually complete discretion on whether to issue a parade 
permit.806 
After discussing the order’s implications on the movement, Dr. King and his 
colleagues concluded that complying with it would be disastrous.807 SCLC aide 
Wyatt Walker reflected the consensus view of the situation: 
One option we eliminated was going to court to try to get the 
injunction dissolved [the traditional legal procedure]. We knew this 
would tie us up in court at least ten days to two weeks, and even then 
we might not get it dissolved. We would have a lengthy lawsuit to 
appeal but no Birmingham campaign. All of our planning and 
organizing, a year’s effort, would have been in vain, and that was 
exactly what the city was trying to accomplish by going to court.808 
                                                
798 Id. at 60. 
799 Id. at 60–61. 
800 Id. at 63–64. The leaders also issued a “Birmingham Manifesto” with three demands: 
(1) desegregation of facilities such as lunch counters and fitting rooms at department stores; 
(2) businesses agreeing to employ Blacks on a non-discriminatory basis; and (3) establishing a bi-racial 
committee to work out a plan for the desegregation of other areas of social life in the city. 
Demonstrations would continue until local officials and business leaders met these demands. Id. at 64. 
801 See id. at 68; see also ESKEW, supra note 50, at 237. 
802 See KING, supra note 22, at 69–70. 
803 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 69. 
804 Id. 
805 Id. at 71. 
806 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 361, 363; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 74. 
807 Their lawyers argued that the way the ordinance was administered was probably a violation of the 
First Amendment. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 73–74. 
808 Id. at 76. 
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Protest leaders recognized that they faced a complex and critical legal 
situation, and they turned to the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund for 
assistance.809 Constance Baker Motley, LDF’s Associate Counsel, answered the 
leaders’ call for help by sending Norman Amaker, who had been working with 
movement groups in the South since the early 1960s.810 In Amaker’s discussions 
with local attorneys Orzell Billingsley and Arthur Shores, and with LDF head Jack 
Greenberg, they took as a given the movement’s decision to disobey the court order 
and go ahead with the Good Friday march.811 The attorneys focused instead on a 
parallel strategy—challenging the anticipated contempt citation. 812  They 
anticipated losing initially, but hoped to successfully challenge the constitutionality 
of the injunction on appeal.813 
Before the march on Good Friday, Amaker briefed Dr. King and his associates 
on the legal situation. Amaker explained that if they marched, they would probably 
be in violation of the injunction and could be convicted of either civil or criminal 
contempt. 814  But since the ordinance, as implemented, was probably 
unconstitutional, the injunction was probably invalid. Amaker committed himself 
and his colleagues to doing whatever they could to support the activists in court.815 
The Good Friday march proceeded.816 The police arrested Dr. King and the 
other leaders. 817  Their legal defense team included Arthur Shores and Orzell 
Billingsley, the two Black Birmingham attorneys who had been involved since the 
movement’s planning stage.818 The LDF contingent started with Norman Amaker, 
with staffer Leroy Clark joining him shortly, and top attorneys Jack Greenberg and 
Constance Baker Motley coming later.819 
On the Monday after Easter, the lawyers filed their application to dissolve the 
injunction as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments, being 
                                                
809 Id. at 77. 
810 Id. 
811 Amaker and his colleagues were sensitive to the leaders’ skepticism about lawyers: “I knew how 
a lot of them viewed lawyers as people who were very conservative; who generally tried to hold them 
back, who would say that they couldn’t do anything.” Id. at 80. 
812 Id. at 80–81. 
813 Id. at 81. 
814 Id. A criminal contempt conviction carried a maximum sentence of five days, while the civil 
contempt laws provided for much more severe penalties, and allowed a judge to “jail defendants 
indefinitely until they ‘purged’ themselves by apology and recantation.” BRANCH, supra note 32, at 
751–52. After the briefing, Dr. King remarked that “he surely didn’t want to spend the rest of his life in 
jail, but that he would not repudiate what he had announced and call off the march.” WESTIN & 
MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 82. 
Empty coffers complicated the situation. SCLC did not have enough money for bail. Dr. King faced 
a dilemma. If he led the march, he would go to jail and his fundraising talents would not be available to 
secure the needed funds. Still, he decided to march, having faith that they would somehow find the 
money they needed. BRANCH, supra note 32, at 728–29; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 122; 
WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 82.  
815 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 81. In hindsight, Amaker thought that it might have 
helped with the expected appeal to file a motion to dissolve or modify the injunction before the march, 
but there was not enough time to prepare the motion. Id. at 81–82. 
816 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 121–22. 
817 Id. at 122. 
818 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 80, 86. 
819 Id. at 89–90. 
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unconstitutionally vague, and enforcing racial segregation.820 Judge William A. 
Jenkins limited the issues at trial to the questions of whether the defendants had 
violated the injunction, and had done so “knowingly.” 821  He held that the 
defendants’ conduct, in blatantly violating the order, was punishable as criminal 
contempt.822 Since the parade permit ordinance was not invalid on its face, the only 
permissible means for the defendants to challenge a denial of a permit was through 
a motion to dissolve the injunction.823 Judge Jenkins fined each of them fifty dollars 
and sentenced them to five days in jail—the maximum punishment permitted for 
criminal contempt.824 
The Alabama Supreme Court agreed to take the case directly, skipping the 
intermediate appellate court.825 LDF attorneys had no expectation that the Alabama 
Supreme Court would reverse the trial court, given the state high court’s record of 
hostility to civil rights cases.826 When the Alabama high court did indeed reject the 
activists’ claims, the defendants’ lawyers petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.827 After the Court accepted this dramatic, high profile case, LDF 
staff lawyer James Nabrit and consultant Professor Anthony Amsterdam prepared 
the brief.828 By a 5-4 vote, in Walker v. City of Birmingham, the Court upheld the 
Alabama Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Stewart.829 
Stewart emphasized the decision was limited to the specific facts of the case—
the state’s rule of law was long established; the defendants had not made an effort 
to challenge the validity of the injunction in court before violating it; and they had 
                                                
820 Id. at 90; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 362. As supporting documents, they included the 
city ordinances requiring segregation in various public and private facilities, and affidavits about the 
arrest of Black patrons for seeking service on a desegregated basis. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 
136, at 91. As the case worked its way up to the Supreme Court, the movement’s lawyers built on these 
basic documents, arguments, and evidence. Id. 
821 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 97. 
822 Id. at 141. While the city had charged the defendants with civil contempt as well, Judge Jenkins 
dismissed that charge without stating his reasons for doing so. Id. Some suggest the practical reason for 
Judge Jenkins’ ruling was that Birmingham’s business leaders did not want Dr. King “languishing 
indefinitely in a Birmingham jail, while a national campaign to free him created terrible publicity for 
the city.” Id. 
823 Id.; see Walker v. City of Birmingham, 181 So. 2d 493, 500 (Ala. 1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 307 
(1967). In such a proceeding, the court could determine whether the defendants had attempted to 
comply with the ordinance and whether officials had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the 
permit. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 141–42. 
As the Alabama Supreme Court pointed out, however, the lawyers’ motions came too late: 
 It is to be remembered that petitioners are charged with violating a temporary 
injunction. We are not reviewing a denial of a motion to dissolve or discharge a 
temporary injunction. Petitioners did not file any motion to vacate the temporary 
injunction until after the Friday and Sunday parades. Instead, petitioners deliberately 
defied the order of the court and did engage in and incite others to engage in mass street 
parades without a permit. 
Walker, 181 So. 2d at 500. 
824 Walker, 181 So. 2d at 498–99; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 142. He permitted their 
release on bond pending appeal. See id. 
825 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 150, 157. 
826 Id. at 157–58. 
827 Id. at 183, 186. 
828 See id. at 219. 
829 See 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
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provided no explanation for that failure.830 And for these reasons, the high court 
affirmed Alabama’s contempt conviction of Dr. King. 
                                                
830 See id. at 318–21. In three lengthy dissents, Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice 
Douglas attacked the majority’s opinion. Chief Justice Warren emphasized the majority’s failure to 
acknowledge that the injunction incorporated a municipal parade ordinance that vested “totally 
unfettered discretion” in city officials, thereby making it “patently unconstitutional.” Id. at 328–29 
(Warren, C.J., dissenting). He further emphasized that the precedent upon which the majority opinion 
relied, Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922), had been substantially modified by the Court’s later 
decision in In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962), which reversed a conviction for contempt of a state 
injunction because the petitioner was not allowed to present evidence challenging the injunction’s 
validity. Walker, 388 U.S. at 331–32 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice maintained that 
neither Howat nor United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947), cited by the majority, 
supported its holding, and he concluded that “[w]hatever the scope of [the Court’s existing] doctrine, it 
plainly was not intended to give a State the power to nullify the United States Constitution by the 
simple process of incorporating its unconstitutional criminal statutes into judicial decrees.” Walker, 
388 U.S. at 333–34 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
Justice Douglas’s dissent focused on the record evidence which clearly established that Judge 
Jenkins’ broad injunction “flouted the First Amendment,” and on the state court’s lack of jurisdiction to 
issue the injunction. Id. at 334–38 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“In the present case the collision between 
this state court decree and the First Amendment is so obvious that no hearing is needed to determine the 
issue.”). He maintained that a state court decree “is ‘state’ action in the constitutional sense” and argued 
that the Alabama circuit court lacked jurisdiction to abridge the petitioners’ First Amendment rights 
“peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” by issuing an 
unconstitutional injunction: “An ordinance—unconstitutional on its face or patently unconstitutional as 
applied—is not made sacred by an unconstitutional injunction that enforces it.” Id. at 335, 337–38. 
Justice Brennan began his dissent with the harshest criticism of all the other minority opinions: 
 Under cover of exhortation that the Negro exercise “respect for judicial process,” 
the Court empties the Supremacy Clause of its primacy by elevating a state rule of 
judicial administration above the right of free expression guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution. And the Court does so by letting loose a devastatingly destructive weapon 
for suppression of cherished freedoms heretofore believed indispensable to maintenance 
of our free society. I cannot believe that this distortion in the hierarchy of values upon 
which our society has been and must be ordered can have any significance beyond its 
function as a vehicle to affirm these contempt convictions. 
Id. at 338 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While Brennan acknowledged the majority’s presumption that 
states “are free to adopt rules of judicial administration designed to require respect for their courts’ 
orders,” he argued that “a valid state interest must give way when it infringes on rights guaranteed by 
the Federal Constitution.” Id. at 343–44. Brennan noted that, to ensure that freedoms guaranteed under 
the First Amendment have the necessary “breathing space to survive,” id. at 344 (quoting NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)), the Court had formulated rules to give individuals the ability to 
express themselves “in the face of such restraints, armed with the ability to challenge those restraints if 
the State seeks to penalize that expression.” Id. at 345. “Yet by some inscrutable legerdemain,” he 
continued, “these constitutionally secured rights to challenge prior restraints invalid on their face are 
lost if the State takes the precaution to have some judge append his signature to an ex parte order which 
recites the words of the invalid statute.” Id. at 346. 
Brennan concluded by discussing the practical effect of the majority’s holding that the petitioners 
“should have sought to dissolve the injunction before conducting their processions.” Id. at 348. He 
pointed out that requiring even a brief cessation of the protesters’ marches could have dealt “a crippling 
blow” to the petitioners’ efforts “to arouse community support for [their] assault on segregation [in 
Birmingham].” Id. at 348–49. Recognizing that the petitioners had strategically scheduled their protests 
for Good Friday and Easter Sunday, and that it was impossible to know how long it might take to have 
the injunction dissolved, Brennan argued that “[t]o preach ‘respect’ for judicial process in this context 
is to deny the right to speak at all.” Id. at 349. 
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ii. St. Augustine: Injunction (1963–1964) 
In St. Augustine, SCLC attorneys sought to enjoin public officials from 
interfering with the demonstrations. After a night march on May 28, 1964, was met 
with white resistance, demonstrators gathered at a church, where police advised 
against additional night marches due to insufficient police protection.831 Still, the 
next night hundreds marched again.832 Police told marchers to disperse, and forbade 
them from marching downtown on any evening in the future.833 
SCLC leader Andrew Young brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of 
himself and all other Blacks in St. Augustine, seeking a temporary restraining order 
or injunction against local law enforcement leaders and the mayor.834 Plaintiffs 
argued that the defendants’ orders during the night marches of May 28 and May 29 
were unlawful prior restraints on demonstrators’ fundamental rights of speech and 
assembly.835 The defendants had the heavy burden of proving that these rights were 
lawfully restrained based on a “clear and present danger.”836 
Federal District Judge Bryan Simpson found that the May 28 and May 29 
night marches caused some disorder but did not rise to a clear and present danger.837 
Thus, the defendants’ interference with the marches was an unlawful restraint on 
the plaintiffs’ fundamental rights, and Judge Simpson granted a preliminary 
injunction.838 “Law enforcement officials would have to protect, not obstruct, the 
marchers whenever they conducted such protests in the future.”839 
Despite Judge Simpson’s order to not obstruct the marches, police continued 
to interfere. On June 24, a group of Klansmen gathered in the park awaiting the 
demonstrators who were ready to march a few blocks away.840 The Klansmen 
attacked the demonstrators, and when police moved to protect the marchers, the 
                                                
831 Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note 58, at 11–12; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 327. 
The Chief of Police was heard saying: “We are declaring martial law. You had no permit for the earlier 
marches and no permits will be given for other marches.” Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note 
58, at 13. 
832 See Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note 58, at 12–13. 
833 Id. at 13. 
834 Id. at 2–3. The named defendants were L.O. Davis, as Sheriff of St. Johns County, Florida; Virgil 
Stuart, as Chief of Police of the City of St. Augustine; and Joseph A. Shelley, as Mayor of the City of 
St. Augustine. Id. at 3. 
835 Id. at 16. 
836 See id. at 16. 
837 Id. at 12. 
838 Id. at 19. 
839 GARROW, supra note 2, at 330. SCLC attorneys sought further injunctive relief when the City 
Commission adopted two ordinances that imposed a curfew and prohibited parking on certain streets 
between certain hours. See Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note 58, at 13–14. The first 
ordinance “impose[d] a restriction from 9:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M. curfew on all persons under the age of 
18.” Id. at 13; see St. Augustine, Fla., Ordinance 185-A (June 1, 1964) (repealed June 5, 1964). The 
second ordinance prohibited parking automobiles between 9:00 P.M. and 5:00 A.M. on forty-two 
streets in or leading to downtown St. Augustine. Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note 58, at 13; 
see St. Augustine, Fla., Ordinance 186-A (June 1, 1964) (repealed June 5, 1964). 
Plaintiffs’ counsel informed the court that they intended to file an amended complaint seeking 
injunctive relief against the enforcement of these ordinances because they violated First Amendment 
rights. Young Findings & Conclusions, supra note 58, at 13–14. The City Commission repealed these 
ordinances, thereby mooting the injunction request. Id. at 15. 
840 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 334. 
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Klansmen attacked the police as well. 841  The police then began directing the 
marchers “back toward the Black residential area,” rather than allowing them to 
continue on their designated route.842 By that time, Florida Governor C. Farris 
Bryant had issued a county-wide proclamation prohibiting peaceful demonstrations 
and marches in St. Augustine’s public places after 8:30 p.m.843 Pursuant to the 
governor’s proclamation, the police ordered the protesters to disband and go 
home.844 
Police also appeared to have offered insufficient protection for marchers 
during demonstrations. For example, when demonstrators “swam at the public 
beaches in St. Johns County,” they were attacked by white mobs, and the police did 
not offer aid or assistance.845 Attorneys Tobias Simon and Earl Johnson filed a 
petition for rule to show cause in the federal district court in Jacksonville against 
the county sheriff and St. Augustine’s police chief and mayor.846 The lawyers 
contended the lack of police protection, the police interference with marches, and 
the governor’s proclamation violated their constitutional rights, and were a direct 
and willful disobedience of the court’s previous order.847 Judge Simpson quickly 
instructed Governor Bryant and the police to show cause why they should not be 
held in contempt of court.848 
While witnesses such as Florida Attorney General James Kynes testified about 
the inherent danger of night marches through narrow streets, Simon countered that 
Blacks had experienced more violence on the beaches in bright daylight. 849 
Attorney General Kynes had no answer for this logical inconsistency.850 
                                                
841 Id. 
842 Id. at 335. 
843 See Petition for Rule to Show Cause at 4, Young v. Davis, No. 64-133-Civ-J (M.D. Fla. June 22, 
1964), http://civilrights.flagler.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16000coll4/id/1183/rec/8. 
844 See id. 
845 Id. at 3. 
846 See id. at 1, 5; WARREN, supra note 701, at 128. 
847 Petition for Rule to Show Cause, supra note 843, at 4. 
848 WARREN, supra note 701, at 128. During the hearing, an officer testified on behalf of the State to 
support the governor’s contention that his night march ban was “necessary to maintain law and order,” 
and that the demonstrators had presented police with sufficient “clear and present danger” to suspend 
First Amendment rights. Id. at 134. The officer averred to the court that his shirt had been torn during 
an encounter with a demonstrator, and such evidence—if true—would seriously undermine Dr. King’s 
claim that the demonstrations were peaceful and protected under the First Amendment. Id. 
Judge Simpson promptly ordered the officer to produce the torn short. Id. at 135. When the witness 
claimed that he had sent the shirt to his wife in Tampa for repair, Judge Simpson ordered the court 
marshals “to proceed immediately to Tampa and retrieve the torn shirt,” without giving the officer’s 
wife any notice of their impending arrival. Id. In response, the State asked Judge Simpson to allow 
them to confer privately with the officer. Id. Tobias Simon, who was representing Dr. King in the 
hearing, did not object, and Judge Simpson consented. Id. 
After conferring with the witness, the State alerted Simon and the court that the officer had lied 
about the shirt. Id. Judge Simpson indicated that he intended to hold the witness in criminal contempt 
for testifying untruthfully in his court. Id. But Tobias Simon “made an impassioned plea on King’s 
behalf that the young man not be punished,” which Judge Simpson ultimately accepted. Id. 
849 Partial Transcript of Hearing at 40–41, Young v. Davis, Nos. 64-133-CIV-J, 64-152-CIV-J (M.D. 
Fla. June 27, 1964), http://civilrights.flagler.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16000coll4/id/1189/rec/20. 
850 Id. at 41. 
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To avoid contempt charges, Governor Bryant agreed that he would “enforce 
the law more vigorously.”851 Judge Simpson in turn chose not to hold the governor 
in contempt, but “set aside his ban on evening” marches. 852  Tobias Simon 
subsequently moved to quash his petition seeking to hold Governor Bryant in 
contempt after he “appointed a four-man ‘emergency bi-racial committee’ ” to 
restore interracial communication in St. Augustine.853 After the formation of the 
committee, Dr. King announced he would be ceasing demonstrations for two 
weeks, as the purpose of their direct action was to bring the case “out in the open” 
and create dialogue, which had now been achieved.854 
Despite the creation of a biracial committee, violence persisted in St. 
Augustine, particularly after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title II of 
the Act prohibited racial discrimination by “public accommodations,” such as 
restaurants, theaters, and hotels.855 Klan members used picketing and violence to 
intimidate businesses that might comply with the Act.856 William M. Kunstler, 
Tobias Simon, Jack Greenberg, Leroy D. Clark, Charles S. Ralston, and Ronald 
Goldfarb filed suit against more than twenty St. Augustine businesses, seeking to 
enjoin them from further violating the Civil Rights Act by refusing service “solely 
on the ground of race or color.”857 Judge Simpson granted the injunction.858 
The same plaintiffs also asked the federal district court in Jacksonville to 
enjoin the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and the Ancient City Gun Club from “using 
pickets and threats of violence” to prevent St. Augustine businesses from 
complying with the Civil Rights Act.859 Judge Simpson enjoined the defendants 
from otherwise threatening St. Augustine businesses with the purpose of limiting 
or preventing them from offering service to Blacks.860 
                                                
851 COLBURN, supra note 744, at 125. 
852 Id. at 126. Judge Simpson was also likely influenced by the fact he and Governor Bryant had 
known each other for a while and were on friendly terms, as well as the fact that Governor Bryant had 
informed Judge Simpson he would “try to establish a biracial committee in St. Augustine.” See id. 
853 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 188; see WARREN, supra note 701, at 153–54. 
854 WARREN, supra note 701, at 153. 
855 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. II, § 201, 78 Stat. 241, 243–44 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012)). 
856 WARREN, supra note 701, at 162. These picket brigades sometimes led to violence against 
property, and the Motor Lodge was firebombed and suffered significant damage. Id. at 164; see also 
supra note 738 and accompanying text. Gangs of whites began roaming the streets, stalking and 
attacking Blacks. WARREN, supra note 701, at 162. 
857 Lance v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir. 1965); see also WARREN, supra note 701, at 167–
68. 
858 See Plummer, 353 F.2d at 587; WARREN, supra note 701, at 168. 
859 WARREN, supra note 701, at 166–67. 
860 See Plummer, 353 F.2d at 587–88. After Judge Simpson’s rulings, several Black customers could 
not register at a motel where the manager was a fervent segregationist. See id. at 588–89. SCLC 
lawyers charged the manager with “violating the equal access provision” of the Civil Rights Act in 
Judge Simpson’s court. COLBURN, supra note 744, at 128. An affidavit also swore that Charles Lance 
Jr., a “volunteer, unsalaried, deputy sheriff” who had followed the Black customers away from the 
motel upon receiving a “signal” from the motel manager’s wife, was a member of the Ancient City 
Hunting Club, which subjected him to Judge Simpson’s prior injunction. Plummer, 353 F.2d at 588–89. 
Judge Simpson held Lance in contempt, and further requested that Lance resign from the sheriff’s force. 
Id. at 590; see also COLBURN, supra note 744, at 129–30. The decision was upheld on appeal, except 
that Lance was not prohibited from being deputy sheriff so long as he began complying with the court 
orders. See Plummer, 353 F.2d at 592; COLBURN, supra note 744, at 130–31. 
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iii. Selma: Injunction (1965) 
In early 1965, civil rights leaders focused on building public support for 
federal voting rights legislation. 861  As a prime example of extreme 
disenfranchisement of Black residents, Selma, Alabama became the focal point for 
this effort.862 On March 7, 1965, some 600 marchers began the fifty-five-mile trek 
from Selma to the state capitol in Montgomery to call on Governor Wallace and the 
Alabama legislature to enforce voting rights.863 Governor Wallace had issued an 
order forbidding the march and authorized the head of the state troopers to stop the 
march, using “whatever measures . . . necessary.”864 As the marchers attempted to 
cross the Edmund Pettus Bridge leading to the highway to Montgomery, state 
troopers attacked them with clubs, bullwhips, tear gas, and nausea gas.865 Dozens 
of Black people required hospital treatment for their injuries.866 Once again, the 
brutality received national media coverage and produced widespread support for 
the marchers.867 Dr. King was in Atlanta and had missed the march.868 In response 
to the violent resistance, he announced that he would lead a march from Selma to 
Montgomery within two days.869  
The next day, SCLC’s lawyers went to federal court to get an injunction 
restraining the governor and other officials from interfering with the planned 
peaceful march. 870  They chose federal rather than state court in the hopes of 
receiving a sympathetic hearing from Judge Frank Johnson, a frequent ally of civil 
rights activists.871 However, Judge Johnson denied the request for an immediate 
restraining order because some of the defendants had not received notice of the 
                                                
861 See GARROW, supra note 22, at 31–34. 
862 Selma was also attractive as a protest site because the Justice Department was in the process of 
filing suits against local registrars’ offices for their complicity in denying Blacks the franchise. See id. 
at 31. The Justice Department had ample evidence of discrimination: in 1961, out of 15,000 voting age 
Blacks in Selma, only 156 were registered, and only fourteen of these voters had been registered since 
1954. Id. The Justice Department had been unsuccessful, however, in challenging the entrenched white 
power structure. See id. at 34. 
863 See GARROW, supra note 22, at 68, 73; THORNTON, supra note 27, at 487; WESTIN & MAHONEY, 
supra note 136, at 176. See generally Selma to Montgomery March (1965), supra note 59. 
864 ABERNATHY, supra note 290, at 327; see also GARROW, supra note 22, at 72. 
865 GARROW, supra note 22, at 74–76. 
866 See id. at 76. 
867 See id. at 78–82. The day after the attack, speakers from Congress “offered harsh condemnations 
of the tactics and weapons used by the Alabama lawmen, with several aiming their sharpest barbs at 
Governor Wallace.” Id. at 81. 
868 See id. at 73. While there is some debate surrounding Dr. King’s reasons for remaining in Atlanta 
during the march, he maintained that he stayed in Atlanta because he had to keep his “preaching 
commitments.” Id. 
869 Id. at 76, 78. 
870 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 383. Norman Amaker and Steve Ralston prepared the 
complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order, and then flew to Montgomery, where Fred 
Gray and Solomon Seay Jr. presented it in federal court. See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 
102 (M.D. Ala. 1965); GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 383; see also GRAY, supra note 7, at 216 & n.26. 
Birmingham lawyers Peter Hall, Oscar Adams Jr., and Demetrius Newton, and LDF (New York) 
lawyers Jack Greenberg, Charles Jones Jr., and James Nabrit III (in addition to Amaker and Ralston) 
also represented the plaintiffs. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 102; GRAY, supra note 7, at 216 n.26. 
871 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 381–82. 
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application.872 He scheduled a full hearing for several days later and enjoined any 
further demonstrations until after the hearing.873 
The injunction posed a dilemma for Dr. King. He had announced a march for 
a date before the scheduled hearing.874 The Black community was outraged by the 
brutality and was determined to act. Sympathetic supporters from around the 
country were coming to Selma to join in the march.875 Dr. King felt compelled to 
lead the march—to put his body on the line as his followers were prepared to do, 
especially since he had missed the first march. 876  But the federal courts had 
continued to play an important role in the Civil Rights Movement’s progress.877 
Judge Johnson had a record of strong support for civil rights, and violating the 
injunction could diminish his support.878 
President Johnson also made a private and public request for Dr. King to 
postpone the march until after the hearing.879 The Justice Department made the 
same request, since the agency was committed to the enforcement of federal court 
orders regardless of the parties involved.880 DOJ officials expressed confidence that 
the hearing would lead to an order permitting the march to proceed under 
reasonable guidelines. 881  In the face of Dr. King’s insistence on proceeding 
notwithstanding the injunction, a Justice Department intermediary negotiated an 
arrangement whereby the march would cross the Edmund Pettus Bridge and turn 
back, and state troopers would not block them unless they tried to go beyond the 
bridge.882  
By the time the march got underway, it included 2,000 Black and white people 
from around the country.883 Dr. King led them across the bridge to the barricade 
protected by state troopers and deputies.884 He announced that the marchers were 
                                                
872 See Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 103; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 383. Judge Johnson 
also ruled that the plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm if forced to wait for a full hearing on the 
matters involved. GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 383. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1). 
873 See GARROW, supra note 22, at 83–84. The hearing date was two days after the planned march. 
Id. at 84; see also GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 385. According to Jack Greenberg, Judge Johnson 
prohibited the scheduled march “apparently to stabilize the situation and cool things off.” GREENBERG, 
supra note 51, at 383. Fred Gray also reported that Judge Johnson had warned he would “put Martin 
Luther King under the jail if he disobeyed the order.” Id. 
874 See GARROW, supra note 2, at 400–01. 
875 See id. at 399–400 (calling clergy and activists to participate).  
876 See id. at 400–01. 
877 In addition to the many federal court decisions requiring desegregation, the Supreme Court had 
overturned a $500,000 libel judgment against four Black ministers and the New York Times in favor of 
a Montgomery city commissioner a year earlier. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
If the Court had sustained the judgment, it could have bankrupted SCLC. See discussion supra Section 
II.A.1.ii. 
878 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 381–82. 
879 GARROW, supra note 2, at 400–01; see also GARROW, supra note 22, at 85–86. 
880 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 172. 
881 Id. The initial effectiveness of the Justice Department’s suits against Selma’s various registrar’s 
offices is debatable, given the ability of the southern segregationists to stymie the legal process. Judge 
James Hare managed to prolong the Justice Department’s actions by forcing them to file multiple suits 
and allowing the state solicitor general to thwart federal policy. See generally GARROW, supra note 22, 
at 33–34. 
882 See GARROW, supra note 22, at 86. 
883 Id.; see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 174. 
884 GARROW, supra note 22, at 86. 
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turning back and returning to the church where they had started.885 The marchers 
were confused by that turn of events, but Dr. King proclaimed it a successful 
demonstration because they had crossed the bridge, as promised.886 
Dr. King’s lawyers, including Harry Wachtel and the LDF’s Jack Greenberg, 
began preparing a defense for the contempt charges that they anticipated.887 Even 
this very limited march could violate Judge Johnson’s prohibition on 
demonstrations before the hearing. Overturning such a conviction would be very 
difficult in light of Supreme Court precedent.888 The hearings before Judge Johnson 
on SCLC’s suit seeking to enjoin Governor Wallace from blocking the march to 
Montgomery included four and one-half days of testimony from “numerous 
witnesses.” 889  Judge Johnson had to decide whether in this instance First 
Amendment rights to protest trumped the state’s interest in safety on the 
highway. 890  The hearings also considered whether Dr. King had committed 
contempt even though he had stopped short of the highway to Montgomery.891 
When Dr. King acknowledged to the court the existence of an implicit agreement 
that he would go no further than the bridge, it was sufficient to free him from the 
contempt charge.892 
The lawyers for the movement presented a detailed plan for the next march.893 
It would be a five-day peaceful march to Montgomery, with elaborate arrangements 
for avoiding interference with traffic and for feeding, bathroom facilities, sleeping, 
and cleaning up.894 Limiting the number of marchers in the narrowest sections of 
the route could provide further protection for the state’s interests without 
significantly impeding the movement’s ability to achieve its objectives.895 
Arguably, the lawyers’ careful plan made it easier for the court to find that 
protecting the activists’ First Amendment interests was compatible with protecting 
traffic flow and safety on the highway. Judge Johnson authorized the march, giving 
great deference to the movement’s First Amendment right “to protest peacefully 
and petition one’s government for redress of grievance.”896 The order limited the 
number of marchers to 300 once they reached the two-lane portion of the 
highway.897 It also directed Governor Wallace and other state officials to protect 
the marchers, and recognized the President’s power to use federal troops for 
                                                
885 See id. at 86–87. 
886 See ABERNATHY, supra note 290, at 337–43. 
887 See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 173. 
888 See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947) (holding that parties may be 
guilty of contempt for violating a properly issued injunction while the question of its validity is pending 
in court, even if it is ultimately deemed invalid). 
889 Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 103 (M.D. Ala. 1965); see also GARROW, supra note 22, 
at 111–12 (discussing the injunction SCLC sought against Governor Wallace and Sheriff Clark). 
890 See Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 105–06; see also GARROW, supra note 22, at 112. 
891 See GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 385–87; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 175. 
892 See WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 175–76. 
893 GARROW, supra note 22, at 112. 
894 Id.; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 176. 
895 See GARROW, supra note 22, at 112. 
896 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 176. 
897 See id. at 177; see also GARROW, supra note 22, at 112. When they arrived outside Montgomery, 
20,000 marchers assembled for the entry into the city. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 177. 
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additional protection. 898  Meanwhile, President Johnson had announced that he 
would provide whatever federal presence was necessary to protect the marchers if 
the district court permitted the march to proceed.899 In accordance with the court 
order, the march culminated with a 25,000-person demonstration on the steps of the 
state capitol.900 In this case, appealing the injunction was a success, but it would 
not always be Dr. King’s chosen path. 
iv. Chicago: Injunction (1965–1966) 
The next year, in Chicago, Dr. King once again encountered an injunction 
restricting the direct action strategies and tactics. This time, on advice of counsel, 
he decided not to violate the injunction.901 The scenario in Chicago was quite 
different from the southern movements. As the protesters marched into white 
neighborhoods to challenge housing discrimination and strive toward an “open 
city,” neighborhood residents and their supporters attacked them with rocks, 
bottles, and threats.902 Rather than also attacking the protesters, as they had done in 
cities like Birmingham, the police tried to protect them from private citizens.903 
Mayor Richard J. Daley saw these confrontations between protesters and 
residents as a threat to his tight control of the city.904  They also came with a 
significant cost to him politically. His two main constituencies—working-class 
whites and Blacks—were doing battle with each other, and neither was satisfied 
with his response.905 As a result, Daley pressed hard for negotiations—to take the 
issue out of the streets and into the meeting rooms.906 The negotiations led to 
“summit meetings” to work out agreements to address the problem of housing 
discrimination.907 When Mayor Daley asked the activists to stop the marches while 
they negotiated an agreement, Dr. King and other leaders refused.908 
                                                
898 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 176. 
899 Id. at 175; see also GARROW, supra note 22, at 112, 114–15. 
900 GARROW, supra note 22, at 117; see also Roy Reed, 25,000 Go to Alabama’s Capitol; Wallace 
Rebuffs Petitioners; White Rights Worker Is Slain, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 1965), http://www.nytimes
.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0325.html. 
901 However, there was considerable debate within the Chicago Freedom Movement about whether to 
violate the injunction. Rubinowitz & Shelton, supra note 651, at 683; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 
21, at 302; RALPH, supra note 62, at 178–79; WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 193–94. 
902 See ANDERSON & PICKERING, supra note 62, at 223–24; RALPH, supra note 62, at 120–21, 123–
24. 
903 RALPH, supra note 62, at 129, 132–33, 188. 
904 Rubinowitz & Shelton, supra note 651, at 680–81. 
905 Whites objected to Mayor Daley’s letting the demonstrations take place and to having the police 
protect the marchers. See ROGER BILES, RICHARD J. DALEY: POLITICS, RACE, AND THE GOVERNING OF 
CHICAGO 128 (1995). The activists viewed the protection as inadequate. For example, during one 
march, Dr. King was hit in the head with a rock and knocked to the ground. AYERS & DOHRN, supra 
note 117, at 33. In another march, white demonstrators pushed protesters’ cars into a nearby lagoon. 
Rubinowitz & Shelton, supra note 651, at 679 & n.141. 
906 See Rubinowitz & Shelton, supra note 651, at 679–82. 
907 See id. at 681–82. 
908 See BILES, supra note 905, at 129–32. Throughout the protests, Mayor Daley was concerned with 
the negative media attention and worked behind the scenes for a compromise that would end the 
marches. See id. at 128–29. See generally RALPH, supra note 62, at 131–32, 141–42. Daley met with the 
realtors who insisted on following their clients’ wishes, even if that meant discriminating against Black 
home seekers. See id. at 154–55. After the realtors stated that they were unwilling to change their 
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As the negotiations continued without reaching an agreement, Mayor Daley 
obtained an ex parte injunction in Cook County Circuit Court.909 The court imposed 
a series of restrictions on the marches: no more than one demonstration per day, no 
marches between 7:30 a.m. and 9 a.m., 4:30 p.m. and 6 p.m., or at night, and no 
more than 500 marchers at a time.910 The court also required movement leaders to 
give the police twenty-four hours written notice of the time and place of each 
demonstration. 911  The leadership of the Chicago Freedom Movement viewed 
Daley’s actions as a betrayal of trust—seeking court intervention at a time when 
the parties were supposed to be bargaining in good faith for a resolution of the 
matter.912 The order significantly reduced the pressure CFM could put on the city 
through their direct action tactics.913 
Without indicating whether he would obey the court order, Dr. King issued a 
press release deeming the city’s action “unjust, illegal, and unconstitutional.”914 He 
then consulted with his lawyers, including James Nabrit and Norman Amaker, two 
LDF staffers.915 They advised Dr. King that the injunction was much less sweeping 
than the one in Birmingham and was not clearly unconstitutional.916 As a result, 
there would be less justification for disobeying it than in Birmingham (the fate of 
which remained uncertain at that point).917 Instead, they suggested that the better 
route would be to contest it in court and seek modifications that would remove some 
of the most severe restrictions.918 Dr. King agreed with this approach, so Nabrit and 
the other lawyers began preparing a motion to dissolve or modify the injunction.919 
Although Dr. King agreed to comply with the injunction, he still wanted to 
maximize his leverage to secure an acceptable agreement.920 He announced on 
Sunday, August 21, 1966, his plans to lead a “massive march” the following Sunday 
into the all-white, notoriously racist western suburb of Cicero.921 In the 1950s, a 
                                                
practices, Daley attempted to meet with and placate Dr. King and the other Chicago Freedom 
Movement leaders. See id. at 156–58; see also BILES, supra note 905, at 129. 
909 See RALPH, supra note 62, at 160; see also City of Chicago v. King, 230 N.E.2d 41, 42 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1967). For a copy of the city’s complaint and motion for an injunction, see J.H. JACKSON, UNHOLY 
SHADOWS AND FREEDOM’S HOLY LIGHT app. e (1967). Mayor Daley had considerable control of the 
composition of the local courts through the slating process for judicial elections. See generally ADAM 
COHEN & ELIZABETH TAYLOR, AMERICAN PHARAOH: MAYOR RICHARD J. DALEY 104–05, 290 (2000). 
910 See JACKSON, supra note 909, at 261–62. 
911 King, 230 N.E.2d at 42; see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 193. 
912 RALPH, supra note 62, at 161. 
913 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 193. Before this restriction, protesters marched in large 
numbers, sometimes over a thousand, through white-only blue-collar neighborhoods where Blacks were 
particularly unwelcome and encountered violent resistance that made for horrific images in the national 
media. While white neighborhood residents were still angry, the restrictions limited the impact of the 
protests. It was easier for police to protect the protesters and more difficult for the movement to garner 
national attention as victims of white violence. See generally BILES, supra note 905, at 124–29, 132–
33; Rubinowitz & Shelton, supra note 651, at 679–80. 
914 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 193. 
915 Id. at 194. At the time, Nabrit and Amaker had just recently finished working on the certiorari 
petition in Walker v. City of Birmingham. Id.; see 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
916 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 194. 
917 Id. 
918 Id. 
919 See id. 
920 See id. 
921 Id. 
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white mob had burned down an apartment building when a Black family moved 
into the community.922 Since the injunction applied only to the city of Chicago, the 
planned march would not violate it.923 The prospect of the Cicero march right on 
the city’s border, with the likelihood of major violence against the demonstrators, 
provided the mayor with additional incentive to push through an agreement quickly. 
On August 26, the parties reached what was called the “Summit Agreement,” which 
identified policies and programs designed to address housing discrimination in the 
city.924 
With the agreement in hand, King called off the Cicero march and began 
winding down his operation in Chicago.925 CFM’s critics argued that the agreement 
lacked specifics and enforcement provisions.926 Since the “Summit Agreement” 
ended the direct action phase of the movement, there is no way of knowing whether 
an appeal to dissolve or modify the injunction would have succeeded. 
v. Memphis: Injunction (1968) 
In Memphis, Dr. King’s lawyers succeeded in securing a court order 
permitting a much-needed march to proceed. It was based on the innovative Selma 
order from three years earlier.927 In early 1968, Dr. King accepted an invitation to 
go to Memphis to support striking sanitation workers, just as he had done in so 
many other cities.928 He did not view this as a major initiative or investment of time 
for himself or SCLC, and the sanitation workers’ demand for better wages fit with 
Dr. King’s increasing focus on class issues.929 Addressing economic inequality was 
the goal of his planned major effort for that year—the Poor People’s Campaign.930 
Poor people from various racial and ethnic groups and from different parts of the 
country would come to Washington, set up a tent city, and lobby Congress to 
address the problem of poverty in a much more significant way.931 
When Dr. King agreed to lead a march in downtown Memphis, he did not 
realize that there were divisions within the movement.932 Most importantly, an 
organization of young Blacks called the “Invaders” rejected the idea of 
nonviolence, arguing that the only way to get whites’ attention on racial issues was 
through violence. 933  The march turned into a debacle as some of the young 
                                                
922 See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Imani Perry, Crimes Without Punishment: White Neighbors’ 
Resistance to Black Entry, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 392–93 (2002) (reviewing STEPHEN 
GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON’T MOVE NEXT DOOR: SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN 
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (2000)). 
923 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 194. 
924 Id. at 194–95. 
925 Id. at 194. That made moot the lawyers’ preparations for seeking to dissolve or modify the 
injunction. See id.; see also RALPH, supra note 62, at 170. 
926 See RALPH, supra note 62, at 196. 
927 See discussion supra Section III.B.3.iii. 
928 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 369–71. 
929 Id. at 371; see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 262. 
930 See discussion supra Section III.B.1.iii; see also BEIFUSS, supra note 65, at 15–16, 59, 191. 
931 See discussion supra Section III.B.1.iii. 
932 FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 374–75 (quoting Dr. King as having reported to the press: “[O]ur 
intelligence was absolutely nil.”); see also WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 263. 
933 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 262–63. 
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demonstrators broke windows and looted dozens of stores.934 Dr. King concluded 
that he had to return to Memphis and show that he could lead a nonviolent march.935 
His credibility was at stake, particularly with respect to ensuring a peaceful Poor 
People’s Campaign in Washington later in April.936 
As Dr. King anticipated, Memphis Mayor Henry Loeb instructed his city 
attorney to file for a temporary restraining order in federal district court, reasoning 
that any such march would be “a threat to public safety.”937 The proposed order 
would prohibit “ ‘non-residents of the city acting in concert’ from organizing or 
participating in a street demonstration.”938 Dr. King’s lawyers anticipated correctly 
that Judge Bailey Brown would issue the temporary restraining order after the 
proceeding on April 3, 1968.939 
Dr. King expressed his commitment to proceed with the march even if his 
lawyers were unable to gain permission for it.940 He said both privately and publicly 
that he viewed the federal court order as a violation of his First Amendment rights, 
and he was prepared to violate it, if necessary, to carry out the planned march on 
the following Monday.941 Dr. King was represented in the injunction proceedings 
by cooperating attorneys for the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Lucius 
Burch, a respected white local lawyer, led the legal team as a pro bono attorney 
seeking to protect Dr. King’s constitutional rights.942 As an initial step, Dr. King’s 
lawyers met with the city attorneys in an attempt to negotiate terms under which 
the march could proceed.943 The city’s representatives rejected those overtures, 
since the city opposed the march under any conditions.944 
On April 4, Judge Brown held a hearing on Dr. King’s motion to dissolve or 
modify the injunction.945 The city argued that the Black community’s anger was so 
high that a march could result in a riot worse than the deadly protests in Watts (Los 
Angeles) and Detroit.946 City officials also feared for Dr. King’s life, which a march 
would put in danger.947 
                                                
934 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 373. 
935 Id. at 375; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 702. 
936 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 375. 
937 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 264–65; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 702. They 
asserted federal jurisdiction primarily under diversity of citizenship and secondarily under federal 
question jurisdiction. Transcript of Hearing at 3, 10, City of Memphis v. King, No. C-68-80 (W.D. 
Tenn. Apr. 3, 1968) [hereinafter Memphis TRO Hearing]. 
938 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 265. 
939 Id. 
940 Cody, supra note 118, at 703. 
941 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 265–66, 268; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 703. 
942 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 265; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 703. 
943 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 265. 
944 Id. 
945 Cody, supra note 118, at 703, 707; see also Opinion & Temporary Injunction at 1, City of 
Memphis v. King, No. C-68-80 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 5, 1968), http://catalog.archives.gov/id/641661. 
Chauncey Eskridge, a Black lawyer from Chicago who was one of Dr. King’s personal advisors and 
SCLC’s General Counsel, joined the legal team for the hearing. WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, 
at 269. 
946 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 269. 
947 Id.; see also Memphis TRO Hearing, supra note 937, at 9, 55, 58, 60–61; Cody, supra note 118, 
at 702, 707. 
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In cross-examining police witnesses, Lucius Burch emphasized the duty of the 
police to protect peaceful demonstrators and to apprehend those attempting to 
engage in violence.948 Allowing threats of violence to justify a ban on marches 
would undermine First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly.949 Burch 
also focused on the fact that city officials’ proposed injunction named only non-
residents as defendants. 950  Local residents, including those who had turned to 
violence in the previous march, would not be affected by the injunction.951 Burch 
argued to the court and to attorneys for the city that the city would be better off with 
the march being led by Dr. King, who was committed to nonviolence, than by local 
residents who did not necessarily share that philosophy.952 
Dr. King’s lawyers’ arguments carried the day. Judge Brown decided that the 
march could proceed as scheduled, respecting the First Amendment rights at 
issue.953 The lawyers for Dr. King then proposed terms for the judge’s order that 
were designed to ensure that the march would remain nonviolent, including 
designating the route, the maximum number of marchers abreast, the number and 
location of parade marshals, and a ban on marchers carrying anything that could be 
used for destructive purposes.954 Thus, rather than violating the original injunction, 
Dr. King had his lawyers move to dissolve or modify it—the process the Supreme 
Court majority envisioned in Birmingham’s Walker case.955 In this instance, the 
court issued the order in such a timely manner that the march could proceed as 
planned. 
On the evening of the hearing, Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated.956 
Judge Brown issued his modified order the next day, with conditions for a peaceful 
march on April 8.957 Coretta Scott King stood in for her husband in the memorial 
march that day.958 
                                                
948 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 269. 
949 Id. at 269–70. Burch also called Rev. James Lawson and Rev. Andrew Young, two of Dr. King’s 
key aides, as his own witnesses. Id. at 270. They made forceful presentations about the crucial role of 
peaceful demonstrations for the Black community. Id. Burch recalled them focusing on peaceful 
demonstrations as “a means of communicating information to people who don’t read the newspapers, as 
a way of getting people together for civil action, and to be a community. It was a magnificent 
philosophical presentation.” Id. 
950 See, e.g., Memphis TRO Hearing, supra note 937, at 84–85. Judge Brown noted none of the 
named defendants were residents of the state. Id. at 3. Presumably, city officials had named only non-
residents to support their argument for diversity jurisdiction. See id.; id. at 20. 
951 See id. at 20–22. 
952 See, e.g., id. at 94–95 (“Now, if it is a fact there is going to be a march, I am going to ask you 
wouldn’t you rather have Dr. Martin Luther King lead that march than a great many other people who 
might come in and replace him in his absence?”). Lawyers for the city argued that they did not want 
any march to take place. See id. at 59–62. Ultimately, they recognized that their proposed injunction 
could not ensure that result and that a march led by Dr. King had a better chance of remaining peaceful. 
See Cody Remarks, supra note 274, at 685. 
953 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 270; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 707. 
954 Cody Remarks, supra note 274, at 685; see also Cody, supra note 118, at 707. Dr. King’s lawyers 
borrowed from the court order in the Selma to Montgomery march in formulating the conditions they 
proposed to the court. See Cody Remarks, supra note 274, at 685. 
955 See 388 U.S. 307 (1967). 
956 Cody, supra note 118, at 708. A single shot mortally wounded Dr. King as he stood on the 
balcony of the Lorraine Motel. See ABERNATHY, supra note 290, at 440. 
957 WESTIN & MAHONEY, supra note 136, at 271. 
958 Id. 
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vi. Poor People’s Campaign: Permission (1968) 
Up until almost the very end of his life, Dr. King sought the assistance of his 
lawyers in an effort to secure required approvals that would enable him to proceed 
with planned protests. In still another escalation of nonviolent direct action, the 
Poor People’s Campaign was an ambitious and complex movement that would 
require many levels of permissions from the White House down.959 There was 
significant opposition to the protest in the White House and Congress. President 
Johnson opposed the idea of a tent city in the shadow of the Washington Monument 
both because it offended him personally and out of fear of a disaster in his racially 
tense city.960  Attorney General Ramsey Clark persuaded the President that the 
protesters had the law on their side—the First Amendment—and that denying them 
legal options would probably result in greater disruption.961 Segregationists and 
other conservatives in Congress were also unable to block the protest from 
proceeding.962 
For this extraordinary movement, Dr. King needed new initiatives from his 
lawyers. A few weeks before his death, Martin Luther King, Jr. called on Jack 
Greenberg to come to Atlanta with some of his LDF colleagues to participate in the 
planning process for the Poor People’s Campaign.963 Greenberg and Louis Pollak 
met with Dr. King to discuss the purposes and the logistics of the movement, 
including the kinds of approvals that would be necessary to build and maintain the 
proposed “Resurrection City.”964 
When SCLC moved forward after Dr. King’s death, it continued to rely on 
LDF to secure permissions and agreements to proceed. Staffer Leroy Clark played 
a central role. He served as the “chief liaison” between SCLC and the Justice 
Department. 965  “Attorney General Clark waived the requirement[] of march 
permits for demonstrations [on] Capitol Hill,” on the condition that “they were 
orderly and did not interfere with traffic.”966 Leroy Clark also led a team of LDF 
staff lawyers that met with the District of Columbia Corporation Counsel to make 
arrangements.967 Moreover, he negotiated a lease with the National Park Service 
for a site on the mall for Resurrection City.968 A permit from the National Park 
Service made the space available through the end of June.969 
                                                
959 See, e.g., MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 110–11. 
960 Id. at 110. 
961 See id. at 110–11. 
962 See id. at 110. 
963 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 463. 
964 Id. at 464. 
965 MCKNIGHT, supra note 67, at 117. 
966 Id. Attorney General Clark also declared some areas off limits because he wanted to avoid 
possible confrontations between the protesters and concentrations of District of Columbia police. Id. at 
118. 
967 GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 465. 
968 Id. Clark also recruited volunteer lawyers to represent protesters and arranged for Howard Law 
School professors to train them. Id. 
969 Id. When the government was preparing to shut down Resurrection City in late June, negotiations 
were required to reduce tensions and the risk of violence. Federal officials met with campaign 
representatives, including legal counsel Christine Clark, to work out an effective plan. MCKNIGHT, 
supra note 67, at 136. As a result, the closure of Resurrection City proceeded peacefully. See id. at 137. 
LDF’s final task involved responding to a bill from the federal government for more than $70,000 for 
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4. Fundraising 
Nearly empty coffers were a recurring reality for SCLC. As mentioned earlier, 
lawyers’ founded the Gandhi Society in an effort to secure funding on a systematic 
basis.970 However, the organization quickly fell on hard times. In part because of 
federal inaction in processing the society’s application for tax-exempt status that 
hindered fundraising, Clarence Jones had to secure a $6,000 loan in early 1964 to 
cover an overdrawn bank account.971 Dr. King helped replenish the coffers by 
donating $25,000 of his 1964 Nobel Peace Prize.972 The Treasury Department 
granted tax-exempt status in 1965, but financial woes persisted.973 
The lawyers’ involvement in fund-raising then became ad hoc. In addition to 
ongoing financial needs, discrete crises and opportunities arose. The year 1963 had 
an example of each of those situations. Inner circle member Clarence Jones was 
involved on both occasions.974 Making bail for protesters required resources that 
stretched SCLC’s capacities. For example, Birmingham officials ratcheted up the 
bail to put even greater strains on the movement’s budgets,975 and the lawyers had 
to find the funds and make arrangements to bail out large numbers of protesters.976 
i. Birmingham 
In 1963, the Birmingham movement enlisted young students to march and 
swell the ranks of the demonstrators.977 As anticipated, Chief of Police Bull Connor 
carried out mass arrests of protesters, including hundreds of young students.978 
                                                
“use of equipment, damage to trees, razing the shanties, and so forth.” GREENBERG, supra note 51, at 
466. LDF consulting lawyer Frank Reeves negotiated it down to $2,197. Id. 
970 See discussion supra Section II.A.3. 
971 Gandhi Society for Human Rights, supra note 518. 
972 Id.; see also GARROW, supra note 2, at 368, 698 n.26. 
973 Gandhi Society for Human Rights, supra note 518; see also FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 98 
(noting that when the Gandhi Society finally gained tax-exempt status in 1965, the organization was 
renamed the American Foundation on Nonviolence); GARROW, supra note 2, at 542, 562 (discussing 
SCLC’s financial difficulties); Letter from Martin Luther King, Jr. to Leslie Dunbar, Exec. Dir., 
Marshall Field Found. 1 (Aug. 22, 1966), http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/letter-mlk-
leslie-dunbar# (“I note in your letter of June 21, 1966 that there was some concern regarding SCLC 
seeking tax exempt status in order that it could administer the funds to [the Citizenship Education 
Program] granted by the Marshall Field Foundation. . . . SCLC does have a tax exempt wing, namely, 
the American Foundation on Nonviolence (AFON). . . . Regarding our financial assets, the total cash in 
banks at this time comes to $8,968.23.”). 
974 See discussion infra Sections III.B.4.i–ii. 
975 See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 196 n.5 (“The city, in its effort to deter the 
Birmingham campaign, quadrupled the cost of bail, effectively using economic terrorism to prevent the 
SCLC from honoring its commitments [to bail out protesters].”). St. Augustine officials had pursued 
similar tactics, raising bail from $100 to $1000 for each person arrested. See St. Augustine Movement, 
supra note 57. 
976 See discussion infra Section III.B.4.i. 
977 See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 124–25; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 67–76, 196; 
discussion supra Section III.B.1.i. 
978 KUNSTLER, supra note 1, at 189–90. In doing so, Connor again played into the hands of the 
movement. Massive arrests of young people for engaging in nonviolent protest against racial 
segregation helped build public support for the movement. See FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 21, at 124–27; 
see also BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON, supra note 326, at 259–65; GARROW, supra note 22, at 139–
41. 
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Those arrests posed a significant problem for movement leaders. They had assured 
the students’ parents that they would provide the bail money necessary to get them 
out of jail so they could return to school.979 However, as the numbers of students 
arrested increased and local officials raised the bond requirements, it became clear 
that the funds available were far short of what was required to get the students out 
of jail.980 The movement found itself in serious danger of reneging on its promise 
to the parents—a potential crucial breach of faith.981 
Dr. King’s lawyer Clarence Jones enlisted Harry Belafonte, a celebrated 
singer, actor, civil rights activist, and loyal supporter of Dr. King, to address this 
critical situation.982 Belafonte used his contacts in the office of Governor Nelson 
Rockefeller of New York to set up a meeting between Jones and a member of the 
Governor’s staff, which led to a meeting with the Governor at one of the 
Rockefeller family’s banks in New York.983 The movement was about to become 
the beneficiary of the Rockefeller’s philanthropy. Since the money—$100,000—
came from a bank, it came in the form of a promissory note.984 Jones was reluctant 
to sign the note, however, since neither he nor SCLC had the funds to repay it.985 
The Governor insisted that he sign the note, assuring him that it would not be a 
problem.986 When the note arrived, it was stamped “Paid in full,” thus turning it 
into a contribution to the movement.987 That enabled the organizers to get the 
students released on bail and to meet their commitments to the parents whose sons 
and daughters had taken the risk of joining the protest.988 
ii. March on Washington 
Later that year, at the March on Washington, Clarence Jones pursued another 
creative tactic that brought significant funds to the SCLC. Just before the event, he 
copyrighted what became the “I Have a Dream” speech.989 He had seen others 
exploit Dr. King’s words in the past, and he hoped to prevent that from happening 
again.990 As staffers were making copies of the speech for delivery to the media, he 
                                                
979 See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 67. 
980 Id. at 67–68. 
981 Id. at 70. 
982 See BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON, supra note 326, at 257–65; see also JONES & CONNELLY, 
supra note 53, at 72. 
983 JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 73–76. 
984 Id. at 74–75. 
985 Id. at 75–76. It was especially problematic because it was a “demand note,” which meant that the 
bank could call in the note at any time. See Clayborne Carson, Martin Luther King, Jr. Centennial 
Professor of History; Founding Dir., Martin Luther King, Jr. Research & Educ. Inst., Stanford Univ., 
Remarks at the Northwestern Law Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin 
Luther King’s Lawyers: From Montgomery to the March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), 
in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 688, 697 (2016). 
986 JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 75. 
987 See BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON, supra note 326, at 264–65; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 
53, at 76. 
988 See BELAFONTE WITH SHNAYERSON, supra note 326, at 264; JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, 
at 70, 76. 
989 JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 91–92. 
990 Id. at 92. 
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had them place the common law copyright symbol of the “c” in a circle on every 
page of every copy that they distributed.991 
Shortly after the march, Jones filed the paperwork to secure formal copyright 
protection.992 He also noticed that record stores in Harlem were blaring recordings 
of the speech out on to the sidewalks. 993  Two companies were selling large 
quantities of the recording, arguably in violation of the copyright.994 Jones filed suit 
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking compensation 
based on a claim of copyright infringement.995 While the defendants claimed that 
Dr. King’s giving the speech to 200,000 people meant that it had entered the public 
domain, the district court found otherwise.996 Giving a speech did not render the 
copyright invalid, so the court ordered the defendants to pay damages for the 
infringement.997 The money recovered through this litigation provided important 
resources for SCLC.998 
CONCLUSION 
Leading Martin Luther King, Jr. scholar Professor Clayborne Carson has 
observed: 
[I]t’s also the case that in studying Martin Luther King, one of the 
things that becomes very clear is that Martin Luther King really 
needed lawyers. . . . 
 During his career, as a leader, not only did he need lawyers for 
incidents of civil disobedience and basically movement activity, he 
needed lawyers because often, the courts are used as a pretext to stop 
leaders, using other kinds of laws that have nothing to do with civil 
rights protest.999 
The need for lawyers became clear the day Rosa Parks refused to give up her 
seat on a Montgomery bus in December 1955 and continued until the day of Dr. 
King’s death in April 1968.1000 The need grew and changed with the evolution of 
the nonviolent direct action strategy, but the lawyers’ remained a constant presence 
throughout. 
                                                
991 Id. at 94. 
992 Id. at 131–34. 
993 Id. at 138. 
994 Id. at 139. 
995 See King v. Mister Maestro, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see also JONES & 
CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 140. 
996 See Mister Maestro, 224 F. Supp. at 103, 106–08. 
997 See id. at 108. 
998 See JONES & CONNELLY, supra note 53, at 143. 
999 Clayborne Carson, Martin Luther King, Jr. Centennial Professor of History; Founding Dir., 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Research & Educ. Inst., Stanford Univ., Remarks at the Northwestern Law 
Journal of Law and Social Policy Eighth Annual Symposium: Martin Luther King’s Lawyers: From 
Montgomery to the March on Washington to Memphis (Oct. 31, 2014), in 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 
634, 635 (2016). 
1000 See discussion supra Sections II.B.1, III.B.3.v. 
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Several themes stand out about those lawyers. Perhaps most strikingly, Dr. 
King was able to implement his preference for Black lawyers.1001 While Blacks 
represented a miniscule percentage of the legal profession at mid-century, almost 
half of the lawyers involved in the movements and events discussed within the 
Article were Black.1002 They played central roles in many of the most critical 
challenges that Dr. King and the movements faced. It was Dr. King’s fond hope 
that Black professionals would take their share of responsibility in attacking the 
profound racial problems of the time.1003 Black lawyers answered the call. 
Overall, the lawyers represented a mix of local practitioners and those coming 
from the North.1004  Because so much of Dr. King’s work was in Alabama—
Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma—several Alabama lawyers served a number 
of movements.1005 Others, such as some of the lawyers in Georgia, and the lawyers 
in Chicago and in Memphis, served in a single movement.1006 As a result, many of 
the lawyers who represented Dr. King did not know each other.1007 
In analyzing the deployment of those lawyers, the main focus centers on the 
ways in which the lawyers’ roles tracked the strategic choices that Dr. King and his 
colleagues made at different times. Since nonviolent direct action was center stage, 
the lawyers always had a key role to play in supporting that activism—helping to 
ensure that the marches, demonstrations, and protests could proceed as planned. In 
the early years, the activists also asked their lawyers to file federal lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of state and federal segregation laws.1008 During 
this period, Dr. King and his colleagues operated on the assumption that educating 
their opponents could persuade them to begin to break down the entrenched system 
of segregation.1009 
With the failure of the Albany Movement in 1962, movement leaders 
reexamined their assumptions and put aside “persuasive nonviolence” strategies in 
favor of “coercive nonviolence” strategies. As tactics became more aggressive, the 
movement’s lawyers had new and different tasks. Whatever their own strategic 
preferences may have been, they saw their role as deferring to their clients’ choices 
in both the early years and the later years of the Civil Rights Movement.1010 When 
Dr. King decided to violate an injunction in Birmingham, the lawyers challenged 
the contempt citation up to the Supreme Court. 1011  When young Birmingham 
students faced expulsion for participating in the demonstrations there, the lawyers 
challenged the school board’s actions in court.1012 When the Chicago Freedom 
                                                
1001 See discussion supra Section I.B.2.i. 
1002 See discussion supra Section I.B.2.i; see also infra Appendix. 
1003 See discussion supra Sections I.A, I.B.2.i. 
1004 See discussion supra Sections I.B.1. 
1005 See discussion supra Sections II.A.1.i.a, II.A.2.i, II.B.1, III.B.1.i, III.B.3.i, III.B.3.iii. 
1006 See discussion supra Sections II.A.1.i.d, II.A.2.ii, II.B.2, III.B.2, III.B.3.iv–v. 
1007 At the October 31, 2014 Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy symposium on Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s Lawyers, lawyers from Chicago, Atlanta, and Memphis met each other for the first 
time. Even Clarence Jones, the keynote speaker who worked closely with Dr. King from 1960 until his 
death, did not know those local lawyers. 
1008 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
1009 See generally supra note 315 and accompanying text. 
1010 See supra notes 30, 230 and accompanying text. 
1011 See discussion supra Section III.B.3.i. 
1012 See discussion supra Section III.B.1.i. 
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Movement decided to engage in a rent strike to pressure landlords to repair their 
substandard buildings, the lawyers fought the building owners’ attempts to evict 
their tenants.1013 
Dr. King needed lawyers to do what would help support and advance the 
changing strategies he pursued. That is what they did, for which Martin Luther 








































                                                
1013 See discussion supra Section III.B.2. 
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